the peace of Europe. Either the Turks are competent to maintain their own rights, or they are not. If they are, the whole of this discussion is eminently gratuitous. If they are not, they must rely on the succour of others; and it is as clear as reason can make it that this succour must be accepted, not on their own terms, but on the terms of those who lend it. The Porte cannot pretend to combine the advantages of independence and protection. If it goes to war on its own decision and its own responsibility, it may commence hostilities at discretion; but if it goes to war with British ships and French soldiers, it can have no right to wrest the initiative from the hands of England and France." By the declaration of war, however, the Ottoman government assumed and exercised that right. It became a question, consequently, how far Britain and France would be justified in permitting such a violation of the terms on which they undertook the office of mediators. What the result of this question, so far as the British government was concerned, there can be no doubt. The anxiety displayed in inducing the Sultan to rely on the negotiations going on, rather than on war, exclude all room for controversy on this point. Influenced, however, from without-goaded on by popular clamour-they had no alternative but that of either taking part with Turkey, or resigning their functions. They made choice of the former, and, in the expressive language of Lord Clarendon, "drifted into war." Having thus presented what we believe to be the facts of the case before us, we are now in a position to reply to the question which heads our paper. That reply is in the negative. The British government, in our opinion, was not justified in entering upon the present war with Russia. Had we not already exceeded the limits to which we are necessarily confined, we would have shown how untenable is the position, that we go to war to maintain the independence and integrity of Turkey-to defend the interests of Britain, and to curb the aggressive spirit of the Russian government. This, however. we must leave to be done by some other friend. E. L. J. Social Economy. IS SECULARISM CONSONANT WITH THE HIGHEST AMOUNT OF SOCIAL HAPPINESS? NEGATIVE ARTICLE.-II. THE present question is proposed in a form well calculated to promote the discussion of the merits of Secularism in se, since it affords no reasonable pretext to the defenders of that system for diverging into a notice of the heresies, contentions, divisions, and consequent bad results, which unhappily affect Christianity as at present constituted, which digression has hitherto been a favourite resort of the ostensible apostles of Secularism, in order to eke out their dubious cause. Secularism should, on this occasion, occupy itself in demonstrating its ability and suitableness for the functions it aspires to discharge the leadership of human progress. Secularism has been well defined as "the practical side of Atheism." Its adherents have more unhappily designated it, "the positive side" of Scepticism. We presume secularists will concur in the opinion that practical morality must be the main element in the constitution of a state which shall realize "the highest amount of social happiness." We may here remark that it is not enough for secularists to point to the members of their body, and ask if they are not as good citizens, and as moral in their lives, as religionists; because, admitting the statement to be true, it may be accounted for by the fact that they were born and educated in the midst of a religionist society, and, therefore, have necessarily acquired some of the taste and sentiment promoted by Christianity, and reflect some of its light. It is essential to their cause that they should show that their system is capable of originating a morality such as our present advanced civilization approves. rally pleasant companions, good neighbours, and good citizens-in a word, all that morality would have them in their external relations to society,-still, this is no more genuine morality than the parental affection which even the most brutal natures manifest towards their offspring is morality, it is na We purpose, in arguing the negative of primary "guarantee of morals," are those the present question, to show, first, that constitutionally easy, inoffensive, good-temSecularism is incapable of originating a pered people, who belong to the temperament genuine morality-that its received canons designated by physiologists "lymphatic." can only be productive of a spurious morality These persons, "whose well balanced feelings -and that thus, its ascendency would be thus incline them to morality,' are easily productive of the most disastrous conse- conformed by external restraints, such as quences to humanity. Secondly, we shall law, custom, notions of respectability, perproceed to take up a contra position, and sonal interests, and the like; but in the maintain that religion alone is adequate to absence of any higher motives for morality, the production of true morality, and conse- we are bold to assert, that any pressure in quently is alone capable of producing "the the direction of self-love sufficient to overhighest amount of social happiness." come their characteristic inertia, and to In pursuing our first proposition we have counterbalance the effect of external reto confront the main position of Secular-straints, would induce them to perpetrate ism," that there exists, independently of immorality to the full extent of the temptascriptural authority, guarantees of morals tion. Allowing that such persons are genein human nature, intelligence, and utility."* We freely concede, that the sentiments in regard to practical morality which secularists enunciate in their public addresses, are all that we could wish in that way; but we say, as in substance we have before said, that Secularism is an excrescence on the surface of religious society, and, as such, its homo-tural feeling, and morality cannot, with any geneity with some of the external aspects of that society is of no account in an estimation of its essential character. There is a morality of ends as well as a morality of means, and the quality of practices ostensibly moral, is altogether dependent on the ends which they subserve. Now, if the secular "guarantees of morals" be tried by this rule they will be found wanting, and, indeed, so many "guarantees of immorality." To take the first in order, "Human nature," which, we are told, "means broadly the sum of the passions and natural qualities manifested by man." Now, the ruling passion in human nature is, proverbially, self-love, and selflove is the essence of all the immorality "manifested by man;" for a principle of self-love implies a hatred of all that opposes its interests. It is the first passion that shows itself in man, and is the last that is conquered in the course of his progressive improvement. It is at the root of all the evil in the world, and, indeed, is only another name for evil. Is not this secular "guarantee of morals," therefore, a guarantee of immorality? The persons whom secularists adduce in illustration of this, their 66 propriety, be predicated of it. The evident preference given, by secular philosophers, to the order of characters here glanced at, in whose ranks energy, and genius, and high moral sense are seldom manifested, reflects but little credit on their discernment of character and estimation of morality. We now come to consider the second "independent" secular " guarantee of morals”"Intelligence." Secularists are wont to maintain that "Ideas are a dominion"-the "inexorable empire of Intelligence;"† but intelligence is not a principle or moving cause, it is only an instrumental or passive cause. "The passions are in morals what motion is in physics" (this sentiment has been endorsed by a high secular authority); and normally, the intellect, its powers and acquirements, are used in the direction the passions indicate. This result is only partially affected even when the intellect, educated by external authority, is made the instrumental agent for affecting the natural bias of the passions, or when embued with the light of accumulated experience; witness the fact, that the whole range of crime, in * G. J. Holyoake. wholly at variance with their usual nature, this being one of the many facts demonstrative of an all wise and powerful Providence, and so confutive of Secularism. The intellect, we have seen, must needs be subservient to the motive power of the will, which, in the present case, is absorbed in self-love; and the subserviency is all the more complete, since the conditions of the state we are arguing under, afford no higher or extrinsic source of truth to affect the intelligence, so that its powers must needs be wholly absorbed in the satisfaction of the selfish and sensual appetites of the race.
clusive of the most devilish cruelty, and the most disgusting unnaturalness, has been excused and abetted by the reasoning powers of the intellect. It goes to prove our position, that even religion itself has been thus profaned by the pandering intellect; while we bear in mind that Secularism is only an alias, which under other names has had its authors in all ages, and a complete secular library would perhaps afford the most striking proof of the entire subserviency of the intellect to the dictates of the voluntary principle, however perverted, in human nature. So much for "intelligence" as a guarantee of morals." "Utility" is a third" Utility," again, would be a motive merely secular "guarantee of morals." Morality relative to the end intended and the means must, indeed, be at a low ebb where "utility" employed. Thus we find Secularism altois its only guarantee. The highest possible gether without any element capable of orisentiment in this direction is, " Honesty the ginating morality- the main element of best policy." We opine that one who prac- civilization and "social happiness;" and, by tises morality from motives of self-interest sequence of reasoning, since it is incapable alone, is essentially immoral. Every one of originating a civilized social state, it is understands that an individual who is only also incapable of maintaining such a state restrained from theft by fear of the law or in its integrity. Secularism acknowledges loss of respectability, which would result in only "relative truth,"* and since truth is the the destruction of more material interests, is theory of the good it can have cognizance still a thief, albeit he does not perpetrate only of relative good. These, then, are its the overt act, for, if external restraints were only elements for restraining and leading removed, he would thieve without compunc- human nature.† Now, naturally, we call tion. This secular " guarantee of morals" is that good which we love, and self-love, we therefore only productive of hypocrisy, which have seen, is inherent in human nature; is immoral! And now, going back to the hence, Secularism would inevitably lead hucommencement of things-such a commence- manity to call self-love good, and that which ment as the secularist must needs suppose favours its lusts truth; but these principles -when mankind were in "a state of nature" are essential evil and falsity, the effect of -when self-preservation, "the first law of whose ascendency would be to break up the nature," and self-love were in all their force, social state altogether, and land mankind on and when the general condition of human the primeval state of wildness from which beings would be altogether like that of wild we have assumed they started. If the applibeasts, among the wildest and vilest of whom ances of religion at this period, consisting they would rank; we put the question dis- of a written revelation, ceremonial, sacritinctly to secularists, and challenge their ficial, &c., worship, should be objected to by reply,-From what quarter is the force which secularists and free-thinkers as conventional should raise them from this condition to a and far-fetched, we reply that the exigencies state of civilization to come? In other words, which they were to meet arose from the perWhat is to originate morality (the main ele-verted and erratic impulses of the human ment of which is self-restraint for the good will, which, nevertheless, had to be reached of others) in such a primitive state? Human nature, in its natural state, we have seen, is wholly under the influence of the passion of self-love, which inevitably generates a condition like that of wild beasts, who are only preserved in existence by a wonderful instinct implanted in them, of affection for their offspring. an instinct *G. J. Holyoake. + In ignoring an absolute standard of goodness and truth, Secularism occurs to us as a boat's crew, adrift at sea, who should ignore the polar star (of Deity), and throw overboard the compass box (of revelation). They are moving, but whither? It may be in circles; or they are drifting with the current upon the rocks of destruction. and operated upon under the condition of intact and absolute freedom. We now proceed to take up our position as religionists. The main question at issue between Religion and Secularism is, of course, the existence of a God-the God of revelation. If there be no such being, Secularism may be wisdom; but if God Is, then Secularism, as ignoring our relation to him, is the veriest folly and madness. It is a fact that the belief in God is all but universal, and, notwithstanding the familiarity with which a concurrent belief and education have invested it, the idea of God is, in the highest degree, sublime and unique. The human imagination is not creative; its ideas are all transcripts of externalities; it is only inventive in the way of combination. Now, we contend that there is nothing in the objective universe, nor in man, considered in a state of nature, capable of originating the idea of God-there is nothing in nature generally, or in human nature in particular, of which the idea of God is a transcript. Yet this idea, so distinctly, firmly, and universally held, must have had an origin, and we at once conclude to revelation as its only adequate source. The idea of God is itself a proof of revelation, and revelation-its history and intrinsic qualities-is reciprocally a proof of the existence, attributes, and providence of God. We understand the first pages of scripture as revealing a primitive condition of mankind (similar to that we have already glanced at) under the figure of a chaotic state of the elementary world. The subsequent account of creation we hold to be typical of the moral creation in man. We read, "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth; and the earth was without form and void, and darkness upon the face of the deep. And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters." The idea of God we hold to have been the first spark which lighted up the human intelligence, and the fear of God to have been the first restraint laid on the rampant wildness of a selfish and sensual condition of human nature. A common re spect in this regard first originated society and civilization, and the respective state and quality of this society and civilization have always been parallel to the quality of the fear and the intellection of Deity. Thus, whether the fear were that of terror, or that of the awe of intelligence, or that of the fear proper to love, and whether the intellection was that of the crude attempt to realize Deity in " images of wood and stone," or that of the worship of the elements or the sun as His manifestation, or that of the higher and truer idea of a Divine humanity, the quality of the ruling religious emotions and ideas must always have affected the moral and civil state of the community holding them. The history of humanity affords the "clenching fact" to our argument. The tide of progress and civilization has indeed ebbed and flowed alternately (and this phenomenon is capable of an explanation which shall still redound to the credit of religion, should it be called for), but here we are in the nineteenth century, enjoying a state of civilization and morality—a state of "social happiness"-in manifest advance of bygone periods. Shall we, then, abandon the advantages of religion, so demonstrable in argument, so appreciable to the feelings, at the call of factious infidelity, with its "tentative and negative" positions, and its last new phase Secularism, the main characteristic of which is, its attempt to ignore that which it cannot logically surmount the primary truths of Theology? Forbid it Reason, Experience, and common Prudence! Other and higher arguments belong to the present question; but we have endeavoured to adduce those which shall impinge on Infidelity, even in the earthy intrenchment in which it is wont to ensconce itself; knowing from experience that it is useless to deploy the forces of religion on open plains and mountain tops, since the combat on these conditions is uniformly declined, in virtue of a process peculiar to scepticism-of ignoring the positions so indicated. AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.-II. HAVING in my previous article endeavoured briefly to sketch Secularism, and to indicate the province of the secularist. I turn now to consider some of the statements of "Rolla." BENJAMIN. "Rolla" charges Secularism with "forgetting, or endeavouring to forget, the 'to come' of immortality." Secularism teaches, that in making the best use of this world, we do not unfit ourselves for any future world which may be in store for us. A wise God-so it seems to the secularist-would not have given us capacities for enjoyment, and placed us in a world teeming with beauty and countless sources of happiness, if he had not intended those capacities to be exercised and developed to the full; nor will he shut out from the benefits of a future life those who wisely enjoy the life that now is. "Rolla" eulogizes as "philosophic" the text, "Set your affections on things above, not on things on the earth." He does not see that if we followed this advice human effort would be paralyzed, and that not only is it not "consonant with the highest amount of social happiness," but that it teaches utter disregard of "social happiness." Secularism being, as "Rolla" declares, the "antithesis" of this apostolic exhortation, is proof that if it is not "consonant with the highest amount of social happiness," it is at least consonant with a higher amount than the Pauline teaching. Secularism does not deny that "the foolishness of God is wiser than men, and the weakness of God is stronger than men;" it is not so impious as to think of associating weakness or foolishness with God. Secularism does not teach us "to abandon the oracles of the Deity," if it can be made manifest that such oracles exist. It regards much that men attribute to Deity as degrading to his character, and as blasphemy against his goodness. In calling upon men to attend to the present, about which they know something, in preference to the future, about which they know nothing, and guess or surmise everything, the secularist is not, as "Rolla" puts it, doing an act of "highest presumption;" nor does he thereby "set God at nought, and defy his vengeance." Is it presumption to seek to know ourselves and our relation to the world in which we live, move, and have our being, and in which it is said God has placed us?-to revel in the blessings of earth, which it is reverently presumed God would not have put within our reach, if he had not intended us to enjoy them? Is it to "set God at nought, and defy his vengeance," to rely with unfaltering trust upon his goodness? Secularism does not associate vengeance with God. Vindictiveness, which is deemed unmanly, Secularism regards as ungodly. What the cultured moral sense of humanity revolts from, Secularism cannot associate with Deity, who must always be presumed to be the infinite perfection of whatever is noble and magnanimous in man-the creation of his hands. To presume otherwise, would be to make morality a chaos. Although "Rolla" writes about the "profane shrine of vaunting and error-bound human reason," he will be obliged to tell us that, in the choice of his creed, his sole reliance was on this "human reason," which he so disparages and discredits. Will "Rolla" tell us whether reason is the gift of God; and, if so, in what way he justifies the disparagement of it? If we are not to follow reason, to what shall we look for guidance? We may be told of the "bold opposition of erring reason to the truth of God;'" but, if our reason, with which it is admitted God has endowed us, warns us that what is represented as the "truth of God" is no such thing, our course is clear, we must reject it. We cannot turn hypocrite and lie. Honest error is nobler and more worthy than dishonest assent to truth. What is it to us if the Shasters, the Koran, and the creeds of Paganism declare Secularism to be false, if our conscience approves it and experience justifies it! If we surrender our human judgment to another, will he insure our safety, and bear the consequences of our errors? Shall we not be called upon to answer for ourselves? Is it not imperative, then, that we should think for ourselves? Secularism denies not the Divine presence; it hesitates to presumptuously pronounce upon or arrogantly dogmatize about a question which ages of controversy has not settled, and leaves it to the earnest and honest consideration of the individual. We are called upon to justify our rejection of the Bible. We do not reject the whole Bible; we only reject those portions of it that seem to us immoral, ambiguous, impracticable, and improbable. Those portions of the Bible we do reject, we do not reject from enmity to the Bible, or from perverseness or unwillingness, but from our inability to see truth in them. It may be an intellectual want, it may be ignorance, but it is not wickedness, or enmity to God, or truth, or the Bible. When in the Bible we find God described as partial, we reject that as derogatory to his character, and pause over |
