this number will undoubtedly be saved, and that those who are not of it will undoubtedly be condemned. It is further explained that the class thus predestined is not a mere general body or church, which is called out of paganism and the world at large, for the enjoyment of certain Christian privileges and means of grace; but that they are a certain number of individuals, and are predestinated not to the means only but to the end also. And in opposition to a certain interpretation of this doctrine, proposed by some in order to reconcile it with the Divine justice, and soften its apparent harshness, it is expressly asserted that this predestination is not caused by any foresight of good works in the persons who are included in it, but, on the contrary, precedes them. Here then is undoubtedly the doctrine of predestination, held by S. Augustine, and by the schools of theologians who followed him, that is to say, by the principal divines of the middle ages. And yet it is quite certain that S. Augustine held the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration. His pages are full of statements which couple the words in a way which leaves no manner of doubt that he considered regeneration and baptism to go together; and one who denied that he held this doctrine would have to fight against the obvious and plain meaning not of particular passages here or there, but of whole books and treatises. In the same way no one can doubt that Peter Lombard and Aquinas held the doctrine of baptismal regeneration, or that S. Bernard or S. Anselm did. And if these follow the language of S. Augustine upon predestination, we must reconcile the two facts as we can, but there is the fact that, together with this language, these divines undoubtedly held that all infants were regenerated in baptism. And if divines of the patristic and medieval times held the doctrine of predestination, and that of baptismal regeneration too, it follows immediately that divines of the sixteenth century may have done the same. And therefore the argument, which has been drawn from their holding the one doctrine to their not holding the other, has been shown to be unsound. For it must be observed we are not called upon for our purpose to prove any logical consistency between the two doctrines thus asserted to be held together; but only the fact that the two have been held together. Because, if other theologians have held both together whether logically or illogically, it follows directly that the reformers, whether logically or illogically, may have done the same; and it is sufficient for our purpose if they may have done it either way, for we are only concerned with the fact of their doctrine, and not with the logic of it.

However, if we may extend our remarks beyond the necessary limits of our argument, we must profess ourselves unable to see any logical inconsistency between the two doctrines; any intel

lectual reason to prevent a person who held the one from holding the other too. The doctrine of predestination undoubtedly confines the ultimate gift of eternal life, and that which is involved in the gift of eternal life, the ultimate holiness and goodness of the individual on whom that gift is conferred, to the class of the predestinate. But it does not necessarily confine other gifts, of a subordinate character and short of this ultimate personal holiness and the eternal life included in it, to this class. Thus a reprobate may enjoy, in perfect consistency with the doctrine of predestination, a great number of privileges and means of grace of which the tendency is to raise his spiritual condition and prepare him for eternal life. Thus he can enjoy the blessing of pious parents, and useful friends, and good instructors; he can have from the beginning of life all the inducements to a holy course which outward and inward providence can supply, comparative freedom from temptations, perpetual mementos of duty, gifts of the understanding and of the heart. He can have these privileges in a peculiar and pre-eminent way, and such as leaves the ordinary state of man in these respects, far behind hand; because these are subordinate gifts of God, and not ultimate ones, means and not ends. The question then is to what class of gifts, the gift which we assert to be imparted in baptism, and which we call regeneration, belongs. And on this point there can be no doubt or uncertainty. It is quite evident as a matter of fact, that vast numbers who receive baptism do not lead good and holy lives, but both live and die in sin. And therefore no sane person could ever imagine that the gift imparted in baptism was that of ultimate personal holiness, or that regeneration as applied to this gift, meant the ultimate spiritual and sanctified state. But if the gift of regeneration as imparted in baptism, is not this ultimate gift, it may then, without any remonstrance whatever on the part of the predestinarian, be conferred upon the reprobate just as well as upon the elect. In fact the predestinarian has no more difficulty in attaching this regeneration to baptism than any other religionist has. In the sense of ultimate personal holiness nobody, predestinarian or not, can so attach it; for actual facts refute it; and facts are exactly the same whether a person is not a predestinarian, or is In the sense of a subordinate gift, both can with the utmost facility attach it; because both can, according to their different systems, provide a most satisfactory reason why it does not issue in any ultimate benefit to the individual, or raise him to a state of personal holiness and goodness. According to the system of free will, the individual's own exertions are the condition of the fruitfulness of the baptismal gift, and if they are wanting, that which is necessary for the development of the gift into the

one.

holiness and goodness of the individual is wanting; and therefore the inefficacy of the gift is fully accounted for. According to the predestinarian's system, an additional gift of God is the condition of the fruitfulness of the baptismal gift, and where that gift is wanting, that which was necessary for the development of the gift into the holiness and goodness of the individual is wanting; and therefore, with him too, the inefficacy of the gift is fully accounted for. Thus both can equally admit the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration into their systems; they only differ in their modes of incorporating it, and draw their adjustments and reconciling expedients from different quarters. The gift is the same in both; the complement of the gift only differs. Both schools make its efficacy conditional, but they give the conditions differently; both leave a void, and fill it up according to their respective theories.

Take, for example, the following passages of S. Augustine, in which he supposes quite clearly and definitely a certain real gift, called regeneration, to have been imparted, while he simultaneously supposes a certain other gift not to have been imparted, which latter gift was necessary for the development of the former.

'Wonderful indeed, most wonderful, that God should to some of his own sons, those whom He has regenerated in Christ, and to whom He has given faith, hope and love, not give perseverance, while He imparts forgiveness, grace and sonship to the sons of strangers.'1

He is alluding to the fact, which he calls mysterious, that God should show so much gratuitous liberality in admitting the sons of heathens, who have no claim upon him on account of their fathers' faith, to baptism; while the sons of His own faithful worshippers, that is to say Christian parents, who, as being born of such parents, have been brought to baptism, and been regenerated, are not given, what we might think God was now bound in justice to give them, the legitimate development of their gift; not receiving that additional gift of perseverance, which alone could develop it, and made it efficacious.

Again, in referring to the same mysterious fact, he remarks

We see some infants regenerated before they are taken out of this life, and others not regenerated, (he alludes to children dying before baptism); and of those who are regenerated, we see some taken away before they have fallen, and so admitted to persevere to the end; others detained in this life till they have fallen, who would not have fallen if they had been taken away before; and again, of the lapsed, we see some allowed to live till

1 'Mirandum est quidem, multumque mirandum quod filiis suis quibusdam Deus quos regeneravit in Christo, quibus fidem, spem, dilectionem dedit, non dat perseverantiam; cum filiis alienis scelera tanta dimittat, atque impertita gratiâ laciat filios suos.'-De Corrept. et Grat. cap. viii.

they have returned, who would have perished if they had been taken away before they had returned.'1

He plainly asserts here that some have been regenerated, who yet afterwards fall away finally. Again he quotes Cyprian

We ask and pray, that we who have been sanctified in baptism may persevere in that beginning.'

And remarks

• Without doubt, whoever asks the Lord for perseverance, admits that this perseverance is His gift. 2

This is saying quite clearly that some have been sanctified in baptism, of whom it is uncertain whether they will have afterwards a certain additional gift, the donum perseverantia imparted to them or not; thus recognising the reception of regeneration, or sanctification, in baptism, together with the absence of final perseverance or reprobation, in the same person. In the same way he speaks (De Corr. et Grat. c. ix.) of persons whom we see to have been regenerated, and to live piously,' (quos regeneratos pie vivere cernimus); who yet fall away afterwards, and do not attain salvation. In these passages we have the actual word regeneration mentioned. Numbers of other passages do not use the actual word regeneration, but-what is exactly the same as far as our argument is concerned-mention grace generally as having been given to persons who yet afterwards fall away, and that finally. We say the same as regards our argument, for if S. Augustine held that persons could fall away finally after they had been in a state of grace, he clearly does not consider that for persons to have been put into a state of grace in baptism, is inconsistent with the fact of their finally falling away. Thus he speaks (De Corr. et Grat. c. ix.) of persons who have received a temporary grace (susceptam temporaliter gratiam) from which they fall away, and that without recovering themselves. Indeed, as S. Augustine maintains all good whatever that Christian men do, and all the goodness that Christian men show, to proceed from grace as distinct from being their own, if he acknowledges that men have ever lived a good life at first, and

1 Cum videant alios parvulos non regeneratos ad æternam vitam, alios autem regeneratos ad æternam vitam tolli de hac vita; ipsosque regeneratos, alios perseverantes usque in finem hine ire, alios quousque decidant hic teneri, qui utique non decidissent, si antequam laberentur hinc exissent; et rursus quosdam lapsos quousque redeant non exire de hac vita, qui utique perirent, si, antequam redirent, exirent.-De Dono Perseverantiæ, c. xiii.

* Id petimus et rogamus, ut qui in baptismo sanctificati sumus in eo quod esse cœpimus perseveremus,- Ecce gloriosissimus Martyr hoc sentit, quod in his verbis quotidie fideles Christi petant ut perseverent in eo quod esse coeperunt. Nullo autem dubitante, quisquis a Domino ut in bono perseveret precatur, donum ejus esse talem perseverantiam confitetur.'-De Corrept. et Grat. e. vi.

then fallen away finally from it, (and this he not only acknowledges as a fact, but writes a book to account for it,) he acknowledges by the most certain implication possible, that men have been in a state of grace, and have fallen away finally from it. He says of such men, in bono erant,' they were in good; they were not, that is, as he proceeds to explain, merely good ficte,' fictitiously and externally, but were genuine and sincere in their goodness. Such goodness as this is the effect of grace, according to Augustine, for God is the author and maker of all good, moral and spiritual, in His creatures. They had therefore been, according to S. Augustine, in a state of grace; from which state, however, they finally fell. In this way S. Augustine explains to us himself how he holds the doctrine of Predestination, and holds the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration too. His writings from one end to the other show the fact that he held the latter doctrine in combination with the former: these passages show the mode in which he held them together, viz. that he believed in temporary grace, grace which could be finally fallen away from; for the immediate result of such a belief is that grace can be conferred upon the reprobate, and therefore that it can be conferred upon them in baptism, and therefore that the doctrine of predestination need not prevent any one from holding the regeneration of all infants in baptism.

It is quite true, indeed, that another class of passages are to be found in S. Augustine, going further than the class we have just spoken of—a class of passages which in one particular sense, and as the result of one particular point of view, deny the reality of the gift of regeneration, as conferred upon reprobates, i.e. those who will not ultimately attain to personal regeneration, to actual holiness and goodness of life, but will ultimately take their rank among the wicked and condemned. For it is the natural, and almost inevitable tendency of the doctrine of predestination, allowed its free course and expression, to anticipate the ultimate result from the very first, and antedate the end from the beginning. Téλos opa is its great maxim: the end is first and foremost in thought in all estimations of human character and condition; and life, present and past, is made to bear the stamp of the future, as well the actual future itself. All things seem unreal, viewed simply as they are now at the present moment : good and evil is alike unreal: present character, condition, state of mind, present action, and present grace, cannot be judged of by themselves: they are not determinate things, viewed simply as things present. In the estimation of human character indeed, this is a rule which all acknowledge. Take a man at any one point in his state of probation, and see if your understanding will allow you to assert definitely this or that character