to that rule, the Court of Appeals must greatly lament it. JASTARY, 1814. Under this impression, it is humbly asked that, if the petition should be rejected, the ground of the rejection may be stated, Spencer and to enable the legislature to possess the court of a branch of White, power so important to the best rights of the people of our Wilson. country. I will mention, that on the principles herein investigated must depend cases which are yet of more common occurrence than the one presented by the petition. I mean those in which the defendant at law, knowing that there is a balance due on the bond, or account, on which he is sued, in the confidence, so commonly entertained, that the creditor will give the just credits, fails to incur the expence to himself, and the delay on the plaintiff, of proving them before a jury. If Spencer fails, so must all the debtors who are thus lured into such an unfortunate confidence. Wirt, for the appellants. Nicholas, for the appellec. Thursday, January 13th, 1814, Judge ROANE pronounced the following opinion of this court. The court is of opinion that, although the appellants might have submitted the question, involving the authority of Patrick Cavan as agent for the appellee, to the jury in the trialat law; and although it may be that such jury ought, in that case, to bave affirmed his competency to have received the sums paid on account of the bond in question ; yet it not appearing that such defence was actually made at that trial; and this being a question involving trust and confidence, and (1) Note. See Alderson v. Biggars and others, 4 H. & M. 470; Nia cholson and Heth v. Hancock and others, Ibid 491; De Lima v, Glassell's adm. Ibid. 369; Syme and others v. Montague, Ibid. 180; Terrell v Dick, 1 Call, 546; Turpin adm. of James v. Thomas, 2 H. & M. 139; Kincaid 1, Cuningham, 2 Munf. 1. ; the Andito. v. Nicholas, 2 Munf. 31; Fenmsick v. M. Murdo, and Fisher, 2 Munf. 244 ; Duvals v. Ross, 2 Munf. 290; and Price's executor v. Fuqua's administrator 3 Munf. as such peculiarly appropriate to the jurisdiction of a Court JANUARY, 1814. of Equity; and it not being proper to confine the appellants to the common law jurisdiction, in which they would have Spencer and been deprived of the appellee's testimony ; the bill was proWhite, perly exhibited. And as it appears that the said Cavan was Wilson. generally reputed and considered as the agent of the appel- Decree reversed, and cause remanded to the Court of Argued, Satur. Vaughan's Administrator against Winckler's Ex ecutor. day, March 13th, 1813. 1 In what The declaration in this case was in the following words : form the declaration may “ Mecklenburg County to wit, John Winckler, executor of be drawn, in trespass by an Executor against an administrator, for goods taken away by the intestate from the testator. perepic **ds the 2. Quære, whether vindictive damages may be recovered in such action ? 3. In trespass for goods taken away, proof by witnesses, that the person of whom the plaintiff bought the good, was heard to say, before the institution of the suit, that, when he sold them, they belonged to the defendant, is not admissible evidence against the plaintiff. 4. In trespass against an administrator for goods taken away by the intestate, judgment ought not to be reversed, for concluding, “and the defendant may be taken, &c.'' instead of " and the defendant in mercy, &c." here stradio V. Jihn Winckler, deceased, complains of Richard H. Walker, MARCH, 1813. administrator, &c. of Thomas Vaughan, deceased, defendant in custody, &c. of a plea, of this to wit, that the said Tho- Vaughan's admas Vaughan, in his lifetime, to wit, on the day of ministrator, in the county aforesaid, with force and arms, unlawfully took Winckler's and carried away from the said John Winckler, deceased, in executor. his lifetime, a large quantity of corn, that is to say, fifteen barrels of corn, of the value of 301. then and there being the lawful property of the said John Winckler, deceased, and in his quiet possession, and other wrongs and enormilies to the said John Winckler then and there did, against the peace of the Commonwealth, whereby right and action accrued, in pursuance of the act of General Assembly in that case made and provided, to the said John Winckler, deceased, in his lifetime, and to the plaintiff, who since his death, qualified according to law as executor of the last will and testament of said John Winckler deceased, to de. mand and receive of the said Thomas Vaughan, in his lifetime, the amount of the value of said corn, and other damages so as aforesaid done to said Jolin Winckler, deceased : Yet the said Thomas Vaughan in his lifetime, and the said Richard H. Walker since his death, although often required, have hitherto altogether refused to pay the same to the said John Winckler, deceased, in his lifetime, and to the said plaintiff since his death, and the said defendant still doth refuse so to do ; to the plaintiff's damage one hundred dollars, wherefore he brings suit, &c." Issue was joined on the plea of not guilty ; and a verdict found for the plaintiff for one hundred dollars damages; two bills of exceptions having been tendered by the defendant, and signed and sealed by the court. The first stated that, on the trial the defendant's counsel moved the court to instruct the jury, that, even if they believed the corn in the declaration mentioned belonged to the plaintiff, they should only give the value of the corn, and not vindiclive damages ; which instruction the court refused to give. From the second, it appeared that the defendant offered to prove that S VOL. IV. MARCH, Robert Lewis, of whom the defendant's testator purchased, 1813, and under whom he claimed the corn, declared, prior to the Vaughan's ad institution of the suit, that the corn, when he sold it to the ministrator, testator of the plaintiff, belonged to the intestate of the de. Winckler's fendant ; which evidence was not permitted by the court to ; Judgment "being entered for 100 dollars damages, to be executor. (a) Williams, for the appellant. The declaration is defective. It should not have been one half in trespass, and the balance in case, but altogether in trespass. It may be said that the part appearing to be in case is merely surplusage ; but whenever a plaintiff assigns a breach as the foundation of his action, he has not a right to consider that as surplusage. Here the breach, in failing to pay the money, is laid as the foundation of the action. 2. The plaintiff was not entitled to recover vindictive da mages, but only the value of the corn, which is all that is Rew.Code, ist. given him by the act of assembly :(a) for at common law, he vol ch. 92. had po remedy; the rule being that actio personalis moritur sect. 58. p. 167. cum persona (6). His right to recover ought to be limited (6) Coup: to the value, for another reason ; because the administrator 375, Hambly Troit, i was not as competent to make defence, as his intestate would have been if the suit had been brought against him in his 3. The testimony of declarations made by Robert Lewis 4. The judgment concluding “ that the defendant may be ; VS. ages, il the hans COUIL defects d the best y be si ndatiad prior to be taken, &c." is erroneous. It would permit a ca sa against MARCH, 1813 dit to the the body of the administrator, for a tort committed by his of the de intestate. Vaughan's ad. be court ministrator Munford, contra. The declaration is not insufficient. The Winkler's action against the administrator in this case is a mere crea executor. ture of the act of assembly; for no such action lay at comfaid defe mon law; and no particular form of declaring is prescribed complete without it. plusu 2. Neither the declaration in the present case, noi' the act of assembly, limits the demand to the value of the curn, rplusat The act only gives the action, by or against executors or that price may have been added by the jury. ctive de limited istrato: CCAUSE 25 10 74 dis. may be |