and defenceless ships; and on the English side in transferring men from the smaller vessels to make up the complement of those larger and better armed. Advantages on the Eng lish side. Neither side could as yet claim any definite advantage. The English crews had redressed the balance so heavily weighted against them by the unskilfulness of their commanders. Yet even their heroism might not have availed them, if the geographical conditions had not compelled Tromp to carry with him the dead weight of a convoy. Those geographical conditions, too, had compelled him to remain long absent from his own country. Whilst Blake had taken on board fresh stores since his defeat, Tromp, whose ammunition had been heavily drawn upon at Dungeness, had been unable to supply his powder magazines in the Bay of Biscay. After the long combat his supplies were now running short, and on the 19th he was forced, instead of renewing the conflict, to make for home, spreading out his warships in the rear to protect his precious charge. There was sharp fighting in pursuit, and two Dutch men-of-war and a few merchantmen fell into the hands of the enemy. Feb. 19. Tromp retreats. Feb. 20. On the morning of the 20th the Dutch fleet, now off Beachy Head, was in a well-nigh hopeless condition. Half their ships were entirely out of powder, and the remainder had Victory of none to spare. In spite of Tromp's threats and enthe English. treaties, many of the captains, knowing their ships to be incapable of defence, made their escape. Surrounded by some thirty ships 1 which alone were constant to duty, Tromp and his subordinates, De Ruyter, Evertsen, and Floriszoon, exhausted themselves in efforts to beat off the now triumphant enemy. In the evening the English commanders combined in a fierce attack, but only to draw off after an hour's impassioned struggle, fearing that unless they anchored the ebb tide would sweep them back towards the west. Tromp was now under the chalk cliffs to the south of Cape Grisnez, and Monk and Deane, who were virtually in sole charge of the English fleet, Tromp says from twenty-five to thirty; the English say thirty-five. 1653 THE DUTCH AT A DISADVANTAGE 219 were assured by the pilots that Tromp would never weather that headland. They had not counted on the resourceful seamanship of their opponent. Tromp knew that another halfhour's fighting would absolutely exhaust his powder and shot, and, with a skill that was all his own, he performed the feat which had been pronounced impossible. Before the sun rose he had doubled Cape Grisnez and not a Dutch sail remained in sight.1 Causes of the Dutch. The victory lay with the English, but it was a victory which they owed to the circumstances under which they fought, and not to the skill of their commanders. The honours the defeat of of that heroic struggle lay with Tromp, whose magnificent seamanship and undaunted courage might have availed to bind victory to the flag of the Republic if the permanent conditions of the strife had been more equal. Unless they could change the positions of land and water, Dutch commerce would always need the protection of a strong fleet as it passed to the Atlantic, and that fleet would always be exposed to fight at a disadvantage when hampered by a convoy. At Dungeness Tromp had shown that he understood as well as any modern commentator that there was everything to gain by the destruction of the enemy's war fleet, apart from the defence of commerce. The conditions under which the Dutch Republic existed did not permit a repetition of the experiment. In the first place, the naval tactics of the day did not readily lend themselves to the destruction of a fleet, unless when, as in the case of the Armada in 1588, and of Oquendo in 1639, it was decidedly inferior in fighting qualities. In the second place, the Dutch, depending as they did upon commerce for their very subsistence, were compelled to impose the defence of that commerce upon their admirals as their first duty-a duty which, See for references, p. 216, note I. The despatch of the three Generals is signed by Blake in a shaky hand, but must have been drawn up by the other two. For Tromp's statement that he would have been out of ammunition in half an hour, omitted in his printed despatch, see De Jonge's Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Zeewesen (ed. 1858), i. 453, note I. as the trade route passed through a narrow channel open to easy attack, it was peculiarly difficult to perform. It was the result of the battle which began off Portland and ended off Cape Grisnez, that the command of that channel had passed into the hands of the English. The end of the war might not be yet, but, whenever it came, the decision could hardly fail to be in favour of the masters of the main line of communication between the Netherlands and the outer world.1 "In allen geval als Engelandt aen Hollandt het Canael konde onbruckelijck maeken, soe wast met de Hollandsche Negotie gedaen, ende soude haer equipagie ten Oorlogh meer ende meer verslappen." Aitzema, iii. 803. 1652. Ill-feeling between army and Parliament. Jan. 30. war. CHAPTER XXIV THE ARMY PETITION THE growing impatience with which the army regarded the proceedings of Parliament was not to be accounted for merely by a difference of opinion on the subject of the Dutch One influential officer indeed appears to have been actuated to a great extent by personal motives. After Cromwell, no soldier bore so high a reputation for military ability as Lambert. As long ago as on January 30, 1652, he had been nominated by Parliament as Lord Deputy of Ireland in succession to Ireton. He accordingly returned from Scotland, where he had been serving as major-general, and put himself to some expense in preparing for his new office. About three months later, a question was raised in Parliament whether it would be expedient to renew Cromwell's lord lieutenancy of Ireland, which, having been conferred on him for three. Lambert appointed Lord Deputy. 1 C.J. vii. 79. 2" Pare che siano ancora attorno per allegerirsi di molte cariche di spesa et particolarmente di quella del generalato d'Irlanda goduto dal Generale Cromuel con venti mila scudi l' anno di stipendio, et forse anche dell' altra del Vice Rè, da essere per l'avvenire maneggiate da Commissarii Parlamentari. Il che se faranno, sarà segno assai manifesto che il Generale Cromuel comincia a declinare di autorità et del fausto popolare che soleva havere, et se io dicessi che i medesimi del Parlamento sono divisi et predominati da interessi particolari non mi discosterei molto della verità." Salvetti to Gondi, May, Add. MSS. 27,962 N. fol. 359. |