selves actively designing, and that do understandingly intend and pursue ends; and consequently that they themselves must partake of an intelligent, spiritual nature, since mere matter is most manifestly incapable of thought or design. And further, by the most evident consequence, that their productive cause, (viz. the necessary, self-existing Being, whereto all other things owe themselves,) must be a mind or spirit, inasmuch as to suppose any effect to have any thing more of excellency in it than the cause from whence it proceeded, is to suppose all that excellency to be effected without a cause, or to have arisen of itself out of nothing. See former Part, Chap. III. Sect. XII. &c. Therefore if it did not immediately appear that necessary being, as such, is absolutely perfect being; yet, by this series of discourse, it appears that the main cause of religion is still safe; inasmuch as that necessary Being which is the cause of all things else, is however evinced to be an absolutely perfect Being, and particularly a necessary self-existent Mind or Spirit, which is therefore a most apparently fit and most deserving object of religion, or of the honour of a temple; which is the sum of what we were concerned for. Nor needed we be solicitous, but that the unity or onliness of the necessary Being, would afterwards be made appear, as also we think it was. For since the whole universe of produced being must arise out of that which was necessary self-existent Being, it must therefore comprehend all being in itself, its own formally, and eminently all other; i. e. what was its own, being formally its own, must be eminently also all being else, contained in all possible simplicity, within the productive power of its own. This Being therefore containing in itself all that exists necessarily, with the power of producing all the rest, which together make up all being, can primarily be but one, inasmuch as there can be but one all. Upon the whole therefore, our general proposition is sufficiently evident, and out of question-That whatever exists necessarily, and of itself, is absolutely perfect. Nor is it at all incongruous that this matter should be thus argued out, by such a train and deduction of consequences, drawn from effects, that come under our present notice; for how come we to know that there is any self-existing Being at all, but that we find there is somewhat in being that is subject to continual mutation, and which therefore exists not necessarily, (for whatsoever is what it is necessarily, can never change, or be other than what it is,) but must be caused by that which is necessary and self-existent. Nothing could be more reasonable or more certain than the deduction from what appears of excellency and perfection in such being as it is caused; of the correspondent and far-transcendent excellency and perfection of its cause. But yet, after all this, if one set himself attentively to consider, there must appear so near a connexion between the very things themselves, self-existence and absolute perfection, that it can be no easy matter to conceive them separately. the uncaused self-existent Being be, but most unlimited, infinite, all-comprehending, and most absolutely perfect? Nothing therefore can be more evident, than that the selfexistent Being must be the absolutely perfect Being. And again, if you simply convert the terms, and let this be the proposition,-That the absolutely-perfect Being is the self-existent Being-it is most obvious to every one, that the very notion of an absolutely-perfect Being carries necessity of existence, or self-existence, in it; which the notion of nothing else doth. And indeed one great masterb of this argument for the existence of God, hath himself told me, "That though when he had puzzled divers atheists with it they had been wont to quarrel at it, as sophistical and fallacious, he could never meet with any that could detect the sophism, or tell where any fallacy in it lay; and that, upon the whole, he relied upon it as most solid and firm." And I doubt not but it may be managed with that advantage as to be very clearly concluding; yet, because I reckoned the way I have taken more clear, I chose it rather. But finding that so near cognation and reciprocal connexion between the terms both ways, I reckoned this short representation hereof, annexed to the larger course of evincing the same thing, might add no unuseful strength to it; and doubt not to conclude, upon the whole, that-whatsoever Being exists necessarily, and of itself, is absolutely perfect-and can, therefore, be no other than an intelligent Being; i. e. an infinite, eternal Mind, and so a most fit, and the only fit, deserving object of religion, or of the honour of a temple. III. But now, be all this never so plain, it will, by some, be thought all false, if they find any man to have contrivance enough to devise some contrary scheme of things, and confidence enough to pretend to prove it; till that proof be detected of weakness and vanity, which must first be our further business with Spinosa. And not intending to examine particularly the several parts and junctures of his model, inasmuch as I find his whole design is lost, if he fail of evincing these things,-That it belongs to all substance, as such, to exist of itself, and be infinite-And, (which will be sufficiently consequent hereupon,) That substance is but one, and that it is impossible for one substance to produce another. I shall only attend to what he more directly says to this effect, and shall particularly apply myself to consider such of his propositions as more immediately respect this his main design: for they will bring us back to the definitions and axioms, or other parts of his discourse, whereon those are grounded, and even into all the darker and more pernicious recesses of his labyrinth; so as every thing of importance to the mentioned purpose will be drawn under our consideration, as this thread shall lead us. His first proposition we let pass; "That a substance is, in order of nature, before its affections;" having nothing applicable to his purpose in it, which we shall not otherwise meet with. His second, "That two substances, having divers attributes, have nothing common between them; or, which must be all one, do agree in nothing, I conceive it will be no great presumption to deny. And since he is pleased herein to be divided from himself, it is a civility to his later and wiser self to do so, who will afterwards have substance, having a multitude of distinct attributes, i. e. essences, and which therefore cannot but be manifold, tc have every thing common. So little hath he common with himself. Self-existence Into how profound an abyss is a man cast at the thought of it! How doth it overwhelm and swallow up his mind and whole soul! With what satisfaction and delight must he see himself comprehended, of what he finds he can never comprehend! For contemplating the self-existent Being, he finds it eternally, necessarily, never not existing! He can have no thought of the self-existing Being, as such, but as always existing, as having existed always, as always certain to exist. Inquiring into the spring and source of this Being's existence, And it will increase the ooligation upon him, to deliver whence it is that it doth exist; his own notion of a him from the entanglement of his demonstration, as he self-existing Being, which is not arbitrarily taken up, but calls it, of this proposition; as I hope we shall also of the which the reason of things hath imposed upon him, gives other too, for no doubt they are both false. Of this pro him his answer; and it can be no other, in that it is a self-position his demonstration is fetched from his third definiexisting Being, it hath it of itself, that it doth exist. It is an eternal, everlasting spring and fountain of perpetuallyexistent being to itself. What a glorious excellency of being is this! What can this mean, but the greatest remoteness from nothing that is possible; i. e. the most absolute fulness and plenitude of all being and perfection? And whereas all caused being, as such, is, to every man's understanding, confined within certain limits; what can tion, viz. of a substance, "That which is in itself, and conceived by itself; i. e. whose conception needs the conception of nothing else, whereby it ought to be formed;" so is his definition defined over and over. We are here to inquire:-1. Into his definition of a substance. 2. Whether it sufficiently prove his proposition. IV. First, For his definition of a substance. He himself tells us, "A definition ought to express nothing each an equilateral triangle of the same dimensions, or in a thousand places besides; each one of these do only make one and the same numerical triangle, because they have each the same attribute. But how are the attributes of these several triangles the same? What! the same numerically? Then indeed they are all the same numerical triangle; for one and the same numerical essence makes but one and the same numerical thing. But who that is in his right wits would say so? And if it be only said they have all attributes of one and the same kind, what then is consequent, but that they are all triangles of one kind? Which who in his right wits will deny? And if the attribute of a substance be that which constitutes its essence, the attribute of any thing else is that which constitutes its essence. See then how far Spinosa hath advanced with his demonstration of the identity of substance! If he prove not all substance to be numerically the same, he hath done nothing to his purpose. And it is now obvious to every eye how effectually he hath done that. but the simple nature of the thing defined;" and we may | Vienna, a third at Rome, a fourth at London, describe as well expect it distinctly to express that. Doth this definition express the simple nature of a substance, "That which is in itself," when it is left to divination what is meant by is, whether essence, or existence, or subsistence? And when we are to be at as random a guess, what is intended by being in itself? Whether being only contained, or being also sustained in, and by, or of itself? And supposing this latter to be meant, whether that self-subsistence exclude dependence only on another, as a subject, which we acknowledge true of all substance; or dependence as on an efficient, which if he will have to be taken for true of all, he was in reason to expect it should be so taken from his effectual proof, not from the reverence of his authority only: for what he adds, "And that is conceived by itself; and whose conception needs not the conception of any other thing by which it ought to be formed;"-would he have us believe this to be true, when afterward his tenth proposition is, "That every attribute of substance ought to be conceived by itself?" Whereupon then so many attributes, so many substances, it being the nature of a substance to be conceived by itself. Whence also it is further equally evident, his demonstration dwindles into nothing; and gives no support to V. But passing from his notion of a substance, let us VII. His sixth proposition, which contains the maligconsider, secondly, How it proves his proposition, that nity of his whole design, viz. "That one substance cannot "Two substances, having different attributes, have nothing be produced by another substance," which rests (as you common between them." According to him, every attri-see) partly upon the fifth, "That there cannot be two subbute of substance is to be conceived by itself; and yet stances of the same attribute," which in his sense is, as have one and the same substance common to them all hath been shown, most absurdly false, and the attempt of therefore the distinct conception of things is, even with proving it as absurd; partly upon his second, “That two him, no reason why they should have nothing common substances, of different attributes, have nothing common between them. But as to the thing itself, he must have between them," which might be said of whatsoever else, somewhat more enforcing than his definition of a substance, as truly as of substances; but which is also most evidently to prove that two (or many) individual substances may untrue; and partly, upon his third, "That such things as not have the same special nature common to them, and have nothing common between them, the one of them canyet be conceived by themselves; having different indivi- not be the cause of the other," which depends upon two dual natures or attributes, or different special natures, false suppositions,-1. "That there can be two things, having the same general nature. Yea, and an equal de- which have nothing common between them;" which, as pendence on the same common cause, which is a less hath been noted, contradicts itself, and needs not be furingredient in the conception of a thing, than the general ther stood upon. 2. "That whatsoever things are cause and or special nature is. And I doubt not, we shall find he effect, the one to the other, must be mutually understood hath not disproved, but that there is somewhat, in a true by one another," which we shall here more distinctly consense, common to them and their cause, that is of a con- sider, it being also his second demonstration of the corolception much more vastly different from them both. lary of this his sixth proposition, (which nothing but a disposition to trifle, or having nothing to say, could have made him mention, as a corollary from this proposition, it being in effect but a repetition of the same thing,) viz. "That if one substance can be produced by another, (agent, or substance, which you please,) the knowledge of it must depend upon the knowledge of its cause, (by the fourth axiom,) and thereupon. (by definition third) it should not be a substance." We are here to consider, Whereupon, it is necessary to take distinct notice of his third proposition, "What things have nothing common between them, of them the one cannot be the cause of the other." In which nothing is to be peculiarly animadverted on, besides the contradiction in the very terms wherein it is proposed, What things have nothing common between them. How can they be things, and have nothing common between them? If they be things, they have sure the general notion of things common to them; there can therefore be no such things, that have nothing common. And let this be supposed to have been absurdly set down on purpose; yet now, for his demonstration hereof, it rests upon a palpable falsehood-that causes and effects must be mutually understood by one another; as we shall see more hereafter. His fourth we let pass; what it hath regardable in it, being as fitly to be considered under the VI. Fifth; "There cannot be two or more substances, in the whole universe, of the same nature or attribute;" unto which, besides what hath been said already, we need only here to add, that (whereas he hath told us, by the attribute of a substance, he means the essence of it) if he here speak of the same numerical essence or attribute, it is ridiculously true; and is no more than if he had said, One thing is but one thing. If he speak of the same special or general attribute or essence, it is as absurdly false; and for the proof of it, in the latter sense his demonstration signifies nothing. There may be more than one (as a stone, a tree, an animal) that agree in the same general attribute of corporeity, and are diversified by their special attributes; and there may be many of the same special attribute, (viz. of rationality,) as John, Peter, Thomas, &c. that are distinguished by their individual ones. He might as well prove, by the same method, the identity of his modi, as of substances; as that there can be but one individual triangle in all the world, of one attribute or property, as but one substance. Let (for instance) one at París, another at 1. This his fourth axiom, "That the knowledge of an effect depends upon the knowledge of its cause, and doth involve it." An effect may be considered two ways; absolutely, as it is in itself, or relatively, as it is the effect of an efficient cause. It cannot, it is true, be understood to be the effect of such an efficient, but the knowledge that this was its efficient, is involved therein; for it is the same thing, and so much may be known, without knowing any thing of the nature of either the efficient or effect. But this signifies nothing to his purpose. He must therefore mean, that the knowledge of an effect absolutely considered, and in its own nature, depends upon and involves the knowledge of the nature of its efficient. Surely, the nature of a thing may be competently known by its true definition. But is the efficient cause wont to be universally put into definitions? He tells us himself, (Schol. 2. upon Proposition 8.) "A true definition contains, or expresses, nothing, besides the mere nature of the thing defined." And let any man that thinks it worth it, be at the pains to examine his own definition in the several parts of this ethico-geometrical tract, and see whether he always puts the efficient cause into every definition. And (no doubt) he thought himself to define accurately. If all other men, who have so generally reckoned the efficient and end, external causes, and only matter and form internal, and ingredient into the nature of things, and therefore only fit to be put into definitions, were thought by him mistaken and out in their reckoning, it was, however, neither modest nor wise, to lay down for an axiom a thing so contrary to the common sentiments of mankind; and without the least attempt to prove it, go about to demonstrate by it, in so portentous a cause; and lay the whole weight of his horrid cause upon it; expecting all the world should be awed into an assent, by the authority of his bare word; and not presume to disbelieve or doubt it, only because he is pleased to stamp the magisterial name of an axiom upon it. If therefore any man assume the boldness to deny his axiom, what is become of his demonstration ? And whereas it is commonly apprehended, that definitions are not of individual things, but of special kinds, and is ac<nowledged by himself, "That the essence of things produced by God, involves not existence, and the producion of a thing is nothing else but the putting it into actual existence;" why may not the abstract essence, or nature of things, be well enough conceived and defined, without involving the conception of their productive cause? And this enough shows, 2dly, That his definition of a substance proves not, that one substance cannot be produced by another, viz. "That which can be conceived by itself," for so it may, without involving the conception of that which produces it; and so be a substance sufficiently according to his definition. Though there can be no inconvenience in admitting, that things understood apart, by themselves, may be afterwards further and more clearly understood, by considering and comparing them in the habitude and references which they bear as causes and effects (or otherwise) to one another. And now is his, : VIII. Seventh proposition, "That it belongs to the nature of substance to exist," which is so great a pillar, left itself without support; and being understood of substance as such, as his terms and design require it to be, it is manifestly impious, communicating the most fundamental attribute of the Deity to all substance. And is as little befriended by reason, as it befriends religion; for it rests upon nothing but the foregoing baffled proposition and this definition, of that which is its own cause; which is, "That whose essence involves existence, or which cannot be conceived otherwise than as existing;" whereas, it is sufficiently plain we have a conception clear enough of the general nature of a substance as such, abstracted from existence, or non-existence, conceiving it only to be such, as if it exist, doth subsist in and by itself, i. e. without having a subject to support it; though it may be such as to have needed a productive, and continually to need a sustaining, efficient cause. Nor is there less clearness in this abstract conception of a substance, than there is in that of a modus, or accident, which we may conceive in an equal abstraction, from actual existence, or non-existtence; understanding it to be such, as that if it exist, it doth inexist, or exist only in another. And now is our way sufficiently prepared to the consideration of his eighth proposition; "That all substance is necessarily infinite." And how is it demonstrated? Why, by his fifth proposition,-"That there can be but one substance, of one and the same attribute," which hath been sufficiently unravelled and exposed, so as not to be left capable of signifying any thing here, as the reader will see by looking back to what has been said upon it. And now it must quite sink; its next reliance failing it, viz. the foregoing seventh proposition,-"That it belongs to it, to exist necessarily." I grant the consequence to be good, and reckon it a truth of great evidence and concernment, "That whatsoever exists necessarily, is infinite." I heartily congratulate Spinosa's acknowledgment of so very clear and important an assertion; and do hope, as in the foregoing discourse I have made some, to make further, good use of it. But for what he assumes, that all "substance necessarily exists;" you see it rests upon nothing, and so consequently doth what he would conclude from it, that all substance is infinite. And his further proof of it avails as little, viz. that it cannot be finite; because (by his second definition) if it be so, it must be limited by something of the same nature, &c. Which would be absurd by proposition fifth,-"That there cannot be two substances of the same attribute:" for that there be two, of the same individual attribute, to bound one another is unnecessary, (as well as impossible,) and absurdly supposed for this purpose. For if there were two of the same individual nature and attribute, they would not bound one another, but run into one; inasmuch as having but one attribute, they should, according to him, have but one and the same essence; and so be most entirely one, and that there cannot be two, or many times two, of the same special or general nature, is unproved; and the contrary most evident, as may be seen, in what hath been said upon that fifth proposition. IX. No man needs wish an easier task, than it would be to show the falsehood or impertinency of his Scholia upon this proposition, and of his following discourse, to the purpose above mentioned. But I reckon it unnecessary, his principal supports being (I will not say overthrown, but) discovered to be none at all. I shall therefore follow his footsteps no further, only take notice of some few things that have a more direct aspect upon his main design, and make all the haste I can to take leave of him, that I may be at liberty to pursue my own. What is in his first Scholium follows, he says, only upon his seventh proposition, which itself follows upon nothing; and therefore I further regard it not. His second Schol. would have his seventh proposition pass for a common notion; and so it will, when he hath inspired all mankind with his sentiments. But why must it do so? Because substance is that which is in itself, and is conceived by itself? Now compare that with his tenth proposition, -"Every attribute of substance ought to be conceived by itself." There the definition of substance is given to every attribute of substance; therefore, every attribute of substance is a substance, since the definitions of substance to which he refers us in the demonstration of that proposition, agrees to it; therefore, so many attributes, so many substances. What can be plainer? We have then his one substance multiplied into an infinite number of substances. By his sixth definition, we shall see his own confession of this consequence, by and by. And whereas in this Schol. he would make us believe, that modifications men may conceive as not existing, but substances they cannot. Let the reason of this assigned difference be considered; "That by substance they must understand that which is in itself, and is conceived by itself, its knowledge not needing the knowledge of another thing. But by modifications they are to understand that which is in another, and whose conception is formed by the conception of that thing in which they are: wherefore, we can have true ideas of not-existing modifications, inasmuch as though they may not actually exist, otherwise than in the understanding, yet their essence is so comprehended in another, that they may be conceived by the same. But the truth of substances is not otherwise without the understanding, than in themselves, because they are conceived by themselves," &c. Which reason is evidently no reason. For with the same clearness, wherewith I conceive a substance, whensoever it exists, as existing in itself; I conceive a modification, whensoever it exists, as existing in another. If therefore any thing existing in another, be as truly existing, as existing in itself, the existence of a substance is no more necessary than the existence of a modification. And if we can have true ideas of not-existing modifications, we may have as true, of notexisting substances: especially since (according to him) we cannot conceive a substance, without conceiving in it some or other modifications. For he tells us, "The essence of modifications is so comprehended in another, that they may be conceived by the same." Now, what means he by the essence of modifications being comprehended in another? By that other, he must mean substance: for modifications do modify substances, or nothing; and if the essences of modifications be contained in substances, they must (according to him) be contained in the essence of substances. For there is, saith he, nothing in nature, besides substances and their affections or modifications (demonstration of prop. fourth, and def. fifth.) Therefore, since nothing can be conceived in substance, antecedent to these modifications, besides its own naked essence, they must be contained immediately in the very essence of substance, g Def 3 or in substance itself; wherefore if all substance be neces- | sarily existent, they must be necessarily inexistent. And if the essence of substance contains the inexisting modi, the essence of the modi doth equally contain their inexistence in substance. Whereupon, by consequence also, the essence of these modifications doth as much involve existence (since no one can affirm inexistence to be existence) as the essence of substance doth, in direct contradiction to prop. twenty-fourth, which expressly (and most truly) says, "The essence of things produced by God" (which he, as untruly, intends of these modifications alone) "do not involve existence." And now for his notanda in this Schol. by which he would conclude, that there is no other than this one infiniteh substance in being. It is true indeed, that the definition of a thing (which we have before said is of specific nature, not of individuals) expresses not any certain number of existing individuals, (be it man, or triangle, or what else you please,) nor any at all. For surely the definition of man, or triangle, would be the same, if every individual of each should be abolished and cease. But that, if any do exist, some cause must be assignable why they exist, and why so many only. What is to be inferred from this? That the reason being the same, as to every substance whose essence involves not existence in it, (which that the essence of every substance doth, or of substance as such, he hath not proved, nor ever can) when any such substance is found to exist, the cause of its existence, not being in its own nature, must be external. And therefore, so many only do exist, because a free agent, able to produce them, (for the very substance of created beings itself, owes not its production to a merely natural, undesigning, or to any subordinate agent only,) was pleased to produce so many, and no more. And so hath this unhappy author himself, with great pains and sweat, reasoned out for us the very thing we assert. But that it may be further seen, how incurious a writer this man of demonstration is, and how fatally, while he is designing the overthrow of religion, he overthrows his own design, I shall not let pass what he says, in demonstrating his twelfth prop." That no attribute of substance can be truly conceived, from which it may follow, that substance can be divided." How he proves it by prop. eighth, and after by the sixth, I shall not regard, till I see those propositions better proved. But that which I at present remark, is his argument from prop. fifth,-"That if substance could be divided, each part must consist of a different attribute; and so of one substance many might be constituted." A fair confession, that many attributes will constitute many substances. And himself acknowledges many attributes of substance, (def. sixth, and prop. eleventh.) And therefore, though he here call this an absurdity, it is an absurdity which he hath inevitably now fastened upon himself, having here allowed, plainly, the consequence (as was above promised to be shown) that if there be diversity of attributes, they will constitute a diversity of substances, which it was before impossible to him to disallow, having defined an attribute (as was formerly noted) to bei that which constitutes the essence of substance. Therefore, his whole cause is here fairly given away; for his one substance is now scattered into many, and the pretended impossibility of the creation of any substantial being, quite vanished into thin and empty air. The many inconsistencies to be noted also in his annexed letters, with several parts of his discourse, it is not my business particularly to reflect on. It is enough, to my purpose, to have shown he comes short of his. X. Upon the whole, little more seems needful for the refutation of this his horrid doctrine of the unity, selfexistence, and infinity of all substance, than only to oppose Spinosa to Spinosa. Nor have I ever met with a discourse so equally inconsistent with all principles of reason and religion, and with itself. And so frequently doth he overthrow his own ill design, in this very discourse, that it is altogether unnecessary to insist on the inconsistencies of this, with his demonstrations of Des Cartes's principles, written divers years before. Against which, every one that hath compared, knows these his later sentiments to import so manifest hostility, that I may well spare that vain and useless labour, it being sufficient only to note the more principal, in the margin. His following propositions (and among them those most surprising ones, the sixteenth and twenty-eighth) tend to evince the onliness of substance, and the absolute necessity of all actions; but upon grounds so plainly already discovered to be vain and false, that we need follow him no further. Nor is it necessary to disprove his hypothesis, or charge it with the many absurdities that belong to it; they are so horrid and notorious, that to any one who is not in love with absurdity for itself, it will abundantly suffice to have shown he hath not proved it. XI. I cannot but, in the meantime, take some notice of the genius, which seems to have inspired both him and his devotees. A fraudulent pretence to religion, while they conspire against it. Whereof many instances might be given; as the prefixing that text of Holy Scripture to so impure a volume, on the title-page, 1 John iv. 13. "By this we know that we dwell in God, and God dwelleth in us, because he hath given us of his Spirit." That the preface to his posthumous works is filled up with quotations out of the Bible; which it is their whole design to make signify nothing. The divine authority whereof, an anony mous defender of his, in that part of his work which he entitles, Specimen artis ratiocinandi, naturalis et artificialis ad pantosophiæ principia manuducens, undertakes to demonstrate (because, as he says, all religion depends upon the word of God) by an argument, which, he says, he can glory, that after many years meditation, the divine grace favouring him, he hath found out, by which he tell us, he is able (to do what, that he knows, no man hath ever done before him) to demonstrate naturally the truth of the sacred Scripture, that is, That it is, the word of God. An argument, he says, able to convince the most pertinacious pagan, &c. And it is taken from the idea of God, compared with that divine saying, Exod. iii. 14. "I am that I am." Whereupon what he says will to any one who attentively reads show his design, viz. at once to expose religion, and hide himself. And so doth his collusion sufficiently appear in making the soul philosophically mortal, and Christianly immortal, p. 70, &c. But if the philosopher perish for ever, what will become of the Christian? This author also finds great fault with the instances usually given to exemplify the common definition of substance, That is, a being subsisting by itself, or in itself,m because he thought them not agreeable enough to his master Spinosa's notion of the unity and identity of all substances, and consequently of the improductibility of any. And he fancies them to contradict themselves, that while they call the sun, the moon, the earth, this or that tree, or stone, substances, they yet admit them to be produced by another. For how can it be, saith he, that they should be in or by themselves, and yet depend on another, as on a subject, or as an efficient cause? He is very angry, and says they by it do but crucify and mock their readers, only because it crosses and disappoints his and his master's impious purpose of deifying every substance. And therefore, to serve that purpose as he fancies the better, he would more aptly model all things, and reduce them to two distinct kinds only, viz. Of things that may be conceived primarily and in themselves, without involving the conception of another; and again, of things that we conceive not primarily and in themselves, but secondarily and by another, whose conception is involved in their conception. But all the while, what is there in this, more than what is common and acknowledged on all hands? as the sense of the trivial distich he takes the pains to recite, Summus Aristoteles, &c. But when all this is granted, what is he nearer his mark? Of that former sort, still some are from another; and one other only of and from itself. But then (says he) There he makes corporeal substance divisible; here, all substance indivisible, m Manuduct. p. 11, 12, how are those former conceived in and by themselves? | Well enough, say I; for they are to be conceived, as they are to be defined; but the definition of a thing is to express only its own nature and essence (as Spinosa himself says, Schol. 2. in Prop. 8.) considered apart by itself, into which (as hath been said) the efficient cause, which is extrinsical to it, enters not; and without considering whether it exist or exist not. Because definitions are of special kinds, or common natures, that exist not as such; not of existing individuals, except the one only self-subsisting, original Being, of whose essence existence is; which Spinosa himself acknowledges, and makes his twentieth proposition; as on the other hand, that "The essence of things produced by God involves not existence," is his twentyfourth. XII. But that the substance of things, whose essence involves existence, and whose essence involves it not, should be one and the same, exceeds all wonder! One would think, so vastly different essences of substance should at least make different substances; and that when Spinosa hath told us so expressly, that an "attribute of substance constitutes the essence of substance; and that all the attributes of substance are distinctly conceived; the conception of the one, not involving the conception of another;" and so do most really differ from each other, and make so many essences therefore, of substance really distinct, (though he once thought otherwise of the divine attributes, that they did only differ from each other ratione, and that God was a most simple Being, which he also takes pains to prove, R. D. Cartes. Princip. Philos. Append. part 2d. cap. 5. p. 117, 118,) one would surely hereupon think, that so vastly different attributes, as necessary existence, and contingent, should constitute the most different substances imaginable. For what is an attribute? Id quod intellectus de substantia percipit, tanquam ejus essentiam constituens. (Def. 4.) Now the essence of some substance the understanding most clearly perceives as involving existence in it. Existence therefore constitutes the essence of such substance, and is therefore an attribute of it. Some other essence it as clearly perceives, that involves not existence. Now this sort of essence is the attribute of somewhat. And of what is it the attribute? Why, he hath told us, "An attribute is what the understanding perceives of substance as constituting its essence;" therefore, some substance hath such an essence as involves not existence. Now let it hereupon be considered (albeit that I affect not to give high titles to any reasonings of mine) whether this amount not to a demonstration against the hypothesis of Spinosa, and the rest of his way, that all substance is self-existent; and that, even upon their own principles and concessions, so frequently acknowledging the world to be produced, and not self-existent, that even the substance of it is produced also; which they deny, viz.n That whose essence, this unnamed author says, includes not existence, either hath some substance belonging to its essence, or it hath not. If not, it may exist without substance; and then unto what is it an attribute, or what doth it modify? If yea, there is then some substance, and particularly that of this world, in whose essence existence is not included; and that by consequence, the substance of this world is produced. But if any make a difficulty of it to understand, how all being and perfection should be included in the Divine Being, and not be very God; so much is already said to this in the former Part of this discourse, (viz. Chap. 4. Sect. XII. &c.) that as I shall not here repeat what hath been said, so I think it unnecessary to say more. And it is what Spinosa himself had once such sobriety of mind as to apprehend, when (Princip. R. D. Cart. Philosoph. more Geometr. demonstrat. Append. part 1. cap. 2.) he says thus of God, or of increate substance, that God doth eminently contain that which is found formally in created things, i. e. God hath that in his own nature, in which all created things are contained in a more eminent manner; and that there is some attribute in God, wherein all the perfections, even of matter, are after a more excellent manner themselves contained. Having before told us, n Manuduct. p. 107. (Princip. Part I. Axiom 8.) That by eminently, he understood when a cause did contain all the reality of its effect more perfectly than the effect itself; by formally, when it contained it in equal perfection. And so he might have told himself of somewhat sufficiently common (though not univocally) to the substance of the Divine Nature, and that of creatures; whereon to found the causality of the former, in reference to the latter, as effected thereby. But as he grew older, his understanding either became less clear, or was more perverted by ill design. CHAPTER II. Animadversions from a French writer, nameless. His pretence to confute Spinosa. The opinion of the world's being made of independent self-existing matter; chosen by him and asserted against two other opinions. That of matter's being created out of nothing rejected, and falsely charged with novelty. Moses, and the author to the Hebrews misalleged, vindicated. Self-originate, independent matter disproved: asserted by this author with evident self-contradiction; and without necessity. I. BUT having here done with him and that sort of men, I shall now very briefly consider the fore-mentioned Monsieur's way of confuting him. The conceit, that there must be such a thing as necessary self-subsisting matter, hath I confess seemed to be favoured by some or other name among the Ethnics of that value, as to have given some countenance to a better cause; besides some others, who with greater incongruity, and more injury to it, have professed the Christian name. It hath been of late espoused, and asserted more expressly, by this French gentleman, who hath not thought fit to dignify it with his name, doubting perhaps whether the acquainting the world with it, might not more discredit his cause, than his cause (in this part of it) could better the reputation of his name. However it be, though my inquiry and credible information hath not left me ignorant, I shall not give him occasion to think himself uncivilly treated, by divulging what he seems willing should be a secret. For though it was not intrusted to me as such, I shall be loth to disoblige him by that, whereby that I know I can oblige nobody else. It is enough that his book may be known by its title, L'Impie convaincu. It is professedly written against the atheism of Spinosa. And when I first looked into it, I could not refrain thinking of Plato's repartee to Diogenes, when the latter undertook to reprehend the other's pride, that he did it with greater pride. Although I think not the application is to be made in the strictest terms. For I will neither be so indulgent to Spinosa, as to reckon that any man's atheism can be greater than his; nor so severe to this his adversary, as positively to conclude he designed the service of any atheism at all. But I think him at least, unwarily and without any necessity, to have quitted one of the principal supports of the doctrine of a Deity; and that he hath undertaken the confutation of atheism, upon a ground that leads to atheism. II. He thinks, it seems, Spinosa not otherwise confutable, than upon the hypothesis of eternal, independent matter, which he thus explains in his preface, it being the second of the three distinct hypotheses whereof he there gives an account. a The second, he says, is theirs who assert two beings or two substances increate, eternal, independent, as to their simple existence, though very differently; the former whereof is God, the infinitely perfect Being, almighty, the principle of all perfection; and the second, matter, a being essentially imperfect, without power, without life, without knowledge; but capable nevertheless of all these perfections, by impression from God, and his operations upon it. This he pretends to have been the hypothesis of the ancient philosophers and divines (after he had acknowledged the former hypothesis-" That the world, and the matter of it, were drawn out of nothing by the infinite power of the first and supreme Being, which itself alone was eternal and independent,"-was the hypothesis of the greater part of Christian divines and philosophers.) And this second, he says, is the hypothesis which he shall fol a La seconde est celle de ceux qui, &c. Avertissement. |