governments would then combine to assist him to recover his rights.1

Sept.

Dutch to

seize Newcastle.

The outbreak of the Dutch war appeared to open a more hopeful prospect before the exile. It would be easy, he appears to have thought, to induce the avowed enemies of England to take up his cause, and to gain for themselves the support of his partisans in the country. Early in He asks the September his agents at the Hague implored the Dutch to send an expedition to seize Newcastle in the King's name and to bring the Commonwealth on its knees by cutting off the supply of coals. If William II. had been still alive the proposition would at least have received favourable consideration. As matters stood it was unhesitatingly rejected. The oligarchy which commanded the Provincial States of Holland had no desire to aggrandise the uncle of the young Prince of Orange, and they also shrank from proposal a step committing them irretrievably to the prolongation of a war which they would willingly bring to an end.2 Possibly the overtures brought by Gerbier had strengthened them in their resolution. They knew that the army desired peace, and that when the army had set its mind on anything, it usually had its way. "Churchmen were, lawyers are, and soldiers shall be" was at this time a popular saying in the streets of London.3

This

rejected.

For the present, however, the continuance of the war was an absolute necessity, and the heavy losses which had been suffered rendered the Dutch people impatient of the disorganisation of their existing constitution. An outcry was raised for the restoration of the Stadtholderate, that unity of authority might be restored to the loose confederation of states. It was almost

Outcry for the restoration of the Stadtholderate.

Nicholas to Hyde, Nicholas, June 12, June 26

82, 89.

221 July 6,

April 29
May 9

Nicholas Papers, i. 297; Hyde to July, August 13, Clar. St. P. iii. 77, 80,

2 Langdale to Clemson, Sept. 13, Clarendon MSS. ii. No. 820. [Printed in The First Dutch War, ii. 225-231.]

3 Aitzema, iii. 737.

1652

VICE-ADMIRAL DE WITH

193

inevitable that men of action should be favourable to the principle of the Orange party, and, in spite of Tromp's unswerving fidelity to his country, the knowledge that his sympathies lay with that party could not fail to expose him to suspicion. His failure to save the herring-fleet was unjustly thrown in his teeth, and the great seaman was sussuspended. pended from his command whilst an inquiry was held into the causes of that disaster. With or without Tromp,

Tromp

now that Blake was once more in southern waters, a new fleet must be sent to sea to bring De Ruyter back in safety, after he had seen the convoy under his charge well into the open Atlantic. The commander selected was Vice-Admiral De With.1

command.

Defects of his character.

2

Under any circumstances the successor of the superseded hero would have had an uphill task. De With's difficulties De With in were aggravated by the defects of his character. Though he was brave to the verge of rashness, and ready to throw himself heart and soul into the requirements of the service, he had no self-control in presence of laxity of discipline, and he terrorised his subordinates by the severity of his punishments. He knew nothing of the art of inspiring great deeds in his comrades by a firm persuasion that they were capable of the greatest. The men who served under him felt their inspiration curbed by the knowledge that their conduct in the event of failure would be visited by a shower of recriminations from their commander. On attempting to hoist his flag on board Tromp's own ship the 'Brederode,' he was driven by the crew to seek quarters elsewhere. When at last he was on board a ship which he could call his own, he addressed himself resolutely to the task of reducing the crews of the fleet to order. According to his own

1 Geddes, Hist. of John de Witt, i. 231, 235.

2 In a despatch written by him after the battle of the Kentish Knock he enlarges with the utmost fervour on a plan of employing parchment cartridges, which, as he says, will prevent the guns from missing the enemy. He does not say whether they were of his own invention. Hague Archives.

VOL. II.

State of

account there was much to be amended. The beer was bad and stinking; the ships, perhaps in consequence, the Dutch were full of sick men. Those who were in good health had no stomach for fighting.'

fleet.

Blake's movements.

Blake had no such complaints to make. His ships were well equipped, and his men well cared for and full of spirit. After his exploit off Calais, he sailed down Channel to pick up Ayscue, in the hope of intercepting De Ruyter on his homeward voyage with their combined forces. De Ruyter's seamanship or good fortune enabled him to slip past them in the night, and on September 22 he joined De With. On the 22nd the united fleets joined by De anchored off Ostend, numbering about sixty-two

Sept. 22 Oct. 2. De With

Ruyter.

throws up

his command.

Sept. 28. Battle off

the

Kentish

sail.2

For some days De With's movements were impeded by high winds, whilst Blake, whose numbers were slightly superior, was lying in the Downs. Ayscue was no longer with him, having Ayscue thrown up his command nominally on the plea of ill-health; in reality, as there is little doubt, on account of his disapprobation of the war.3 It was not till the 28th that De With's fleet was descried to the northwards, not far from the Kentish Knock. The zeal of the fighting Dutchman had outrun his discretion, and with the wind in the south-west he found himself to the leeward of Blake coming out of the Downs to meet him. Of this mistake Blake was not slow to take advantage. As the greater part of his own fleet was still some distance astern, he lay to till his whole command was assembled. Aitzema, iii. 747; Geddes, 252. [See The First Dutch War, ii. 220, 235, 237.]

Knock.

Sept. 24
Oct. 4 "

Add.

[See The First

2 Geddes, 254; Aitzema, iii. 749; Salvetti's Newsletter, MSS. 27,962 N. fol. 433b; Merc. Pol. E, 675, 20. Dutch War, ii. 252.]

Feb. I'

3 This pretext of ill-health is mentioned in A Perfect Account, E, 676, 6. Writing on Jan. 22, Pauluzzi says that Ayscue con pretesti legitimi ha rittrovato il modo d' escusarsi dal servizio, e ne sta conseguito il suo intento con pubblica e sua particolare soddisfazione.' This implies intentional avoidance of service. [See The First Dutch War, ii. 265.]

E. S. Weller.

Then, dashing into the midst of the enemy, he opened the battle.

Blake as a

Blake was no Nelson, and he had none of that innovating tactical skill which had enabled Cromwell to convert a mere success into a crushing victory. He was however tactician. a bold and inspiring commander, and he might be trusted to fight to the last and to do everything compatible with the somewhat primitive tactics of the day. According to the prevailing system, it was of the utmost importance to gain the wind, in the first place because it enabled the commander to launch his fireships against the enemy, and in the second place because it placed his fighting ships in a position in which they could bear down upon the hostile fleet, and, thrusting themselves through it, could attack with their broadsides individual vessels on the less-defended parts—the bows or the quarters. So slight was the carrying power of the cannon of those days, that not much damage would be inflicted upon the bows of the attacking force as it approached. This method had two main defects: by disseminating the attack amongst individual ships, it threw away the advantage which would have been gained if the whole fleet, or a large group of it, had concentrated its fire, as it passed through, upon a single portion of the enemy's defence; and further, when once the attack was over,

The tactics of the fight with the Armada are explained by Sir H. Palavicino: 66 'Our fleet had the wind throughout, and gave always occasion to the enemy to open out and to fight; but they chose rather to be followed and to bear away as well from Calais as from Dunkirk than to open out and permit the fight to become general, so as it was not convenient to attack them thus together and in close order, for that our ships being of smaller size would have had much disadvantage; but, in the continued assaults which they gave on them without entering, they made them feel their ordnance, and if any ship was beaten out of their fleet she was surrounded and suddenly separated from the rest. Defeat of the Spanish Armada (Navy Records Society), ii. 207. These tactics were out of place with an enemy standing his ground with smaller ships. 2 On the other hand, if it came to boarding, an attack on the quarter was usually avoided, as the poop was raised so high as to be not easily accessible. See Smith's Seaman's Grammar (ed. 1652), p. 57.