The statute of 1849 gave it the criminal jurisdiction of a county court of sessions, and the act of 1870 made it like that of oyer and terminer.

The court and its judges, have the like powers in relation to actions therein, and the process and proceedings therein, and powers over the docket of its judgments in the County Clerk's office, as the Supreme Court and its justices, in relation to actions, &c., in the Supreme Court; and all laws regulating practice, &c., in the Supreme Court, apply as far as practicable to this court. The judges have the powers of a Supreme Court judge at chambers.

Special terms are held by single justices, for the trial of issues of fact with or without a jury, and for the determination of motions, &c. ; and general terms are held, necessarily by two of the judges, for hearing appeals from decisions at special term.

Appeals now lie from the general term of this court direct to the court of last resort (L. 1849, p. 171, ch. 125, § 6, amended 1 L. 1870, p. 1047-8, ch. 470, §§ 5, 6, and 7; amended again by 1 L. 1871, p. 556-7, ch. 282, §§ 3 and 8).

EDWARD W. BELL.

CHIEF JUSTICE NEILSON.

THE presiding judge, Hon. JOSEPH NEILSON, was born at Argyle, in this State, in 1815. He is of Scotch-Irish parentage, a union of races which has been singularly productive of energetic and able men. Descended from a notably long-lived and robust stock, his sturdy frame, and the vigor and determination which have formed the lines of his countenance, as their fittest expression, betoken stamina and vitality. His grandfather, John Neilson, the founder of the family in America, came from the north of Ireland in 1760, with a band of friends, and settled in Washington county in this State. They were strict Presbyterians, and brought with them their pastor, the Rev. Dr. Clark.

The eldest son, John Rogers Neilson, introduced a slight change in the family name by dropping the "i," thus making its spelling conform to its pronunciation, and his branch of the family have continued the change to this day. Of that branch, and the most illustrious of the name, was Samuel Nelson, who for the unexampled period of half a century continuously fulfilled the high functions of a Judge, serving both as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of this State, and as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. A son of his, Rensselaer R. Nelson, of St. Pauls, Minnesota, is one of the District Judges of the United States.

Samuel Neilson, the third son of John Neilson, was a physician, and a man of culture and scientific attainments. He removed to Canada and died there at the age of eighty-seven years. His son, the subject of this sketch, practiced law in Oswego until November, 1844, when he removed to the city of New York. An affectionate address, on that occasion, presented to him by the members of the bar of Oswego, was published in The Oswego Palladium and The Albany Argus. In his practice here he had a large and favorable experience; was often concerned in cases of grave importance, and was the trusted counselor of some of the foremost citizens in New York. Continuing his practice in New York, he fixed his residence at length in Brooklyn, and became identified with its interests professional, political, and social. When the reorganization of the City Court under the new constitution was proposed, he was selected as chairman of the meeting of the bar, held to consider the bill to be proposed for legislative action; and the plan of reorganization having been adopted, he was elected in 1870 one of the judges of the new court. At the end of Judge THOMPSON's term, which extended from the old organization into the new, the place of Chief Judge was assigned to Judge NEILSON by his colleagues, Hon. ALEXANDER MCCUE and Hon. GEORGE G. REYNOLDS.

In person Judge NEILSON is rather below the medium height, and strongly built. A certain air of rugged energy and a manly and resolute bearing show him to be a man apart, and admirably befit his station. His voice is peculiar and at once attracts attention; capable of great softness of expression, it rises in rapid gradations when excited or aroused.

As to his mind it need hardly be said to any one who peruses these volumes, that it is distinguished for clearness and quickness of perception, strength of memory and accuracy of reasoning. He is possessed of great firmness of purpose, and, as a consequence, his patience is not easily disturbed.

In the transaction of the business of the court, he is usually indulgent toward counsel. But from the experienced lawyer he exacts courtesy, not merely towards himself, but towards the opposing counsel, towards the witnesses, and towards the jury. From the inexperienced he exacts careful preparation, and at times enforces this by censure. But he is kind and patient with the young practitioner, and we have heard him in private express great regard for the personal worth and abilities of some whom he had publicly censured. He is most pleased to have eminent counsel before him, partly because they exemplify the best results and workings of the science of the law, and partly because, as he expresses it, "they lighten the labor of the court." He has at all times confined himself to the sphere of action which is prescribed by the law and by ali illustrious precedents: the "thus saith the law" is of great weight with him, so that even the defense of usury under a statute which he regards as impolitic and inequitable, is, when clearly proven, treated as if meritorious. He limits himself to the expounding of the law, usurping neither the office of counsel to discuss, nor of the jury to decide, the questions of fact. In his charges, as published and as printed on appeals, this regard for the office and duty of the jury is uniformly apparent. As an instance, his charge in the case of Landers against The Staten Island Railroad Co., printed at large in Abbott's Reports (vol. 13, p. 338, N. S.), might be cited. On going over it carefully we are not able to discover any indication of what may have been his opinion as to the weight of the testimony, although the case grew out of a great calamity which might well have excited judicial as well as public sympathy. In Homan against Earle (13 Abbott's R. N. S., 402, opinion on appeal by Judge McCUE) the same deference was paid to the jury, the facts and circumstances given to them to find whether, to the mutual comprehension and intent of the parties, the alleged promise of marriage had been made, there having been no expressed engagement. It was in this case that Judge NEILSON ruled that the contract to marry could be made without words.*

His Honor always blends the gentleman with the judge. He is uniformly courteous to the gentler sex; he holds that woman is man's equal in the finer intellectual traits, not his superior; that while the avenues open for her activity and usefulness should be extended, our recent laws disturbing the marriage relation, and allowing her to carry on business as a femme sole, and to employ her husband as clerk, agent, or servant, indicate no healthy progress. His moral sentiments are all in favor of the law of marriage and of divorce as it exists in New York to-day. He is of opinion that the laxity of legislation in some of our sister states on the subject of divorce is unwise and demoralizing. Indeed, in this and in other respects, he is somewhat of a Puritan. He holds to John Calvin, denying the austerities imputed to the Institutes, but supplements the

* Affirmed, 53 N. Y. R., 267.