REMAINDER-MEN.
See LIFE TENANTS.
7. That the title to property for which replevin is brought is shown to be in one of the plaintiffs is sufficient to sustain the
Liability of Trustee in Bankruptcy for, action; and defendant cannot take advan-
3. Replevin lies for growing strawberry plants, although they are attached to the soil, since they are fruits of industry, and must be treated as chattels. Cannon v. Mathews (Ark.) 827
4. The rule that one in adverse possession under color of title of a tract of land is en- titled to maintain replevin for logs cut thereon by one claiming to be the true own- er, regardless of the true location of the ul- timate title to the land, applies where the spot from which the logs were cut is an- nexed to the actual possession of a portion of the tract because within the boundaries of the paper title. Wheeler V. Clark (Tenn.)
5. That logs for which replevin is brought were not all cut from plaintiff's land is im- material, where the one from whose land they were cut transferred all his right to plaintiff before the bringing of the action. Id.
6. That one suing to recover logs cut from real estate is shown to have deeded away a portion of the land, and that the grant is not shown not to have included the logs, are immaterial, where the grantee is joined as plaintiff in the action.
tage of the fact that other plaintiffs are not shown to have a right to the possession of any interest therein.
2. Although there is no express statutory limitation as to the filing of bills of re- view, the analogous limitation of the right of appeal should govern; and a bill, of re- view cannot be filed after the lapse of three years from the final decree, except in case of new or newly discovered matter. Id.
3. Condonation of the adultery on which a decree for divorce was based will not justify the granting of leave to file a bill of review. If intended to be interposed, it should have been pleaded and proved in the original suit. Id.
Obtaining leave of court for.
4. When it is sought to reverse a decree upon the discovery of some new matter, leave of the court must first be obtained by Id. petition, supported by affidavit that the ev-
Parol Evidence as to, see EVIDENCE, 14. 1. An implied warranty that an article will be fit for a particular purpose may be inferred from a contract to make or fur- nish it to accomplish that specific purpose, because the accomplishment of the purpose is the essence of the contract. Davis Calyx Drill Co. v. Mallory (C. C. App. 8th C.) 973 2. No implied warranty of the fitness of an article for a particular purpose arises out of a contract to make or supply a de- scribed and definite article, although the seller knows that the purchaser is purchas- ing it to accomplish the specific purpose, because the essence of the contract is the delivery of the specific article, and not the accomplishment of the purpose.
3. An implied warranty of the fitness of a machine to do a particular work does not include a warranty that it will do the work as rapidly or economically as some other specified machine; such a covenant can be introduced by express contract only. Id.
4. There is no implied warranty that a drill and its machinery are suitable to bore holes through a particular strata of land, where a contract in writing, containing no reference to a warranty, is made with a manufacturer to buy one class F3 drill made by the latter and described in his catalogue, and certain other specific ma- chinery and tools, for an agreed price, al- though before the contract is made the pur- chaser informs the seller that he wants the drill and machinery to bore holes through certain described strata of land, and the manufacturer assures him that its class F3 drill will do this work as rapidly and economically as a diamond drill. Id.
Sale; written contract of sale; right to
ble damage is suffered, and no fraud is in- flicted upon him, and where he is in statu quo at the time of the commencement of his action. Howes v. Barmon (Id.) 568 2. Specific performance of an oral agree- ment to make a lease may be decreed where a signed memorandum in writing of the terms, made at the time of the agreement. and a signed but undelivered lease, taken together, show a completed agreement upon the terms of the lease. Charlton v. Colum- bia Real Estate Co. (N. J. Err. & App.)
1. A court of equity will not grant the aid of specific performance where the party 4. A provision in a statute authorizing invoking its aid has not parted with any the condemnation of land for boulevards to consideration or property, and no irrepara-connect parks is covered by a title stating
the object of the statute to be to authorize | STREET FAIR. the acquisition, improvement, and mainte- nance of parks.
Permitting Use of Streets for, HIGHWAYS, 3, 4.
5. A prohibition of contracts releasing STREET RAILWAYS. corporations from their liability to injured employees is within the main subject ex- pressed in the title, which is the regula- tion of liability in such cases. Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Montgomery (Ind.) .875
Arrest of Motorman to Abate. Nui- sance, see FALSE IMPRISONMENT. Negligence of motorman.
Question for Jury as to, see TRIAL, 5. 1. The speed of an electric car running along a sparsely settled country road in the 6. An amendatory act, whose caption space between intersecting crossroads in the merely recites the title of the original act, dark is to be governed, not by the ability of without enlarging its scope, is constitution- the motorman to stop his car after discov al and valid, providing its purview is ger-ering an object on the track by the aid of mane to the title of the original act. Mem- phis v. Hastings (Tenn.) Special legislation.
7. The employer's liability act changing the law as to the defense in case of negli- gence of fellow servants of corporations is: not within a constitutional provision as to local or special laws "regulating the prac- tice in courts." Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Montgomery (Ind.)
his headlight, but by the ability of persons on the track conveniently to leave it after seeing the light and hearing or understand- ing the signals given by the approaching car. Vizacchero v. Rhode Island Co. (R. I.)
3. A motorman in charge of a street car, upon seeing a wagon approaching the track, has the right to presume that the driver will use his senses to avoid driving onto the track in front of the car. 389 Metropolitan Street R. Co. (Mo.) 4. One in charge of an electric street car approaching a public crossing must antic- ipate that any person approaching the junc- tion from either side may turn his team into the cross street, and must exercise all due care to have his car under such con- trol as to be able to stop it at the crossing, if necessary, to avoid an accident. Marden v. Portsmouth, K. & Y. Street R. Co. (Me.) 300
Contributory negligence.
Question for Jury as to, see TRIAL, 9. Imputing Owner's Negligence to Driv- er of Wagon, see NEGLIGENCE, 9. 5. It is negligence to attempt to drive across a street car track in dangerous prox- imity to an approaching car which is in plain sight, whether the car is actually seen or not. Markowitz v. Metropolitan Street R. Co. (Mo.)
careful and prudent man, having in mind | puting time; transaction of judicial busi- his own safety, under like circumstances, to ness on; signing of bill of exceptions on conclude that no car is in such proximity Sunday.
as if properly managed, to endanger his safety in crossing.
Id. SUPERINTENDING CONTROL. See COURTS, 6, 7. SUPPORT.
Liability where both parties are neg- ligent.
8. To hold a street car company liable for the results of a collision with a team attempting to cross the track in front of a car notwithstanding the negligence of the driver, those in charge of the car must have been guilty of gross negligence, or reckless and wanton conduct. Markowitz v. Metropolitan Street R. Co. (Mo.) 389
9. The negligence of a man in crawling on his hands and knees towards an ap- proaching electric car in the dark after the appearance of the headlight, which can be seen 800 feet away, is continuing, so as not to entitle his personal representative to hold the company liable for his death on the theory of last clear chance, because the speed of the car is so great that it cannot be stopped after his presence on the track is discovered. Vizacchero v. Rhode Island Co. (R. I.) 188
Street railways; limiting speed of street cars; unreasonableness of limitation; speed on country roads; injury to intoxicated per- son crawling along track. 189
Care required in crossing track; negli gence in running car at improper speed; measure of care required of motorman; relative rights of street car and pedestrians in street. 300 Duty of motorman to avoid injuring per- sons on track; effect of contributory negli- gence where motorman saw peril in time to prevent accident; not necessary that motor- man be guilty of gross negligence to render company liable.
Duty to look and listen before crossing track; duty of motorman to person on or near track; negligence in walking on track. 606
SUBPARTNERSHIP. See PARTNERSHIP.
Excluding in Computing Time to Sign Bill of Exceptions, see APPEAL AND ERROR, 3.
Sunday; including or excluding, in com-
Of Wife; Husband's Liability for, see HUSBAND AND WIFE, 14.
Of Insane Person, see INCOMPETENT PERSONS.
3. The holding of annual stockholders' and directors' meetings at the place named in the articles of incorporation as the home of the corporation is not its principal busi- ness, so as to make it taxable there, where substantially all the business for which it is organized is transacted and its funds kept at another place, under a statute pro- viding that a corporation shall be taxable where its office is located by its charter, pro- vided its business is actually transacted there, but that, if it shall establish its principal office in another place, then the place where it transacts its principal busi- ness shall be deemed its residence for pur- poses of taxation.
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