Opinion of the Court.

observers, and situated on or near the path along which the plaintiffs travelled in going to and from their work, must have been known to them, and are not such as to be made the subject. of concealment and misrepresentation. The fact, however, that there was no such discovery of an actual vein or body of ore demonstrates that there could have been no such fraudulent and collusive concealment and misrepresentation, as to its limit and extent, as is charged in this complaint. It required not only a considerable excavation, but also a great outlay of money and great labor on the part of the defendant to develop the existence of a vein of ore.

This virtually disposes of both propositions advanced by the plaintiffs in support of their contention. That the defendant paid Porter $1000, there is no question. But that such sum was paid him to conceal from the plaintiffs his knowledge of the existence of a large ore body on the claim could not have been true; for the findings state that he possessed no such knowledge. It is presumable that the plaintiffs, as men of ordinary intelligence, must have known that Porter was to receive from the defendant, or his agent, Wall, a commission for his work in the transactions connected with the sale of the mine; for the findings show that they did not pay him anything out of the sum received from such sale, as their agent, and informed him beforehand that while they were willing to sell the claim for $2000, in that case they could not allow him any commission. It really could make no difference to the plaintiffs what he was paid, since they received for the claim all they had asked for it, and in reality $200 more than they had, a few hours before, agreed to take, and within $50 of what they would have got if Porter had made the sale under their first agreement with him.

There are no other features of the case that call for special mention. In no aspect of it do we think either the law or the equities are with the plaintiffs.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Idaho is, therefore, Affirmed.

Statement of the Case.

THE CHINESE EXCLUSION CASE.

CHAE CHAN PING v. UNITED STATES.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA.

No. 1446. Argued March 28, 29, 1889.- Decided May 13, 1889.

In their relations with foreign governments and their subjects or citizens, the United States are a nation, invested with the powers which belong to independent nations.

So far as a treaty made by the United States with any foreign power can become the subject of judicial cognizance in the courts of this country, it is subject to such acts as Congress may pass for its enforcement, modification or appeal. The Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580, and Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U. S. 190, followed.

The abrogation of a treaty, like the repeal of a law, operates only on future transactions, leaving unaffected those executed under it previous to the abrogation.

The rights and interests created by a treaty, which have become so vested that its expiration or abrogation will not destroy or impair them, are such as are connected with and lie in property, capable of sale and transfer or other disposition, and not such as are personal and untransferable in their character.

The power of the legislative department of the government to exclude aliens from the United States is an incident of sovereignty, which cannot be surrendered by the treaty making power.

The act of October 1, 1888, 25 Stat. 504, c. 1064, excluding Chinese laborers from the United States, was a constitutional exercise of legislative power, and, so far as it conflicted with existing treaties between the United States and China, it operated to that extent to abrogate them as part of the municipal law of the United States.

A certificate issued to a Chinese laborer under the fourth and fifth sections of the act of May 6, 1882, 22 Stat. 58, c. 126, as amended July 5, 1884, 23 Stat. 115, c. 220, conferred upon him no right to return to the United States of which he could not be deprived by a subsequent act of Congress. The history of Chinese immigration into the United States stated, together with a review of the treaties and legislation affecting it.

THE Court stated the case as follows in its opinion:

This case comes before us on appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of California refusing to release the appellant, on a writ of habeas corpus, from his alleged unlawful detention by Captain Walker,

Statement of the Case.

master of the steamship Belgic, lying within the harbor of San Francisco. The appellant is a subject of the Emperor of China and a laborer by occupation. He resided at San Francisco, California, following his occupation, from some time in 1875 until June 2, 1887, when he left for China on the steamship Gaelic, having in his possession a certificate, in terms entitling him to return to the United States, bearing date on that day, duly issued to him by the collector of customs of the port of San Francisco, pursuant to the provisions of section four of the restriction act of May 6, 1882, as amended by the act of July 5, 1884. 22 Stat. 58, c. 126; 23 Stat. 115, c. 220.

On the 7th of September, 1888, the appellant, on his return to California, sailed from Hong Kong in the steamship Belgic, which arrived within the port of San Francisco on the 8th of October following. On his arrival he presented to the proper custom-house officers his certificate, and demanded permission to land. The collector of the port refused the permit, solely on the ground that under the act of Congress, approved October 1, 1888, supplementary to the restriction acts of 1882 and 1884, the certificate had been annulled and his right to land abrogated, and he had been thereby forbidden again to enter the United States. 25 Stat. 504, c. 1064. The captain of the steamship, therefore, detained the appellant on board the steamer. Thereupon a petition on his behalf was presented to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of California, alleging that he was unlawfully restrained of his liberty, and praying that a writ of habeas corpus might be issued directed to the master of the steamship, commanding him to have the body of the appellant, with the cause of his detention, before the court at a time and place designated, to do and receive what might there be considered in the premises. A writ was accordingly issued, and in obedience to it the body of the appellant was produced before the court. Upon the hearing which followed, the court, after finding the facts substantially as stated, held as conclusions of law that the appcllant was not entitled to enter the United States, and was not unlawfully restrained of his liberty, and ordered that he be remanded to the custody of the master of the steamship from

Argument for Appellant.

which he had been taken under the writ. From this order an appeal was taken to this court.

Mr. George Hoadly and Mr. James C. Carter argued the case orally for appellant. They also filed a brief, prepared by Mr. Hoadly, citing: Woolsey, Internat. Law, 5th ed. § 63; Field, Code of Internat. Law, § 318; Bluntschli, Das Moderne Voelkerrecht der Civiliserten Staaten, § 381; Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580, 598; Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U. S. 536, 592; Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. New Haven, 8 Wheat. 464, 493; McClurg v. Kingsland, 1 How. 206; Townsley v. Sumrall, 2 Pet. 182; Langdell on Contracts, 2d ed. 62; Poste's Gaius, Lib. 3, 372; Dig. 9, 5, 15, 22, 25; Sandar's Justinian, Lib. 3, Tit. 14, 2d ed. p. 419; 1 Parsons on Contracts, 429; Thomas v. Thomas, 202 Q. B. (N. S.) 851; Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 655; Shuey v. United States, 92 U. S. 73; Loring v. Boston, 7 Met. 409; Janvrin v. Exeter, 48 N. H. 83; 2 Bl. Com. 37; Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 595; 4 Madison's Writings, 478-480, 526; Virginia Report of 1799-1800, 204-205, Richmond, 1850; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87; Knapp v. Thomas, 39 Ohio St. 377, 381; United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 128 U. S. 450; Von Holst on Const. 40; 9 Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, Jefferson's Writings, 466, Riker's ed. 1853-6; Virginia Resolutions of 1798, 4 Elliot's Debates, 528, 531; Mass. Resolutions, Feb. 30, 1799; N. H. Resolutions, June 15, 1799; The Debates on the Virginia Resolutions in the Virginia Legislature; The Debates on the Alien and Sedition Law in Congress; Story, Conflict Laws, $ 41, 46; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 142; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 661; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 31; New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102, 139; United States v. Cruik shank, 92 U. S. 542; Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 266; Magna Charta; Dauphin v. Key, McArthur & Mackay, 203; 1 Hare Const. Law, 550; Cummings v. State, 4 Wall. 277; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 377; Pierce v. Carskadon, 16 Wall. 234; Blair v. Ridgly, 41 Missouri, 63; S. C. 97 Am. Dec. 248; In re Yung Sing Hee, 36 Fed. Rep. 437; In re Look Tin Sing, 21 Fed. Rep. 905, 910; In re Wy Shing, 36 Fed. Rep. 553; Kilham v. Ward, 2 Mass. 236.

Argument for Appellant.

Mr. Carter also filed a brief "designed to present in a short compass the main propositions elaborated and illustrated in the more copious brief prepared by Mr. Hoadly."

I. It appears by the record that the appellant when brought before the court below in pursuance of the writ of habeas corpus was restrained of his liberty in not being allowed to land from the steamer Belgic-in other words, that he was imprisoned upon that vessel. The judgment of the court was that he had no right to land, and was therefore not unlawfully restrained of his liberty. If he had such right, it will not be denied that the judgment was erroneous and should be reversed.

II. Inasmuch as it did not appear to the court below that the petitioner was held under any sentence, judgment, writ or other judicial process of any court, it became instantly manifest that he was deprived of his liberty without due process of law, unless some other matter appeared showing that he was not entitled to the protection of the common constitutional safeguard to personal liberty.

(1) It is, at least, in general true that whenever upon the hearing, upon a return to a writ of habeas corpus any man is held a prisoner upon any other ground or pretence than the command of some writ or other judicial process, order, or judgment, he must instantly be discharged. It is only by the authority of law manifested through the mandate of some court or judicial officer that one man can be held a prisoner by another.

(2) There is no distinction in this and the subjects of other nations.

respect, between citizens Liberty is the birthright For this propo

and inalienable possession of all men, as men. sition an American lawyer disdains to cite authority. Neither the fundamental law of the United States, nor of any one of the States, recognizes any such distinction.

III. The special matter which the judgment of the court below determined as sufficient to take the case of the appellant out of the operation of the principles above mentioned, was, that the appellant was a Chinese laborer who had been a resident of the United States, but who had departed there