1651 SEXBY'S MISSION 157 On the proceedings of the other two no information has reached us. Sexby at He proposes When Sexby arrived at Bordeaux, Condé had left the town to take command of his army, having entrusted the place to his brother Conti, a man of no great abilities. Conti found it hard to control a population in which party spirit ran high, especially as the merchants and lawyers were opposed by the Ormée,1 a faction advocating advanced democratic principles. Recognising language with which he had been long familiar, Sexby proposed to Conti to issue the adoption a manifesto 2 demanding for France a constitution, which he copied with such changes as were necesAgreement of the sary from the first twenty-two articles of Lilburne's People. latest edition of the Agreement of the People. To this he attached a declaration stuffed with the commonplaces of the Levellers, and leading up to demands which were probably for the most part suggested by his allies of the Ormée. With few exceptions, such as a perfunctory complaint of the of the Lilburnian Demands of the Ormée. treatment of 'our heroic princes,' these latter demands either seek to encourage Protestantism, or, redolent of the spirit of 1789, call for the protection of the poor against the insolence of the rich and powerful. A demand for the punishment of drunkenness and other vices in accordance with the laws of England bears the imprint of Sexby's brain; whilst a request for the opening of the ports to English trade must have been equally agreeable to an Englishman, and to the vine-growers of the Medoc. The force of ignorance and folly could go no further. It would be unfair to hold Cromwell responsible for his agent's absurdity. Yet it is impossible to acquit him of From their place of meeting under 'les Ormes.' 2 This marvellous document is printed in Cousin's Madame de Longueville (ed. 1859), ii. 464. Lenet, amongst whose papers it was found, notes that it was given to Conti 'par les sieurs Saxebri et Arrondel que je n'approuve pas.' Saxebri is, of course, Sexby. M. Chéruel (Ministère de Mazarin, i. 58) quotes it from another copy as L'accord du Peuple, but does not recognise its connection with the English Agreement of the People. hankers after a policy hostile to A Spanish alliance favoured by extreme Puritans. hankering after a policy which, by assailing the national unity Cromwell of France, headed straight for disaster. In the course of his military career he had grown accustomed to regard war, not as Elizabeth was wont to regard it, France. as a hateful necessity, but as a righteous method of advancing the holiest of causes; and, if war there was to be for the benefit of Protestants, there were many reasons to induce him to advocate alliance with Spain rather than with France. It is undeniable that by advanced Puritans the policy of agreement with Spain was at that time held to be the Protestant policy; probably because Spain, though still remaining the home of the Inquisition, had no Protestants left to persecute, whilst Protestants were still numerous in France. No doubt to this simple consideration were added others drawn from the political situation of the day. Spain had been the first Power to recognise the Commonwealth, and had no conceivable motive for interfering in the domestic affairs of England. On the other hand, the Stuart Pretender was a cousin of the young King of France, and had found refuge on French soil, whilst the rulers of France had persistently refused to recognise the Commonwealth unless the English Government, by recalling its letters of reprisal, would take the first step in suppressing the maritime disorders from which both nations were suffering. Nor was it only the personal protection accorded by France to the Stuart princes which gave deadly offence in England. It was there that Charles was weaving his interminable Oct.-Dec. Charles seeks aid from the Pope. schemes for the recovery of his throne. Since his flight from Worcester he had been holding secret conferences with a Roman Catholic ecclesiastic, and had given him to understand that he was willing to change his religion if only the Pope would make it worth his while. Innocent X., however, refused to accept a convert who demanded a price, and Charles then fell back on his earlier position, offering protection to English and Irish Catholics, if the Pope and the Catholic princes would give him the means 1651 The Duke of York a colonel in the French service. TWO FOREIGN POLICIES 159 of recovering his throne. Meanwhile Charles's brother, the Duke of York, accepted a colonelcy in the French service and fought vigorously against the Fronde. Was it likely that a government which showed itself so friendly to the Stuarts would ever become a hearty ally of the Commonwealth ? Cromwell's vacillation on questions of foreign policy. With Cromwell himself the disposition to see England ranged on the side of Spain was hardly more than tentative. To him as yet foreign alliances were somewhat like constitutional forms at home-no more than the means to rescue Protestantism from oppression; and if that end was to be achieved by a direct agreement with the French Government, he was quite ready to take the alternative into consideration. Scarcely indeed had Sexby been despatched to Bordeaux when an opportunity of securing a better understanding with France opened itself before him. On every point of the frontier at which France had successes in pushed forward her territory in the days of her Flanders. unity, Spain was regaining her lost possessions. In the campaign of 1651 the Spanish army in Flanders had made itself master of Furnes and Bergues in the immediate vicinity Danger of of Dunkirk, and in the course of September had Dunkirk. proceeded to blockade Dunkirk itself. Estrades, the French Governor, reported that his provisions were running short, and that he would therefore be unable to hold out beyond January. Spanish Oct.-Nov. Scanty as our information is,2 we may take it that Cromwell's some time at the end of October or in the beginEstrades. ning of November a certain Colonel Fitzjames, who overture to Cardinal Bagni to 19 Dec. 29 ? Nov.; W. Grant (i.e. Father Leyburn) to Father Pripa, Nov. 13; Cardinal Pamfili to Bagni, ; the Duchess of Aiguillon to Innocent X., March; Pamfili to Bagni, Apr. 12, Roman Transcripts R.O. 2 An account of the negotiation which followed, supported by documents, will be found in an article of mine published in the Historical Review for July 1896, and it is therefore unnecessary to repeat the references to be found there. had formerly served in the Royal army, was going to Dunkirk to arrange for the exchange of prisoners captured by privateers on either side, when Cromwell seized the opportunity to commission him, without the knowledge of the Council of State, to make some overture of a larger import. There can be little doubt that Fitzjames was charged with a proposal for a cession of Dunkirk to England. Subsequently, after his return to England, Fitzjames received two letters from Estrades which he was not allowed to answer, containing, if we accept a story afterwards told by Whitelocke, an offer made by Estrades to bargain in his own name for the surrender of the place to an English garrison-an offer which Cromwell refused to accept because he was unwilling to owe anything to treason. On the whole it is reasonable to suppose that Estrades communicated Cromwell's proposal to his government, and was instructed to play a traitor's part in appearance, in order not to compromise his superiors. In any case Cromwell's refusal to answer becomes intelligible, not merely on moral or sentimental grounds, but on the substantial argument that if England accepted Dunkirk from Estrades' treason she would be exposed to the enmity of both the contending monarchies, whereas if she accepted it from the French Government she would gain an ally at the same time that she made an enemy. Alleged advantages of holding In our own day a proposal to occupy a fortified post on the opposite side of the Channel, and therefore assailable by continental armies, would be reprobated by all Englishmen without distinction of party as wilfully throwing Dunkirk. away the advantage of the moat placed by nature round the island-state. No such thought of danger appears to have crossed Cromwell's mind. To him the long tenure of Calais was mere glory, and he could hope to make of Dunkirk not only a place of arms from which he might throw an English army on the Continent at pleasure, but a great commercial centre from which waterways stretched eastward, thus enabling trade to be carried on with central Europe without any obligation to the Dutch.1 1 See Hist. Rev. (July 1896), p. 484. 1651 Object of the French alliance. Attractive as the hope of possessing Dunkirk might seem, we may be sure that, at this time as well as later in his life, Cromwell did not confine himself to considerations arising out of the utility of the port itself. An alliance with France would imply on the one hand the carrying out schemes of conquest in Spanish America inherited from the sea-rovers of Elizabeth's day, and on the other hand the obtaining of an engagement, tacit or explicit, from the French Government that the persecutions to which the Huguenots were subjected should definitively come to an end. Cromwell's double object of doing something for religion, as well as of securing an extension of empire for England and with it an increase of trade, would surely be attained in this way far better than by an understanding with Spain and Condé. Dunkirk offered to the Dutch. Such an alliance was as yet far distant. Finding that no reply came to Estrades' proposals, the French Government offered Dunkirk to the Dutch. This negotiation however came to nothing, owing to the protestations of the Spanish ambassador at the Hague, whom the Dutch were unwilling to offend. It is likely enough that the failure of this overture led to an order given to Gentillot in the King's name, almost certainly without Mazarin's knowledge,2 to betake himself to London. Dec. 1. His mission to England. Gentillot was a Protestant, who had been sent to England in the preceding February to open a negotiation, and had been expelled because he was not authorised to recognise the Commonwealth.3 Finding on his arrival that no credentials had been sent to him, he left the country hurriedly, no doubt because he feared punishment for reappearing without authority after his expulsion earlier in the year. The failure to send credentials may be attributed to the vacilla 16 In a letter to Estrades of Nov. 18, Mazarin approved of what was being done, as far as the Dutch were concerned (Lettres de Mazarin, iv. 518). 16 2 In a letter to Estrades of Dec. 18, Mazarin wrote strongly against the surrender to the English (ib. iv. 576). 3 See vol. i. 314. VOL. II. M |