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Braid Hill.

June 30July 14. Cromwell

been assailed by a severe illness in the spring months, and at one time it seemed unlikely that he would be able to endure the labours of a campaign. He was now, however, fully recovered, and on the 25th he and his troops took up June 25. Cromwell on their quarters at their old post on Braid Hill.1 On the 30th, having received intelligence of Leslie's movements, he marched in the direction of the fails to bring enemy. During the next fortnight he strove in vain to bring on an engagement. The hills beyond the Carron were an insuperable obstacle to a direct attack, and in spite of numerous feints and of a successful attack by the English army upon Callander House close to Falkirk, Leslie had taken too thoroughly to heart the lesson taught him on Doon Hill to descend into the plain.2

on a battle.

If a battle could not be had in any other way, the attempt made in 1650 to cut off the Scottish army from its supplies in Fife must be repeated in 1651. Once more the command of the sea stood Cromwell in good stead, and on July 17 July 17-20. Forces sent he despatched a small force across the Firth of Forth with instructions to entrench themselves in the peninsula of North Queensferry. On the 19th reinforcements were sent over under Lambert, and by the 20th about 4,500 men were firmly established on the northern side of the Firth under his command.

into Fife.

3

Leslie, perhaps imagining the English force in Fife to be less numerous than it was, contented himself with sending against it 4,000 men under Sir John Brown. On the 20th July 20. Lambert, anticipating the blow, fell on the Scots on The fight at a hillside to the north of Inverkeithing, and in spite keithing. of the disadvantage of the ground put them to the rout. About half the Scottish force was slain outright,

Inver

1 Merc. Pol. E, 633, 5.

2 Walker to A. Baynes, July 14; John Baynes to A. Baynes, July 19; Letters from Roundhead Officers, 33, 34; Several Proceedings, E, 786, 26.

3 See Great Civil War, i. 336. Carlyle confuses him with MajorGeneral Richard Brown, formerly Governor of Abingdon.

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and more than fifteen hundred prisoners, amongst whom was Brown himself, fell into Lambert's hands.1

Whilst Lambert was virtually annihilating Brown's force at Inverkeithing, Cromwell watched with delight the withdrawal

Cromwell's

movements.

from Torwood of the enemy's main body, which had moved off to give support to Brown. Pressing on across the hills he rode forward with a small number of officers to the historic field of Bannockburn, only to find Leslie too strongly posted in the King's Park to be attacked with advantage. Before night Cromwell drew back to his old position, and Torwood was reoccupied by the Scots.2

He resolves

army into

Fife.

risk of a Scottish invasion of England.

Cromwell would hardly have fallen back across the hills unless he had made up his mind to try some fresh method of dislodging the enemy from his fastness. He had in to carry his fact resolved to carry his army across the Firth and, by seizing Perth, to cut Leslie off from his supplies He runs the in the North. It did not escape his notice that by taking this course he uncovered the road to the South and made it easy for Leslie to carry out that plan of invading England which, as Cromwell well knew, had, in one form or other, been agitated in the Scottish councils for more than half a year. He was, however, too well aware of the danger he incurred by remaining inactive in the north to estimate the risk of a Scottish invasion above its just value. The affair at Inverkeithing had taught him that the materials of which the Scottish army was composed were not really formidable, and, since the English Royalist leaders had been secured, the chance of an English insurrection had been much diminished.

1 Cromwell to Lenthall, July 21, Carlyle, Letter clxxv., corrected by a subsequent letter of July 22, published by Mr. Firth in the Eng. Hist. Review, ii. 151; Lambert to Bradshaw (?), July 21; Merc. Pol. E, 638, 10; J. Baynes to A. Baynes, July 22, Letters from Roundhead Officers, 151; A Great Victory, E, 638, 2; The Army's Intelligencer, E, 638, 15; Life of Blair, 276.

2 Nicoll's Diary, 54; Cromwell to Lenthall, July 24, Carlyle, Letter clxxvi.

1651

July 23. His conference with Harrison.

CROMWELL AT PERTH

29

Cromwell did what he could to lessen the danger before setting out on his adventure. Harrison had already advanced with part of the force under his command to Edinburgh, and Cromwell now summoned him to Linlithgow, where the two held a conference on July 23. The result was that Harrison, who would be reinforced by a body of horse advancing from Nottinghamshire under Colonel Rich, was directed to post himself on the Borders and to fight, or at least to keep in check the Scots if they thought proper to march for England.1

July 24-29.
Capture of
Inchgarvie,

Burntisland,

Aug. 2. and of Perth.

Having made these arrangements, Cromwell lost no time in carrying out his own operations. His base having been secured by the capture of Inchgarvie on the 24th and of Burntisland on the 29th, he pushed rapidly forward through Fife. On August 2 Perth surrendered to his summons. Cromwell had thus interposed his army between Leslie and Middleton who had gone north to hasten the reinforcements which Huntly was collecting. Even if the whole English army remained at Perth it could hardly fall short of supplies. The fertile Carse of Gowrie was at no great distance, and the Firth of Tay would bear shipping to a point not far below Perth itself. Once more the indented character of the east coast of Scotland was in favour of an invader holding the command of the sea.

Aug. 1. A rumour that the

Scots are marching South.

2

The capacity of the district round Perth to support the invaders was not, however, put to the test. On August 1, the day before the surrender of Perth, a rumour spread through the army that the Scots The Army's Intelligencer, E, 638, 15. "His Excellency hath reserved a force here of Horse and Foot, which at present lie in and near Edinburgh and himself in Leith; these in conjunction with the Horse under Col. Rich in Nottinghamshire and those left by Major-General Harrison in Northumberland and Cumberland, all which Horse my lord hath sent for to be upon the Borders—will be in a capacity, through God's assistance, to engage or at least impede their march if they attempt that way." This, in a letter from Leith of July 26, puts it out of doubt that Cromwell foresaw the possibility of the Scots marching southwards.

2 The Weekly Intelligencer, E, 640, 4.

Cromwell is not in a hurry.

achievement.1

had taken the step which Cromwell had anticipated. Before long the rumour developed into sure intelligence. Cromwell, however, had already taken every precaution in his power, and he was not the man to let a present success escape from his hands in pursuit of a distant He waited at Perth till the capitulation was signed, and then-leaving five or six thousand men behind under Monk's command to reduce Stirling-he started on the 2nd with the remainder of his army in hot pursuit. On August 4, after his arrival at Leith, Cromwell justified himself in a letter to Lenthall. The enemy, he wrote, in his desperation and fear and out of inevitable necessity, is run to try what he can do this way.'

Aug. 2. Cromwell in

pursuit.

Aug. 4. Cromwell

justifies

himself,

"I do apprehend," continued Cromwell, "that if he goes for England, being some few days' march before us, it will trouble some men's thoughts; and may occasion some incon. veniences; of which I hope we are as deeply sensible, and have been, and I trust shall be as diligent to prevent as any. And indeed this is our comfort that in simplicity of heart as towards God we have done to the best of our judgments, knowing that if some issue were not put to this business it would occasion another winter's war to the ruin of your soldiery, for whom the Scots are too hard in respect of enduring the winter difficulties of this country, and [have] been under the endless expense of the treasure of England in prosecuting this war. It may be supposed we might have kept the enemy from this by interposing between him and England; which truly I believe we might, but how to remove him out of this place without doing what we have done, unless we had a commanding army on both sides of the river of Forth, is not clear to us; or how to

1

"To Cromwell at Perth," writes Professor Masson (Life of Milton, iv. 290), "on the 2nd of August, this news was a thunderclap. Never had he been more taken by surprise: people would soon be saying he had been outwitted." That this is a mistake is shown by the extract from The Army's Intelligencer given at p. 29, note 1, if not by Cromwell's own letter of August 4.

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