viz., that an imbecility of thought can be in any way transmuted into a property of the nature of things. But the difficulty is only apparent; an impotence of thought only forbids us to discover how a thing is (Tì čσT), or "the mode of existence," and so what it is: the conception of its nature in a word is excluded. While faith or belief is possible in the mere fact of its existence; Tò OT-faith therefore if real in any sense must be a potence in one way or another; we must believe that a thing is, or that it is not. Nor let it be maintained in reply to this that conception and faith must be the samethey can only be supposed to be so, by taking them to imply a mere assertion of a fact, and not as is really the case, to import, in the one case, that the existence of the fact is believed in, while in the other the mode of its being is accurately conceived. Regarded thus, the distinction is as simple as it is obvious. To conclude, as regards our cognition of really speculative truths, I need only make this remark. The belief which some hold in regard to their power of intuition is one which cannot touch us practically in any general reasonings on the subject. If any such intuitions there be, they must be peculiar to the individual, and as all seem to admit, incapable of transference or even of description to any other person.

It occurs to me that it is open to question whether Mansel's four conditions of consciousness would recognize the validity of knowledge so gained. But our limits narrow; and ere closing I must say something on the subject of physical laws. It is usual to say that the course of this world is ordered by the establishment of certain arrangements termed laws, by which "the periodical occurrence of its phenomena is determined." And so the universe, on its creation, is compared to a machine so skilfully contrived, that, once made, it need no longer require any special interference from its Maker.

Now the question, I consider, just comes to this at last. If philosophers are so inclined to reject the theory of the possibility of special interpositions with man and nature, as merely a human notion of the infinite and unchangeable, how can they be assured that it is any less human an account of the Supreme to say that His works are bound "by an immutable order in time," so that, His work once done, He has withdrawn into the mysterious recesses of eternity? The fact, on the contrary, is that which follows from the premises already admitted and established. The notions of unbroken succession in time, and of an arbitrary interference with it by

special interposition, are equally human and imperfect. Still, speculatively imperfect as each representation must be of the exercise of infinite power, they are both regulatively necessary, and, as Mansel remarks, may both have their prototype (and counterpart) in the ineffable being of God. But the truth is, that the whole theory of the government of the universe by laws inflexible and unchangeable rests upon a fundamental error.

Such a theory seems to build altogether upon "material principles," and to ignore the indisputable fact of the existence of a potent influence exercised by mind upon matter. In matter all seems an unending series "of mutual dependence;" in mind there is discoverable "an originating and self-determining source of power." That something in mind called will, "the agent," as Mansel so well describes it, "uncompelled yet not uninfluenced, whose continuous existence and productive energy are summed up in the word myself," is an element which, as it must be felt in the little world around us, so we cannot but acknowledge that the sphere of its influence, when residing in the Infinite, must be such as to set all calculations at defiance, and to take laws from nothing short of its own Almighty purposes.

Thus it appears at last that the so much vaunted discovery of modern science-namely, the inseparable connexion of cause and effect, with the necessary succession of the one to the other, is one which can hold true only in pari materia, i. e., when both members of the succession are of the same kind, and even then the rule can only be proved universally true of a physical succession. Where, however, scientific researches have only approximated to, without precisely reaching a systematic and therefore orderly recurrence of phenomena; viz., the moment we pass from the world of matter into that of mind, we become sensible of the presence of new distracting elements connected with the individual volitions, which are so variable and fluctuating as to defy calculation, and baffle all attempts to reduce them to a system. No theory of character ever yet laid down could do more than estimate the bias of any mind. The decision by any mind, however well we have studied it, in any given case, on any point at issue, must always remain a matter of probability, not of certainty. The corollary to all this is obvious. If one finite mind cannot reduce to order the workings of a mind precisely like itself, the operations of the Infinite mind, transcending as it does the human conditions of time and space, cannot in all cases be known, but are only open to investigation in

certain cases where their impress has been left upon the world of matter in the form of certain orderly arrangements.

A fixed law of succession, therefore, is one which can only be established in the case of matter; and so long as mind is excluded from the computation, contingency is inconceivable. But once admit mind with its inherent will, and there is no saying where a break may not occur in the continuity, and a link be superseded from the succession, provided only that the mind and will in the case supposed be strong enough.

us.

Such then, to wind up, are the conclusions to which a just estimate of the extent of man's faculties is calculated to lead Such as his faculties are, such also must be his knowledge. We have seen that the attempt to transcend the faculties, conditioned in time and space which God has given us, is one which must necessarily end in defeat.

In transcending the present conditions of thought we pass at a bound the limits of consciousness, and find the result of the flight, if really ever made, to be something undefinable in human language, were it even realizable in human thought. Nor is this all. We have also made the unpleasant discovery that even could the true Infinite be known by a higher and truly practical reason, the flimsy abstractions of philosophy are only likely to mislead us in the search by their ignis fatuus light. What then remains? Nothing but to know ourselves to be but men-not self-idolizing gods-to follow reason as far as she will lead us, and where she fails to hear the voice of the true God on the things above us, and solely of His sphere, the tidings of which we receive from messengers well tested and approved by reason. Thus, by giving to reason what is hers, and to the Infinite what justly belongs to it, we may see there are laws which reason's plummet never sounded, determined only by the will of the Supreme!

ON THE ORIGIN AND APPROPRIATION OF

STONEHENGE.

BY REV. R. KIRWAN, M.A., RECTOR OF GITTISHAM.

In the investigations of the Archaeologist, even when confined within a limited range, or devoted to a single pre-historic memorial, he constantly finds that he is dealing with the evidences of certain phases of progressive civilization in the history of the human race. If he proceeds from the consideration of the antient monuments with which he is familiar at home, to those that occur in other parts of the globe, he will learn that there has been an epoch in the early history of man when a megalithic taste, characteristic of a primitive era, manifested itself under the utmost variety of circumstances. Rude memorial stones, of which the associations of venerable tradition have perished with their rearers, still survive in all parts of the world, as the enduring literature of an unlettered people.

When we enquire into the worship of nations in the most remote periods to which we have access, we find that the first object of idolatry was a simple unwrought stone placed in the ground as an emblem probably of the re-creative powers of nature. In all parts of India these stones are to be found, and are known by the name of "Linghams." There are many of them of immense size, and generally they stand near some magnificent temple. It is said that there is no instance of any of the antient heathen temples being found without them. It is probable that most of these stones were themselves the first objects of adoration, and that the temples were built near them as being places of peculiar sanctity. The Tyrians had two similar stones set up near Tyre, and probably the pillars of Hercules were stones of this description, set up by the Phoenicians. Amongst the Greeks similar stones (stelo or lithoi) were to be seen in the neighbourhood

of many of their cities, and one is mentioned as occurring within the walls of Athens. The megalithic circle is an example of the same remarkable phase of the human mind, the influence of which has long since disappeared, although there was an era in the early history of man when it appears to have manifested itself almost universally. Throughout the whole of the Asiatic Continent this megalithic period of art at one time prevailed. In North and South America, amongst nations separated from the old world by oceans which had been regarded as impassable until the days of Columbus, we can point to enduring evidences of the same stage of development of the human intellect. In Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Brittany, there occur many remarkable remains of this peculiar class; whilst in our own island, and close to our own homes-upon Dartmoor-the stone circles, cromlechs, and other interesting memorials of primitive antiquity afford abundant evidence of the same psycological phenomenon. And yet amidst this profusion of megalithic memorials, that of Stonehenge has a distinct and peculiar character, and is in some respects unique. Many of the stones of the outer circle have been hewn and squared by art, whilst the impost have been attached to the upright props upon which they rest by mortises and tenons fitted one to the other with the utmost nicety. In this respect, I believe, Stonehenge differs from all other monuments or memorials with which it has been compared, and gathers around it additional interest from the fact of its being the oldest existing example of the result of man's skill as a toolmaking and tool-using animal.

I have said that these primeval memorials have outlived the traditions of their builders, whilst no hieroglyphic carved upon their surface furnishes us with a clue to their long-forgotten origin or purpose. And yet we are not to regard them as altogether silent and meaningless memorials of an older generation. We can furnish a probable answer to the question "What mean ye by these stones?" It is worthy of remark that remains of the class under consideration are frequently alluded to in the Old Testament. The history of the Jewish people proves that the rude monolith may preserve the memory of the event which it was intended to commemorate, and be faithful to the purpose for which it was set up. The oldest written

notice of the monolith is that raised by Jacob after his dream: "Jacob rose up early in the morning, and took the stone he had put for his pillow, and set it up for a pillar, and poured oil upon the top of it." (Gen. xxviii. 18.) Again we read,