settled in Hindostan on each of their three grand irruptions, received constant accessions to their strength by Mussulman adventurers of all coun

march where they choose, I will surround them with a desert." This observation reminds us of the advice of Memnon the Rhodian, for conducting the war against Alexander the Great, as given by *Diodorus Siculus and Arrian,+-to check the Macedonians by destroying the country before them, and preventing their marching forward for want of provisions; to trample the herbage under their horses' feet; to burn the produce of the country, and even to lay the towns and villages waste; "by which means," says the latter, "Alexander, finding himself destitute of provision and forage, would be unable to penetrate farther." To the portion of this opinion on the inexpediency of forming the Persians into regular battalions, Sir John Malcolm seems to have given his ready assent; though, from what is stated in the chapter immediately preceding the one first quoted, not altogether upon very correct principles; for, if the harlequin-changes which are there referred to, had indeed left his Persian friends no remains of barbarism but their beards, the introduction of the modern system of discipline would be in all respects right and proper; it would then be the effect of an efficient cause it is only its premature introduction before other departments of the state, and indeed the nation generally, had been sufficiently improved to enable them to appreciate its value, and to give it full effect, that is earnestly to be deprecated. If they go hand in hand with civilization, there is plenty of good stuff in Persia to oppose the progress of the Russians; but by no other means is this desirable end to be effected.

* Lib. xvii. c. 2.

+ Lib. i. c. 13.

tries, whether from the North, or by the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. It was by this extensive colonization that their numbers were augmented beyond the usual ratio of natural increase, and their spirit was enabled to keep pace with that of their sect in other parts of the world; a point which, though it appear of easy accomplishment to us, was sufficient to preserve their intellectual superiority over the degraded Hindoo, as well as to give them great weight as a component part of the population. To this state of things our present situation bears no sort of resemblance, nor is there indeed any thing strictly analogous in all history to the conquest of Hindostan by our countrymen. All other extensive conquests have been effected by means of large armies, and maintained either by such armies settling in the conquered country, or protecting the settlement of their fellow countrymen. But in India, the number of European troops employed at any one period, has been inconceivably small; and our acquisitions have at once been made and maintained almost entirely by the agency of our conquered subjects. At the decisive battle of Plassey, Lord

See a long enumeration of instances given by Seneca, ending with the passage quoted by Gibbon, (Decline and Fall, chap. ii.) "Wheresoever the Roman conquers, he in

habits."

Clive had only nine hundred Europeans; and at the present day, the number of Europeans in the whole army is not more than as one to ten native soldiers. The Europeans of every description, actually in India, are only in the proportion of one to three thousand natives; whilst under the height of the Mogul government, the Mohammedans are said never to have been less than onetwentieth, though sometimes estimated as high as one-twelfth of the whole population.

With this immense disparity of numbers against us, it is surely unwise, and even criminal, to shut our eyes to the real circumstances by which our situation, as the ruling caste of India, is distinguished. If, indeed, our hold upon the natives is in opinion-if they look up to us with confidence for security of person and property, as well as for encouragement in whatever conduces to their happiness and prosperity-which, indeed, is the only rational meaning of an empire of opinion-then it behoves us to endeavour, by every means in our power, to diffuse the benefits of education throughout the country; to reform the habits of the people; to excite their industry, and to impress them with that consciousness of their own defects, which shall at once awaken in them the desire of knowledge, and dispose them to rely upon the wisdom and beneficent intentions of their

rulers. But if by opinion, it is meant to be insinuated, as is sometimes the case, that our strength depends upon the ignorance of the natives of their immense numerical preponderance, then the idea displays not only the extreme of folly, and inattention to passing events,* but is in itself highly dangerous to the continuance of our rule. That ignorance, even if it exist at present, cannot possibly be expected to endure much longer; and if in the mean time any serious danger threaten

*The opposition to the house-tax, &c. at Benares and Bareilly—and lately, the disaffection manifested throughout the provinces during the whole period of the Burmese warbut particularly on the siege of Burtpore being undertaken, are well known. A long catalogue of the signs of the times, more than sufficient under a military despotism and an enslaved press to indicate the temper of the people, might easily be prepared ;-two only are here selected. In a late disturbance in the South of India, when a distinguished servant of the Company lost his life, the natives are said to have cut off his right hand, and nailed it to the gate of their fortress, with an inscription, purporting that it belonged to one who had boasted that he never returned a native's salute. In Calcutta, under the eye of the Supreme Government, a wealthy Hindoo, who had erected an immense bazar at an enormous expense, on speculation, was almost ruined by the steady and unanimous refusal of the natives to resort to it, because he was said to have entered into a contract for the purchase of Government salt, by which the already high price of that article was likely to be farther enhanced.

our dominion, the natives will not fail to ask themselves, how far it is desirable to make common cause with a nation which has shown so little solicitude for their welfare. The presence of a rival power will at least afford them the prospect of a change; and as to the great mass of the population of Hindostan no change could well be for the worse, we ought not to be surprised at any excesses into which they may be driven. For nations do not, like individuals, "rather bear the ills they have than fly to others which they know not of;" on the contrary, they strenuously exert themselves to get rid of the burthens which they feel to be galling and troublesome; and when their condition, notwithstanding all their efforts, is perceptibly deteriorating, they eagerly catch at any, even the most remote prospect of relief; they become desperate, and judge that, happen what may, they cannot be worse: by perpetually brooding over the possible evils of a revolution, they familiarize their imagination with disasters and dangers of every description; and it has been truly said, that he who despises life is inaccessible to pity, and that there is no enemy more truly formidable than one who is prepared to die.