duces, "therefore neither of these will be necessarily existing," this is a consequence which does not at all afflict my mind. Inasmuch as neither of the supposed Beings have yet been proved to possess that which Dr. Clarke implies by this word. And how these self-existent Beings can lose that which they do not seem to have had, it is for those who advocate that Argument to consider. Indeed, I would venture the assertion that whoever will deeply consider the matter, by the light of Nature alone, will be apt to conclude that no Being, except an Eternal Mind, can, in the strict sense of the term, have any mathematical necessity for existence; and that absolute necessity only can be predicated of the possible relations of Being; and not, in general, of Being itself. For we surely may, without a mathematical contradiction, suppose a Universal Nothing, i. e., an absence of all Being; with this exception to the supposition, that there must only necessarily be some Eternal Mind, wherein Eternal Truths must exist.

I need hardly remark, that the passage concerning the Unity of the Deity, on which I have heen dwelling is that which startled Bishop Butler; and which he could not be brought to believe, even though he had the advantage of corresponding with Dr. Clarke himself on the subject. But it seems a little surprising to me, that so impartial and acute a thinker as Butler did not perceive where the fallacy of the Argument lies; viz., in the ambiguous term "necessarily existing.

991

1 The letters of Clarke and Butler, on this subject, appended to

I conclude that it is now sufficiently proved, that the Argument à priori no more establishes the truth of the Unity of God, than the Argument à posteriori. Though certainly its weakness is not so immediately evident as that of the latter. Dr. Clarke, in a letter appended to his Discourses, writes thus on this subject. "The Unity of God can no otherwise be demonstrated than by considering, à priori, the nature of a necessary or selfexistent Cause." And this method we have now seen to be fallacious.

It belongs not to this Dissertation to consider that part of Dr. Clarke's Argument which represents space and duration as attributes of the Deity. And few might be disposed to follow me in such a discussion. I would, however, remark, that the objection to Clarke's opinions, on these points, is, perhaps, rather to the form of expression and the order of his inferences, than to the real notion entertained. I believe that the followers of Kant, in Germany, hold that our ideas of space and time are not derived from the senses. Which important observation, Berkeley made long since.

Of TIME it may, indeed, be more difficult to speak briefly, without being misunderstood; but SPACE seems, without doubt, to be an attribute of Mind.1

And here I take leave of the Argument à priori, which is certainly the strong hold (the strongest

the Demonstration, and to Butler's Works (Clarendon Edition) are models of patient and thoughtful reasoning.

'I mean of all minds, whether finite or not.

hold) of Natural Theology; as it would be useless to go through the consideration of those attributes of Deity, which have before occupied our attention, if the Unity of God cannot first be established.

The whole conclusion of Natural Theology, concerning all the attributes of Deity, is "Clouds and Darkness are round about Him." The Christian alone can add, "Righteousness and Judgment are the habitation of His Throne ! "

PART III.

CONCLUSION.

"THY Creatures have been my books, but thy SCRIPTURES much more! I have sought THEE in the courts, fields, and gardens, but I have found THEE in thy Temples!"

LORD BACON.

SECTION I.

RELIGION, A FINAL CAUSE OF THE HUMAN MIND.

OUR argument has thus far been directed against the alleged proofs of the Fundamental Truths of Natural Theology, viz. those concerning the Being and Character of the "Unknown God" of the Deists. It will be remembered, that it was boasted, That Revelation itself was dependent (see p. 35.) on Natural Theology; because the idea of a Revelation from God, presupposed a belief in his Existence. To which it might have been a sufficient answer to say, That even allowing the necessity of this previous belief, it would not follow from thence, that it was either strictly deducible, or actually deduced, from the principles of natural reasoning; since there are

M

other sources from which such a belief might, and actually does, arise; as will hereafter appear. But since we have shown, that the knowledge of one God is not attained, by any of the arguments which have yet been adduced, it may, perhaps, be too much to admit, that a firm and positive belief in one God, is necessary (even if possible) previous to a Revelation.

For let a case be fairly supposed; That a personage, possessing supernatural power, should appear among men who had no Natural Theology of a clear and certain kind, but only doubtful theories of their own devising. The question would be-Whether the suspension of the wonted laws of nature-the working of benevolent miracles, openly, and undeniably-would not be a fair criterion of his character; and prove that he was, what he declared himself to be, a Messenger sent from a Benevolent Superior Power-i. e. God? Could those people honestly reject him; unless it could be shown that his pretensions implied an impossibility? Or, at least, unless they could demonstrate, that there was an antecedent improbability against all Revelations (such as Mr. Hume pretended with regard to Miracles) which no evidence could possibly overcome ?-This, certainly, then, is what the Deist must prove, before he can infer that his Natural Theology is a pre-requisite to Revelation. And, until this be proved,

such an inference cannot be admitted.

But, I have said, there are other sources from which, if it were necessary, some previous, though imperfect, acquaintance with the First Truths of Theology, might be (and indeed actually is) attained; by which