by making void all contracts which have for their object to influence legislation in any other manner than by such open and public presentation of facts, arguments and appeals to reason as are recognized as proper and legitimate with all public bodies. While counsel may be properly employed to present the reasons in favor of any public measure to the body authorized to pass upon it, or to any of its committees empowered to collect facts and hear arguments, and parties interested may lawfully contract to pay for this service,1 yet to secretly approach the members of such a body with a view to influence their action at a time and in a manner that do not allow the presentation of opposite views, is improper and unfair to the opposing interest; and a contract to pay for this irregular and improper service would not be enforced by the law.2

1 See Wildey v. Collier, 7 Md. 273; Bryan v. Reynolds, 5 Wis. 200; Brown v. Brown, 34 Barb. 533; Russell v. Burton, 66 Barb. 539.

2 This whole subject was very fully considered in the case of Frost v. Inhabitants of Belmont, 6 Allen, 152, which was a bill filed to restrain the payment by the town of demands to the amount of nearly $9,000, which the town had voted to pay as expenses in obtaining their act of incorporation. By the court, Chapman, J.: "It is to be regretted that any persons should have attempted to procure an act of legislation in this Commonwealth, by such means as some of these items indicate. By the regular course of legislation, organs are provided through which any parties may fairly and openly approach the legislature, and be heard with proofs and arguments respecting any legislative acts which they may be interested in, whether public or private. These organs are the various committees appointed to consider and report upon the matters to be acted upon by the whole body. When private interests are to be affected, notice is given of the hearings before these committees; and thus opportunity is given to adverse parties to meet face to face and

obtain a fair and open hearing. And though these committees properly dispense with many of the rules which regulate hearings before judicial tribunals, yet common fairness requires that neither party shall be permitted to have secret consultations, and exercise secret influences that are kept from the knowledge of the other party. The business of lobby members' is not to go fairly and openly before the committees, and present statements, proofs, and arguments that the other side has an opportunity to meet and refute, if they are wrong, but to go secretly to the members and ply them with statements and arguments that the other side cannot openly meet, however erroneous they may be, and to bring illegitimate influences to bear upon them. If the

lobby member' is selected because of his political or personal influence, it aggravates the wrong. If his business is to unite various interests by means of projects that are called 'log rolling,' it is still worse. The practice of procuring members of the legis lature to act under the influence of what they have eaten and drank at houses of entertainment, tends to render those who yield to such influences wholly unfit to act in such

* The Introduction and Passage of Bills.

Any member may introduce a bill in the house to which he belongs, in accordance with its rules; and this he may do

[* 138] at any time when the house is in session, unless the constitution, the law, or the rules of the house forbid.

limits. Selden, J., makes the following comments on the case of Harris v. Roof: Now the court did not mean by this decision to hold that one who has a claim against the State may not employ competent persons to aid him in properly presenting such claim to the legislature, and in supporting it with the necessary proofs and argu-. ments. Mr. Justice Hand, who delivered the opinion of the court, very justly distinguishes between services of the nature of those rendered in that case, and the procuring and preparing the necessary documents in support of a claim, or acting as counsel before the legislature or some committee appointed by that body. Persons may, no doubt, be employed to conduct an application to the legislature, as well as to conduct a suit at law; and may contract for and receive pay for their services in preparing documents, collecting evidence, making statements of facts, or preparing and making oral or written arguments, provided all these are used or designed to be used before the legislature or some committee thereof as a body; but they cannot, with propriety, be employed to exert their personal influence with individual members, or to labor in any form privately with such members out of the legislative halls. Whatever is laid before the legislature in writing, or spoken openly or publicly in its presence or that of a committee, if false in fact, may be disproved, or if wrong in argument may be refuted; but that which is whispered into the private ear of individual members is frequently beyond the reach of correction. The point of objection in this class of cases then is, the personal and private nature of the services to be rendered.'

"In Fuller v. Dame, cited above,

Shaw, Ch. J., recognizes the wellestablished right to contract and pay for professional services when the promisee is to act as attorney and counsel, but remarks that the fact appearing that persons do so act prevents any injurious effects from such proceeding. Such counsel is considered as standing in the place of his principal, and his arguments and representations are weighed and considered accordingly.' He also admits the right of disinterested persons to volunteer advice; as when a person is about to make a will, one may represent to him the propriety and expediency of making a bequest to a particular person; and so may one volunteer advice to another to marry another person; but a promise to pay for such service is void.

66

Applying the principles stated in these cases to the bills which the town voted to pay, it is manifest that some of the money was expended for objects that are contrary to public policy, and of a most reprehensible character, and which could not, therefore, form a legal consideration for a contract."

See, further, a full discussion of the same subject, and reaching the same conclusion, by Mr. Justice Grier, in Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 16 How. 314. A sale of a town office, though by the town itself, cannot be the consideration for a contract. Meredith v. Ladd, 2 N. H. 517; see Carleton v. Whitcher, 5 N. H. 196; Eddy v. Capron, 4 R. I. 394. A town cannot incur expenses in opposing before a legislative committee a division of the territorial limits: Westbrook v. Deering, 63 Me. 231; or to pay the expenses of a committee to procure the annexation of the town to another: Minot v. West Roxbury, 112 Mass. 1; s. c.

The Constitution of Michigan* provides that no new bill [* 139] shall be introduced into either house of the legislature after the first fifty days of the session shall have expired; 1 and the Constitution of Maryland provides that no bill shall originate in either house within the last ten days of the session.2 The purpose of these clauses is to prevent hasty and improvident legislation, and to compel, so far as any previous law can accomplish that result, the careful examination of proposed laws, or at least the affording of opportunity for that purpose; which will not always be done when bills may be introduced up to the very hour of adjournment, and, with the concurrence of the proper majority, put immediately upon their passage.3

17 Am. Rep. 52.

And any contract the purpose of which is to influence a public officer or body to favor persons in the performance of his public duty is void, on grounds of public policy. Ordineal v. Barry, 21 Miss. 9. The same general principle will be found applied in the following cases: Swayze v. Hull, 8 N. J. 54; Wood v. McCann, 6 Dana, 366; Hatzfield v. Gulden, 7 Watts, 152; Gil v. Davis, 12 La. Ann. 219; Powers v. Skinner, 34 Vt. 274; Frankfort v. Winterport, 54 Me. 250; Rose v. Lonax, 21 Barb. 361; Devlin v. Brady, 32 Barb. 518. A contract to assist by money and influence to secure the election of a candidate to a public office in consideration of a share of its emoluments, in the event of election, is void as opposed to public policy, and if voluntarily rescinded by the parties a recovery cannot be had of the moneys advanced under it. Martin v. Wade, 37 Cal. 168. So is a contract to resign an office that another may be appointed. Eddy v. Capron, 4 R. I.

constitutionally be done, as an amendment to some pending bill, the whole of which, except the enacting clause, is struck out to make way for it. Thus, the member who thinks he may possibly have occasion for the introduction of a new bill after the constitutional period has expired, takes care to introduce sham bills in due season which he can use as stocks to graft upon, and which he uses irrespective of their character or contents. The sham bill is perhaps a bill to incorporate the city of Siam. One of the member's constituents applies to him for legislative permission to construct a dam across the Wild Cat River. Forthwith, by amendment, the bill entitled a bill to incorporate the city of Siam has all after the enacting clause stricken out, and it is made to provide, as its sole object, that John Doe may construct a dam across the Wild Cat. With this title and in this form it is passed; but the house then considerately amends the title to correspond with the purpose of the bill, and the law is passed, and the constitution at the same time saved! This trick is so transparent, and so clearly in violation of the constitution, and the evidence at the same time is so fully spread upon the record, that it is a matter of surprise to find it so often resorted to.

For the same reason it is required by the constitutions of several of the States, that no bill shall have the force of law until on three several days it be read in each house, and free discussion allowed thereon; unless, in case of urgency, four-fifths or some other specified majority of the house shall deem it expedient to dispense with this rule. The journals which each house keeps of its proceedings ought to show whether this rule is complied with or not; but in case they do not, the passage in the manner provided by the constitution must be presumed, in accordance with the general rule which presumes the proper discharge of official [*140] duty.1 * In the reading of a bill, it seems to be sufficient

Thus, a

to read the written document that is adopted by the two houses; even though something else becomes law in consequence of its passage, and by reason of being referred to in it. statute which incorporated a military company by reference to its constitution and by-laws, was held valid notwithstanding the constitution and by-laws, which would acquire the force of law by its passage, were not read in the two houses as a part of it.3

1 Supervisors of Schuyler Co. v. People, 25 Ill. 181; Miller v. State, 3 Ohio, N. s. 480. In People v. Starne, 35 Ill. 121, it is said the courts should not enforce a legislative act unless there is record evidence, from the journals of the two houses, that every material requirement of the constitution has been satisfied. And see Ryan v. Lynch, 68 Ill. 160. The clause in the Constitution of Ohio is: 66 Every bill shall be fully and distinctly read on three different days, unless, in case of urgency, three-fourths of the house in which it shall be pending shall dispense with this rule;" and in Miller v. State, 3 Ohio, N. s. 481, and Pim v. Nicholson, 6 Ohio, N. s. 178, this provision was held to be merely directory. The distinctness with which any bill must be read cannot possibly be defined by any law; and it must always, from the necessity of the case, rest with the house to determine finally whether in this particular the constitution has been complied with or not; but the rule respecting three several

readings on different days is specific, and capable of being precisely complied with, and we do not see how, even under the rules applied to statutes, it can be regarded as directory merely, provided it has a purpose beyond the mere regular and orderly transaction of business. That it has such a purpose, that it is designed to prevent hasty and improvident legislation, and is therefore not a mere rule of order, but one of protection to the public interests and to the citizens at large, is very clear: and independent of the question whether definite constitutional principles can be dispensed with in any case on the ground of their being merely direc tory, we cannot see how this can be treated as any thing but mandatory. See People v. Campbell, 8 Ill. 466; McCulloch v. State, 11 Ind. 424.

2 Dew v. Cunningham, 28 Ala. 466.

8 Bibb County Loan Association v. Richards, 21 Geo. 592. And see Pulford v. Fire Department, 31 Mich. 458.