and the officers of the government at the capital and in the provinces took the oath of allegiance.

There is scarcely another instance in history of a man no way distinguished as a military leader, and having no hold on the affections of the people for any distinguished or patriotic services, raising himself to the supreme power, over an extensive country. But notwithstanding the crooked counsels and open violence by which Iturbide obtained the sovereign power, had he possessed talents, and governed with moderation, such was the condition of the country, that he might have maintained his elevation for a considerable time, and possibly have established a new empire and a new dynasty. Fortunately, however, for the Mexicans, and indeed for America, the intoxication of success arising from the sudden possession of power, turned the head of Iturbide, and prepared him for his own destruction. His obvious policy would have been not only to have conciliated the people as well as the soldiers, but to have acted in concert with the cortes, and to have encouraged that body to form a constitution which might have recognised his elevation, and formed the basis of his power. His security required that he should have been content with the enjoyment of the executive power, and to have governed in conjunction with the cortes, leaving with them the responsibility of making the laws. But instead of this course he immediately attempted to render himself absolute, and kept up a constant struggle with the congress for power. He insisted on the appointment of his privy council, the judges of the supreme court, and an unqualified veto on all laws made by the cortes, and even on the articles of the constitution which that body was about to frame. The cortes proposed to leave the question of the veto to be determined by the constitution, and yielded to him the appointment of his council, but insisted on retaining the privilege of nominating the secretary of the council. The cortes were strenuously opposed to investing him with the right of appointing the supreme judges, that being a very dangerous power, and much exposed to be abused. During the interval that might elapse previous to the adoption of a constitution, the cortes proposed that the emperor, with the advice and consent of his council, should have the right of returning laws and proposing alterations. The emperor at first assented to these propositions; but soon changed his mind, and renewed his first pretensions; insisting that the constitution of the Spanish cortes, which had been adopted as the basis of a temporary government, conferred on him those powers. The congress had at first adopted the Spanish constitution as the basis of a government in Mexico, until a constitution could be provided; excepting such parts as were inconsistent with the inde

pendence of Mexico, the plan of Iguala, and the decrees which the cortes might pass, as it was intended only as the outline of the government, and not to restrict the legislation of the cortes. It could not therefore invest the emperor with any power inconsistent with the decrees of the cortes. The struggle was continued between the executive and legislative branches of the government, but at length the cortes yielded to the emperor the арpointment of the secretary of his council, yet continued firm and unshaken in their purpose to withhold from him the control of the judiciary, as they had reason to fear, if he possessed this power, he would elevate to the bench men who would become the mere instruments of his arbitrary purposes, to the subversion of all justice, and the danger of the liberty and lives of all who might oppose the imperial will. The emperor attempted to overawe and control the deliberations of the cortes, for which purpose his partisans and the soldiers filled the galleries, and were guilty of the most disorderly and threatening conduct, disgraceful to the government, and derogatory to the national legislation. The cortes, however, could not be intimidated, but remained firm in their purpose of resisting the arbitrary measures of the emperor, and maintaining the liberties of the people. The project of a law for the establishment of military tribunals, was prepared by the emperor and his council, and submitted to the cortes by the minister of justice. As the adoption of so extraordinary a measure could only be justified from the existence of extraordinary and alarming circumstances, the preamble to the law declared:

"That the interruption in the administration of justice-the robberies, murders, assassinations-the banditti that infest the highways-the disorders that disturb the public tranquillity-the absence of all punishment, an impunity authorized as it were by law, clearly show that the administration of justice is paralyzed, that there are no judges, no tribunals of justice, and that the commission of crimes has gone so far that the ordinary tribunals are not sufficient to suppress them. To remedy these evils it is thought expedient to adopt a new system for the administration of justice; and the following articles are proposed to be passed into a law:

"1st. That there shall be in this city, and in all the capital cities of the provinces, a special tribunal, composed of two officers of the army, and of one lawyer, to be appointed by the emperor.

"2d. This tribunal shall have exclusive jurisdiction, or jointly with the other judges, in all cases of conspiracy against the state, and jointly with the other judges in all cases of robbery, assassinations, and murders.

"3d. All appeals to be made to the captain-general of the proVOL. I.

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vinces, who shall pronounce sentence after hearing the opinion of a solicitor, appointed for that purpose.

"4th. This sentence to be carried into execution whenever it agrees with that of the first tribunal; and in case of disagreement, the cause to be referred to a council of war.

"5th. The articles 287, 293, 295, 299, and 300, of the Spanish constitution to be suspended. (These provide for the habeas corpus.)

"6th. That there shall be in this capital a chief, with whatever name or title the emperor may choose to confer on him, especially charged to watch over the public security, and to exercise the most vigilant police."

The committee of congress appointed to examine and report on this project of a law, declared

'1st. That it is contrary to the enlightened principles of those authors, who have written on the subject of government with most philosophy.

"2d. Contrary to public opinion, which all governments are bound to respect.

"3d. Contrary to the Spanish constitution, which has been adopted until a new one be formed for the empire.

"4th. Contrary to reason, which ought to guide the legislation of a people.

"5th. Contrary to the interests of the Mexican nation in its present situation."

This report was adopted unanimously, and the attempt to establish military tribunals, as a preliminary step toward military despotism, was indignantly put down.

CHAPTER XI.

Tyrannical conduct of the emperor-his power over the congress―. dissolves the congress-a junta assembled-disaffection of the people-Santana and Victoria join the republicans-spirit of revolt spreads rapidly—Iturbide resigns the crown-he embarks for Leghorn-new congress assembled commissioners from Spain-state of the country-adoption of the constitution—disaffection in the army-Iturbide meditates a return-congress declares him a traitor and outlaw-public credit-slavery-Iturbide returns in disguise-is arrested and executed.

THE emperor perceiving that the cortes were firm and resolute in opposing his plans, found it necessary to resort to coercion and violence; and on the night of the 26th of August, 1822, he caused fourteen of the most distinguished and intrepid members to be arrested and thrown into prison, on a charge of conspiracy against the government. Indignant at this tyrannical measure, the cortes assembled in secret session the next day, and demanded of the minister the cause of the arrests which had been made; and was informed that some of the members were actually implicated in a conspiracy, and others suspected, and that they had been arrested by authority of an article in the Spanish constitution, conferring that power on the executive. The following day the cortes sent a message to the minister, suggesting that the 172d article of the Spanish constitution provides, that all persons arrested shall be brought to trial, if they desire it, within fortyeight hours, and demanding that, in compliance with this provision, the prisoners be immediately brought before a competent tribunal for trial. To this message it was answered, that the charge was of so complicated a nature, that it was impossible to comply with the request of the cortes; and that the article of the constitution referred to spoke only of one person, and could not be applicable to several who were charged with the same crime, as it might be easy to try one person within forty-eight hours, but would be impossible to examine the charges against a number in that limited time. The congress next determined to present an address to the emperor himself, praying that the constitution may not be violated, and requesting that the deputies accused might be delivered up to them, in which case they could

constitute a tribunal for their immediate trial. At nine o'clock at night his majesty's answer was received, which repeated the interpretation given by the minister to the 172d article of the constitution, and declared that he could not consent to have the accused members tried before the tribunal which the cortes might create, until it could first be ascertained whether the members of the tribunal were not themselves implicated in the conspiracy. This communication excited much feeling, and occasioned an animated discussion, attended with severe animadversions on the conduct of the emperor and his ministers.

After continuing to assemble in secret sessions until the 12th of September, without being able either to procure the release or trial of the accused members, the cortes resolved to say no more on that subject at present, and attend to the business before them. The great questions of the veto, and the appointment of the supreme judges, still continued unsettled, and subjects of dispute between the emperor and the cortes. At length, becoming satisfied that he could not carry these points, and that it would be impossible to render himself absolute whilst the cortes remained, the emperor resolved to free himself from what he regarded as the only obstacle to his power. He assembled in his palace a junta, or what in this country would be called a caucus, composed of the general officers of the army, his ministers, and council of state, and such of the deputies of the cortes as were favourable to his views. He addressed the junta, and declared, that the majority of the cortes were hostile to the present system, and wished to establish a democracy, under the name of a monarchy; that the country was in imminent danger, and would be ruined unless the number of the deputies was reduced; that the congress had failed to give a constitution to the empire, but had adopted that of Spain, which was not suited to its condition, and had made no provision for the administration of justice, or for the exigencies of the treasury. These charges against the cortes were correct in point of fact, but the emperor himself had been the cause why the congress had not effected any of these objects, by his arbitrary conduct, and his persecutions and encroachments on the authority and privileges of the legislative body. It was finally determined at this meeting to require of congress the reduction of their number, and that they grant to the emperor the appointment of the judges, and an unqualified veto on all laws. These proposals were submitted to the cortes by the ministers and four counsellors of state, who were allowed to discuss them. The cortes wishing to put at rest these disputed questions, and many believing that they were the sole causes of the persecutions the congress had suffered; and being sensible of the alarming circumstances of the country, as the government did not even