CHAPTER X.

ON BRUTALITY.

Distinguishing features of Insanity re-stated, and contrasted with those of Brutality.-The latter disease traced to deficiency of the moral sense ;-principles of treatment deduced from this supposition.-What men will not do, as being right, they must do, as being ordered to do it.-The class of persons to whom this principle is applicable, left uneducated or ill-educated owing to its non-application; punished, when convicted of criminal acts, not taught to avoid them-e. g. Lord Ferrers.-Discrepancies between these views and some contained in a former Essay by the Author.

WE have pointed out, that those, who labour under insanity, exhibit also a certain suspension of the of will.

power

To this suspension of the power of will, we have attributed the incoherency of thought and the falseness of perception, which, when not accounted for by sleep, or produced by certain forms

of physical disease, indicate the presence of the insane state.

In this point of view, we have termed insanity a state of mental perversion. For the suspension of the will does not at any period of that disease amount to abolition of its influence; and the operations of thought and perceptions are vitiated in the course of it, without being destroyed.

We have next to consider a primary mental disease, in which the deviation from the normal state goes a step farther, and amounts to the original deficiency or abolition of a property.

In discussing this form of mental disease, I shall borrow its leading features from an Essay * already before the public, in which I have endeavoured to pourtray its features, the grounds on which it may be contrasted with the normal or natural forms of vice, and the principles of its treatment.

"In the following passage, Tacitus sums up the moral life of the Emperor Tiberius: His moral character had,' he observes, different periods. It was excellent in the life which he led, and the good report which he gained, while he remained in private life or held office under the sway of Au

* Essay on the relation of the Theory of Morals to Insanity, by T. Mayo, M.D.

gustus. It was dark and deceitful in the simulation of virtue, as long as Drusus and Germanicus survived: it was still the same, with a mixture of good and evil, during the life-time of his mother. It was formidable in cruelty, but free from exhibitions of open lust, while he loved or feared Sejanus; finally, it burst forth at once into vice and infamy, after that all influence of shame and fear being removed, he acted entirely in conformity to his own dispositions.'

*

"In drawing the character of the notorious Lord Wharton, Swift makes the following remarks: I have had the honour of much conversation with his lordship; and am thoroughly convinced how indifferent he is to applause, and how insensible to reproach. Which is not a humour put on to serve a turn or meet a countenance, nor arising from any consciousness of innocence, or any grandeur of mind, but the mere unaffected bent of his nature.

"He is without the sense of shame or glory, as some men are without the sense of smelling; and therefore a good name to him is no more than a precious ointment would be to these.'

"The following instances of this 'bent,' or deviation from common nature, are obtained out

* Vide Appendix, Note V.

of a less elevated rank of society. Mr. A. was born in a respectable station, and is in possession of a good fortune, of as much at least, as he has allowed to remain out of a good fortune. He has a wife and children, and as many friends or rather associates as his convivial qualities retain for him in spite of the hardness of his character. He has always been profusely extravagant; for his passions and appetites have compelled him to squander money, which he would probably have hoarded if his selfishness had taken that turn. His temper is at once stern and violent; and all who know him expect that the disposition of his will, must prove him to the last moment of his life, utterly unjust. If he had sufficient courage, he would rob and murder, for his cupidity is under no moral check; but he is naturally very timid, and owes to this circumstance his freedom from such acts, as the law construes into crimes. Such is Mr. A. ; and such also, or as nearly such, as the distinctive points, which separate all individuals, will allow, is Mr. G. his neighbour. But there happens to exist a peculiarity in the latter, which materially alters the course of his life and its results upon others. Mr. G. was observed to talk very much to himself; this excited attention, and on farther

inquiry it was discovered, that he was habitually under the influence of false perceptions, and that he considered himself solicited by certain voices, audible only to himself, to perform those actions, which indeed flowed naturally enough from his own evil dispositions. Mr. G. was accordingly recognized as a lunatic, and placed under restraint. Thus the family of Mr. G. is secured against the results of his moral character; and his fortune will descend according to the principles of law, thus dealing out a justice to others and a protection to him, which would have been refused, but for this hallucination.

"If on the one hand the interests of virtue require the admission of a moral sense, and if this admission is borne out by sufficient natural evidence, on the other hand, it still appears both reasonable and humane to accept with readiness the proofs of an exception to this general law. Aristotle terms the absence of a moral sense a lesser evil than the struggle of vice against a principle of conscience; probably because it involves less responsibility. And surely to impute a principle of conscience or moral approbation to the class of men, which the above cases illustrate, is to allow a very gratuitous extension of the depravity of human nature, which will rather weaken than strengthen our