1652

NAVAL TACTICS

197

the positions of the two fleets with respect to the wind were reversed, and the enemy being now to windward was able in his turn to attack in precisely the same fashion as he had been attacked before.1 The result was that the advantage would fall to the best equipped ships and the more disciplined crews, but to this result the skill of the commander-in-chief contributed but little. The idea of throwing the whole or a considerable part of a fleet upon one particular spot in the enemy's defence did not occur to any one for some time to come, and Blake was not the man to anticipate it.

Defeat of the Dutch.

De With was, as ever, full of fight. Whilst he was still at Ostend, he had told his despondent subordinates that he would bring them into the presence of the enemy, and the devil might bring them off. When Blake fell upon him he was beating to windward on the port tack. Then, probably in the hope of recovering the wind, he tacked to the southward, only to fall into the hands of Penn, who was now serving as Blake's Vice-Admiral. From that time no tactical skill was shown on either side. For three hours, wrote

66

وو

1 That the ships which had the wind broke through the enemy's fleet individually is, I think, made out by the accounts of the battle of the Kentish Knock. In A more perfect and exact Relation (E, 676, 2) we find that Blake charged twice through the enemy's fleet with the 'Royal Sovereign" and the "Resolution." In A Letter from General Blake's Fleet (E, 676, 4) it is said that 'Major Bourne with the "Andrew led on, and charged the Hollanders stoutly, and got off again without much harm'; and, again, that the "Sovereign sailed through and through the Holland fleet and played hard upon them.' [These two accounts are reprinted in The Second Dutch War, ii. 282, 288.] The Dutch Intelligencer (E, 676, 5) tells us that 'the General . . . charged twice through the enemy's fleet with the " "Royal Sovereign and the "Resolution." " Of concerted action there is no sign, though ships, seeing a neighbour attacked, naturally came to her help, but this rather in the fleet assailed than in that assailing. That the system of passing through was accepted at the commencement of the war is shown by the fact that it was practised by both Ayscue and De Ruyter in the action off Plymouth. That it was so-De Ruyter boasts that he passed twice through Ayscue's fleet-though Ayscue had the wind at the beginning of the fight, shows that two fleets alternately exercised it upon each other.

De With, in giving an account of the action to the States General, 'I saw nothing but smoke, fire and English.' In the end the larger and more seaworthy vessels, the greater number of guns, and the mistake committed by the Dutch gunners in firing at the masts and sails rather than at the hulls of their opponents,' told in Blake's favour.

It was a symptom of the more far-reaching malady which was weakening the Dutch navy, that some twenty captains carried their ships out of the battle and made for home. Of these, as was afterwards noted, the greater number were Zealanders, and the province of Zealand was known to be full of suppressed indignation against the masterful statesmen of Holland. De With, unpopular amongst all under his command, was still more unpopular in Zealand, not only as a Hollander by birth, but as a devoted supporter of Holland against the Orange succession. There were parties enough and to spare in England as well, but there were no parties on board the English fleet.

Sept. 27: Retreat of

When night fell the advantage was all on the English side. The next day there was no serious fighting, as De Ruyter and the other commanders compelled De With to abandon what was now a hopeless struggle, so that the Dutch. Blake was unable to do more than inflict some damage on the rearmost ships of the retreating foe. On the 30th the whole of the Dutch fleet was in safety at Goree, and Blake returned in triumph to England.2 Yet, victorious as Blake had been, he had delivered

Sept. 30. The Dutch

at Goree.

1 Only three men were killed in Blake's own ship the Resolution,' which was in the heart of the fight. "We," writes Penn, "had two men killed, another past hopes, and about five hurt; all our masts, except the mizen, very badly shot; our hull, sails, rigging and gear--as usual in such cases-somewhat shattered." Mem. of Penn, i. 447.

2 Aitzema, iii. 750.

Most of the English authorities have been quoted in the note on the last page. Penn's own account is in Memorials of Sir W. Penn, i. 446. The account given in Geddes, 254-258, is specially worth consulting, as he draws much of his information from unpublished sources on the Dutch side. The Dutch believed that Blake was reinforced on the second day by twenty ships. There is no mention of this in any

1652

DUTCH SUCCESSES

199

no crushing blow. Two prizes had been taken by the English fleet, and each side claimed to have sunk some ships of their opponents. A Dutch war proved to be something very different from the child's play which its promoters had anticipated.1

Appleton blockaded at Leghorn.

Aug. 27.

Badiley defeated and driven into Porto

In more distant seas the advantage lay more decidedly with the Dutch. An English commander, Appleton, who had been employed to convoy home the vessels engaged in the Smyrna trade, was blockaded in Leghorn by a superior Dutch fleet, and another commander, Badiley, approaching to relieve him, was on August 27 attacked off Elba by the Dutch under Van Galen ; and being defeated with the loss of one ship, the ' Phoenix, took refuge in Porto Longone, at that time in Longone. Spanish, and therefore in friendly, hands." Yet more serious was the news that the King of Denmark, whose good understanding with the Dutch was notorious,3 had detained in the Sound twenty English merchantmen laden with materials for the construction and repair of shipping. Even before these tidings arrived, the necessity for increased expenditure had been foreseen, and on September 28, the very day of the battle of the Kentish Knock, an order was given to build no less than thirty new frigates." Parliament was at least

Ships stopped in the Sound.

Sept. 28. Thirty frigates to be built.

4

resolved to prosecute the war with vigour.

English authority, and it is doubtless an error. [Penn's account is re printed in The First Dutch War, ii. 276, and with it the letters of Blake and Captain Mildmay, and many of the Dutch authorities mentioned above; see pp. 217-309, passim.]

See p. 181, note I.

2 Appleton to the Navy Committee, Sept. 3, S. P. Dom. xxiv. 120. [See Mr. T. A. Spalding's Life and Times of Richard Badiley, 1899, pp. 81-113.]

See p. 146.

The Weekly Intelligencer, E, 678, 14; Blackborne to Longland, Oct. 22, S. P. Dom. xxv. 25. [See The First Dutch War, ii. 312, 315, 364, 368, 376.]

5 C.J. vii. 186.

200

CHAPTER XXIII

THE COMMAND OF THE CHANNEL

FINANCIALLY the Dutch war imposed no slight burden on the Commonwealth. It was calculated that the building of the

1652. Sept.

Financial burdens.

thirty frigates lately ordered would cost 300,000l. Even without this exceptional expenditure the yearly cost of the fleet was estimated at 985,000l., whilst the revenue set apart to meet this charge amounted to no more than 415,000l., leaving a deficit of 570,000l.; or, if the building of the new frigates was taken into calculation, of no less than 870,000%.1

fiscation

Bill.

of the navy.

To stop the deficit recourse was once more had to Royalist confiscations, this time on a vastly extended scale. A new Nov. 18. Bill was brought in containing a long list of traitors, A new Con- whose property was to be confiscated for the benefit For weeks the House applied itself to the discovery of new names to be inserted, and when, on November 18, the Bill was at last completed, they had risen to the portentous number of 618.2 For the most part the persons selected for undeserved impoverishment were quite insignificant, and would never have been marked out for punishment but for the pecuniary necessities of the Government.

Nor was it by any means certain that this last and most cruel of the Confiscation Acts would attain even the purpose

1 C.J. vii. 210.

The provision made for the navy is there given as 515,000l., but unless 100,000l. has been omitted from the items, this must be a misprint. 2 lb. vii. 218; Scobell, ii. 210.

1652

UNPOPULARITY OF THE WAR

201

for which it was designed. It was resolved to offer for sale the lands affected, by the now well-established process of

Doubts raised as

to the prospects of sale.

doubling,' and it was hoped that 200,000l. would be almost immediately procured. Unfortunately for those who had made this sanguine calculation, buyers came slowly in. It was said that the extreme injustice of the measure would exasperate the Royalists, and thereby lead to a reaction which would weaken the value of the security.

Nov. The war

not

popular.

2

So far, at least, the policy which had brought on the Dutch war had failed to secure popularity for its authors. The Mediterranean and the Baltic trade were alike paralysed, and the preponderance in the number of Dutch prizes captured availed little to redress the balance. When English vessels fell into the hands of the enemy, the losses were borne by individual owners. When Dutch vessels were taken the benefit accrued to the State. The discontent created was the more dangerous to the holders Feeling of of power because it was shared by the officers of the army the army, amongst whom there had, from the against the beginning, existed a strong feeling against a conflict with a Protestant nation. About the middle of November a proposal was made in Parliament, with the full assent of the A proposal army, to send ambassadors to Copenhagen and the Hague with the object of ascertaining the views of the two governments on the terms of peace.3 Under such circumstances the impending election of a fifth Council of State was regarded with unusual interest. For the first time since the establishment of the CommonElection of a wealth, an election of a Council was to be held on the broad grounds of political difference on a matter

war.

to send ambassadors.

Nov. 24-25.

fifth Council of State.

1 See vol. i. 85.

2 Pauluzzi to Morosini, Nov. 1; Letter Book R.O.

3 The soldiery, writes Pauluzzi, non havendo mai assentita la intrapresa della presente rottura con le Provincie Basse, intendono . . . sapere la vera intenzione così degl' Olandesi come delli danesi.' Pauluzzi to Morosini, Nov. 19, Letter Book R.O.

299