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CHAPTER II.

ON THE DANGER TO WHICH BRITISH INDIA

IS EXPOSED FROM INVASION.

"La vostra nominanza è color d'erba
Che viene, e va, e quei la discolora
Per cui ell' esce della terra acerba."

THE view just taken of the nature of our Indian empire, suggests these two important inquiries. What are the dangers to which Hindostan is exposed in the event of its being invaded by a powerful enemy capable of meeting a British army in the field? and, What degree of attachment can the Natives be supposed to bear to our name and government? Upon the first of these points, a few observations will form the subject of the present chapter.

The most careless reader of Indian history cannot have failed to observe, that every Asiatic people, with whom the British forces have come into contact, have shown themselves unable to resist the European system of war and discipline.

Yet past exploits, and the transactions under the administrations of Lords Wellesley and Minto, were not of themselves sufficiently decisive upon this head, to convince those who had taken a superficial view of the causes of our success; and the then impending conflict with Nepaul, which may be said to have been bequeathed as a state legacy to Lord Hastings, was by many considered to be the experimentum crucis of the military character of the Indian government. So, indeed, it proved to be, as far as tactics and discipline were concerned; for it was by our superiority on those points alone that the struggle was decided in our favour. The Nepaulese were superior in physical strength, if not in personal courage, to the greater part of our troops; they had numbers at their command, and their country abounded in natural obstacles and defensive positions; yet by the effect of comprehensive military arrangement, assisted by good discipline, were all these advantages set at nought, and the war, so formidable in its first aspect, brought to a successful termination in two short campaigns. Still, although the splendid government of Lord Hastings achieved this great and important triumph, which, in addition to those masterly operations which his Lordship directed against the Mahrattas and Pindarries, appeared to place the Company's territories in a state of per

manent security, there yet remained one enemy with whom the Indian army had not measured its strength; and as Lord Minto had left the war of Nepaul to him, so Lord Hastings left that of Ava to his successor. In the event, however, the Burmese proved to be even less formidable than any antagonist whom the British had hitherto been tempted to meet in the field; and the dismemberment of their empire, together with the establishment of military stations in Cachar, Arracan, and on the borders of Pegue, effectually put it out of their power to molest the Bengal government in future, even if their contemptible character, in a military point of view, did not render the occurrence of such a contingency comparatively unimportant. Thus, while the interior of India is entirely under British influence or authority, the whole frontier of that vast tract is tenanted by states, which not only have felt the weight of our arms, but which have been compelled to admit resident officers at their courts, or in their immediate vicinity, to watch over and report upon their conduct. The Seiks, who witnessed the operations of the British army in 1805, and have since acknowledged our influence, form no material exception to this general arrangement.

Whether it be in consequence of the influence of climate, or of imperfect social institutions, or,

as is more probable, of both, it is observable that the Asiatic nations have shown themselves less susceptible of consistent and sustained exertions of warlike skill, in proportion as the country which they inhabit approaches towards the tropics. The sun, which imparts its fire and vivacity to them, seems to deny them the exercise of judgment and discretion. Even the natural advantages of a strong country appear to form no exception to the truth of this remark; and whilst the mountaineers of Nepaul excel the inhabitants of the hilly regions of Southern India, including Ceylon, the latter made a much firmer stand against the Moguls and the English, than the tribes established in the fastnesses of Java have shown themselves capable of in their resistance to the Dutch.* Many of the nations now alluded to had acquired considerable knowledge in the arts of war and government; the Nepaulese and Burmese had subjugated several neighbouring states and provinces; but the latter, in particular,

* By recent advices, however, it would appear that the extremely weak state of the European establishments of the Dutch in Java, has at length tempted the natives of that island to rise and make strenuous efforts to recover their independence. If the character here given of the Southern Asiatics does not operate to the disadvantage of the Javanese, we may shortly hear of the Dutch being totally expelled the island.

after pursuing the career of conquest with remarkable spirit for a series of years, had apparently become contented with what they had acquired, and, without evincing any genius for improvement, had deteriorated in the stupid tyranny of their domestic government, in proportion as they had relaxed from the energy of their foreign policy. It seems, indeed, to be a law of nature, that nothing in the history of mankind shall be stationary to cease to advance in the career of improvement, is to retrograde; and thus we invariably find, that the half-civilized portions of the globe, when no longer acted upon by their first impulse, become alike the prey either of the civilized portion, on the one hand, or of the complete barbarian on the other. Thus the half-civilized states of China, Persia, and Hindostan, showed themselves as unable to resist the barbarian Tartar tribes, as the Asiatics of modern times have been to withstand the attacks of European invaders; whilst the Tartar conquerors, in their turn, when they came to partake of the half-civilized character of the conquered, evinced themselves utterly incompetent to withstand the discipline and organized institutions of Great Britain and Russia.

The same reasoning, which is applicable to the English in their present attitude as an Asiatic

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