tingent and mutable. It cannot have an absolute but only a relative necessity of existence. It might, by a possibility, have been otherwise than it is. A perfect recognition of such a truth is called an act of "understanding;" for, in understanding, we "judge according to the sense."1 Now, there is no more room for scepticism concerning this latter class of truths than concerning the former, as will abundantly appear by considering, that we have, in each case, the best evidence which the nature of the matter admits.

"Truths of reason" being superior to all proof, and known by the intuition of nature, or revelation, have the highest of all evidence, and are called "demonstrable." They cannot even be imagined to be possibly otherwise than they are; for they are eternal, and "absolutely necessary." But" truths of sense," (and, indeed, all particular truths also) are only relatively necessary. (See Part ii. sec. 3.) "Truths of sense" admit of being proved at the bar of reason; because they might have been otherwise than they are. Therefore, the evidence for them is said to be "probable." And this distinction between demonstrative and probable evidence should be very carefully observed. I repeat, then, that a truth is demonstratively established, as absolutely necessary," when it appears, that it is a contradiction in the nature of things to imagine it otherwise. A truth has the very highest probable evidence, when it is proved, in an irrefutable manner, from the evidence of our senses, from testimony or any other of the sensible

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1 Sec Leighton, Coleridge, &c.

means of human knowledge. The term "probable" does not necessarily imply any degree of uncertainty.'

2

Unless we know to which of the two classes any truth belongs, we cannot tell what kind of evidence is to be expected to support it. The first truths of Theology have been defended both à priori and à posteriori; i. e., both by demonstrative and probable arguments. Perhaps no one has employed the former with such ingenuity as Dr. Clarke. And, indeed, if the truths of Theology be eternal, immutable and necessary truths (which seems undeniable, if they be admitted at all), it would appear reasonable to regard them as "demonstrable," à priori, to intelligences capable of apprehending them; and the only doubt might be, whether they might not transcend the natural capacity of the human mind? It is certain that Dr. Reid, Professor Stewart, and their followers, regard the argument à priori, merely as the " speculation of men of genius," the soundness of which is much to be suspected; at the same time, strangely overlooking the fact, that eternal and necessary truths must be also "demonstrable." With these writers, the argument à posteriori is much more popular, and the generality of men have, doubtless, the same predilection. Which might, indeed, be expected, as it is much easier to avail one's self of what comes within the province of sense and understanding, than

For many of these observations, I may refer to Dr. Cudworth and others; and still later to Kant and Coleridge.

2 Many of Clarke's able contemporaries also adopted it. It is indeed, as old as Lactantius.

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to exert the reason in contemplating lofty truths. The popular form in which the argument à posteriori is generally put, is this: Its advocates represent it as an argument from design," or, as it is commonly called, "an argument from Final Causes." But a close attention to the real nature of an argument from final causes will discover, that it is not a correct à posteriori process.

A very common way of stating this argument is this; "From certain marks of contrivance or design, which may be traced in the works of nature, we may, by the light of nature alone, infer a contriver, a God." Before entering immediately on the consideration of this position, it may be observed, that the truth of the doctrine here laid down is meant to depend on the principle, That we may argue from effect to cause. And, without question, the à priori and à posteriori arguments must both depend on the validity of this principle; and in order to examine this, it will be necessary to inquire, What is a CAUSE ?

Believing that much evil results from partial views of this subject, I have attempted to investigate the whole matter; not with a view of bringing forward, or criticising, instances of "Final Causes," but in order to examine the foundations of the argument from them; and thus determine the whole amount of the value of such an argument. In so doing, I shall endeavour to bring all doctrines and opinions to the simple test of the consciousness and experience of every man's mind; believing, that if there be one thing of which we may be more certain than another,

it must be that which exists within ourselves, and is, as it were, a part of us. It is evident, as I shall frequently take occasion to enforce, that if any doubt or uncertainty be thrown on the operations of intellect, knowledge will become impossible and reasoning absurd. This, then, is my only POSTULATE, which I am the more explicit in stating, because I amsure that its importance cannot be overrated ;

Let it be granted; THAT THE FACTS OF THE HUMAN MIND,1 ARE

SUFFICIENT ᎠᎪᎢᎪ

FOR THE SCIENCE OF THE HUMAN MIND; AND THE IMPORTANT TRUTHS DEPENDENT THEREON.

As the admission of this Postulate will lead to more practical consequences, than are apparent at first sight, I would have it very cautiously inspected. Let it not be considered as identical with the proposition of Mr. Hume, that all our knowledge is derived from Experience. It is very different. This proposition, which Hume borrowed from Mr. Locke, is not indeed to be regarded as false, but, rather, as ambiguous; but there is one part of its ambiguity (so to speak) which has not, as far as I am aware, been fully detected. If there be, as we have seen, certain necessary truths of reason, prior to truths of sense, which depend on no "experience" for their substantial verity, what can be more unreasonable than

1 If any one prefers to substitute the word Nature for the word "Mind," in both the places in the Postulate where it occurs, I see no great objection to it. I have said "Mind," from having considered Body as one of the phenomena of mind; and also considering the word "Nature" as inapplicable to intelligent beings.

2 Which has been well exposed by the Archbishop of Dublin.

to attempt to apply to them the test of sensible experience? And yet this is the very mistake of Mr. Hume and his fellow-disciples of the school of Locke. It is impossible that sensible experience could teach me that the three angles of a triangle are necessarily equal to two right angles. I might know, from sensible experience, that I always found it to be so, and thence I might infer1 as a highly probable truth, that it might be so, in future. But a single glance of the reasoning mind perceives, at once, the higher truth -the truth of reason-necessary and immutable; it MUST be so. Perhaps, most of the fallacies of the Sceptics of the last century may be traced to an oversight of the fact, that there are "Truths of Reason."

But it may be said, that all the operations of the mind may be called "Experiences" for we could not know that we had power, even to think, unless we had previously exerted it, and so obtained knowledge of it by experience. Now even if it be true, that in this sense, all our knowledge is derived from " experience," it does not alter what has been said, concerning the necessary and immutable character of "Truths of Reason." For, if it be granted that we learn by experience that 2×2=4 it is evident that that truth is in no way affected by our experience of it. It is immutably and necessarily true, and would have been so, had no being ever existed to learn it by "experience." But there is an objection to this manner of using the word " experience," arising from the

1 I first met with this idea, I think, somewhere in the writings of Coleridge.