possible for the government of any independent state, and evinced a most conciliatory spirit. Even admitting that she knew of the hostile remarks against Austria, and the anti-Austrian propaganda, she could hardly confess to them publicly in her answer to Austria, and make it possible for Austria both to disdain her reply and use the confession as an excuse for aggression. Such a confession, at most, concerned their past relations; what was important to the security of Austria was that Servia should punish the conspirators and restrain in future any hostile propaganda of whatever nature or designation.

Every statesman in Europe would have admitted that Austria was justified in taking some action to protect herself against Servia, whose Government was unwilling or unable to restrain a widespread and dangerous propaganda openly directed against the integrity of the Dual Monarchy. Such action is nothing but the exercise of the right of a state to protect itself against potential aggression. At the same time every state owes it to the general interests of all the other states not to have recourse to force until every reasonable effort has been made to secure the desired result by peaceful means.1 Austria referred to Servia's violation of her promise of March 31, 1909, as indicating that her promises could not be relied upon, but trian participation in the inquiry, Servia denied by evasion. Now this clause in the ultimatum was a vital part of it. The Austrian authorities recalled that one of the men chiefly implicated in the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his consort had been quietly warned out of Servia by the Servian police after the Austrians had requested his arrest."

1 In the absence of any organized machinery for determining what constitutes international law and enforcing a respect therefor, it is of the utmost importance that the forms, ceremonies, and even courtesies of international intercourse be strictly observed. In the early history of legal development within each state, the necessity of an unswerving respect for legal forms was well understood. At the present time in the affairs of nations, the greatest protection against the abuse of force and disastrously precipitate action is a strict observance of the forms of procedure. Baron von Macchio, the Austrian General Secretary of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, was not correct in saying: "Interest was sometimes an excuse for not being courteous." (F. Y. B. no. 45.)

in the five years that had elapsed since Servia had been obliged to make that promise, the whole Balkan situation had been completely changed as a result of the Balkan War. Since the national aims of Servia and Austria's policy to preserve the political integrity of the Dual Monarchy were in conflict, it was necessary, for the maintenance of peace, either that the Servian Government should restrain the people, or that they should be arrested by the fear of Austria. Servia's Government was powerless in the face of an all-pervading national enthusiasm for the PanSerb propaganda, and the fear of Austria was, to a certain degree, paralyzed by the reliance placed upon Russian support. If Austria would not rely on Servia's promises, the only remaining possibility of preserving the peace lay in the calming influence of other powers. It may be said that the hope of Europe lay in the mediation of the less interested powers. The course of the subsequent events shows how Austria ignored this situation, and, trading on the sympathy of the world for whatever real grounds of complaint she might have, attempted to subjugate her weaker neighbor under the guise of exacting satisfaction.

It is quite possible that Servia, advised, that is to say, directed, by the powers, might have been ready to give and live up to assurances adequate to satisfy the reasonable demands of Austria. If Austria, because of her peculiarly perilous situation, considered it impossible to discuss the question and to examine whether the proposed guaranties would not be adequate, we must conclude her action to be a confession that she was herself unable to live up to her international obligations.

5. Austria rejects Servia's reply

Influenced by Russia (B. W. P. nos. 22 and 46), Servia had met the advice of the powers more than halfway (B. W. P. nos. 21 and 30), and the powers of the Entente had been justified in feeling satisfied with their efforts and

in hoping that a reply so conciliatory would prove acceptable to Austria (cf. R. O. P. no. 33). 'Servia's attitude had been such as to produce the best impression in Europe.' (Modified quotation, July 26, R. O. P. no. 27.) Sir Edward Grey said that 'the Servian reply went further than could have been expected to meet the Austrian demands.' (Modified quotation, July 27, B. W. P. no. 46; cf. R. O. P. no. 42.) Yet Von Tchirsky, the German Ambassador at Vienna, did not blush when he asked his British colleague 'whether he had been informed that a pretense of giving way at the last moment had been made by the Servian Government. The Servian concessions he considered all a sham, and Servia proved that she well knew that they were insufficient to satisfy the legitimate demands of AustriaHungary by the fact that before making her offer she had ordered mobilization and the retirement of the Government from Belgrade.' (Modified quotation, July 26, B. W. P. no. 32.) From St. Petersburg it was learned that the German Ambassador there also 'considered the Servian reply insufficient.' (Modified quotation, July 28, B. W. P. no. 54.)

Count Berchtold instructed the Austrian Ambassador at London to make clear to Sir Edward Grey that 'Servia's complaisance was only apparent and was calculated to deceive Europe without giving any guaranty as to the future. Since the Servian Government knew that only an unqualified acceptance of the demands could satisfy Austria, Servian tactics could be easily understood: Servia in order to influence the public opinion of Europe, was to accept some of the demands with all sorts of reservations, trusting that she would never be called upon to fulfill her agreements. The Ambassador was asked, in his conversation with Sir Edward Grey, to lay stress on the fact that the full mobilization of the Servian army was ordered for July 25 at 3 P.M., whereas the answer to the Austrian note was only handed in just before the expiration of the time

limit; i.e., a few minutes before 6. Before that, the Austrian Government had made no military preparations, but were forced to make them by Servia's mobilization.' 1 (Modified quotation, July 28, A. R. B. no. 39; cf. A. R. B. no. 40.)

July 28, the Russian Government learned from their chargé at Berlin that 'the Wolff Press Agency had not published the text of the Servian reply which had been communicated to it, and that up to the time of sending the dispatch the note had not appeared in extenso in any of the local newspapers, which evidently did not wish to print it because they realized what a calming effect its publication would have upon the German public.' (Modified quotation, July 28, R. O. P. no. 46.) This attitude on the part of the 'German Government was most alarming' (modified quotation, July 28, B. W. P. no. 54) in view of the extremely conciliatory nature of the Servian reply. For it began to look as though it lacked the will to preserve the peace of which Sir Edward Grey had spoken when he remarked to the Austrian Ambassador that 'in times of difficulty like the present, it was just as true to say that it required two to keep the peace as it was to say, ordinarily, that it took two to make a quarrel.' (Modified quotation, July 23, B. W. P. no. 3.)

The powers must have foreseen that Austria, having refused to extend the time limit of the ultimatum, would probably refuse to accept the Servian reply, conciliatory as it was, and they tried to prevail upon Austria to refrain from having immediate recourse to force while they tried to find a satisfactory solution to the difficulty. July 24, Sir Edward Grey 'urged upon the German Ambassador that Austria should not precipitate military action.' (Modified quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 12.) 'When the Austrian Ambassador, the day following, was authorized

1 According to the Servian Blue Book this mobilization did not occur till later. (S. B. B. no. 41.)

to inform Sir Edward that the Austrian method of procedure upon the expiration of the time limit would be to break off diplomatic relations and commence military preparations, but not military operations,' it was natural that the British Secretary should say, 'in informing the German Ambassador, that in accordance with what he had urged the day before, it interposed a stage of mobilization before the frontier was actually crossed.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 25.) To the Ambassador at Vienna Sir Edward telegraphed: "Since the telegram to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna was sent, it has been a relief to hear that the steps which the Austrian Government were taking were to be limited for the moment to the rupture of relations and to military preparations, and not operations. I trust, therefore, that if the Austro-Hungarian Government consider it too late to prolong the time limit, they will at any rate give time in the sense and for the reasons desired by Russia before taking any irretrievable steps." (Extract, July 25, B. W. P. no. 26; cf. R. O. P. no. 16; F. Y. B. no. 40.) The telegram referred to is that from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, asking for an extension of the time limit. (R. O. P. no. 4.)

6. The powers urge Austria to delay military operations and accept the Servian reply as a basis for discussion

In the mean time the negotiations at St. Petersburg between M. Sazonof and the Austrian Ambassador gave some reason to hope for a pacific solution. The Russian Ambassador at Vienna said that 'in fact they had practically reached an understanding as to the guaranties which Servia might reasonably be asked to give to Austria-Hungary for her future good behavior.' 1 (Modified quotation, July 27, B. W. P. no. 56.) So that even though Austria should refuse to accept the reply, it was hoped that 'it

1 This optimistic statement of Russia's optimistic representative does not find any corroboration in the published correspondence.