will be, at last, converted into an evidence of right, and demanded as such. The lands proposed to be bestowed on Louisiana [said Mr. S.], were acquired by purchase from France, and with the treasure of the nation. They are the property of all the States. Why, then, shall they be ceded to a particular State, without equivalent? Why shall that which is the property of the many become the property of the few Where is our right to cede the national domain as a gift to particular parts of the Union, for merely State or individual purposes? These lands were bought with the common treasure; let them be sold for general benefit. The public lands were bought with the public means; and, of the fifteen millions paid by the United States for the lands of Louisiana, Pennsylvania, the State I have the honor in part to represent, paid at least two millions of dollars towards this purchase. She has not authorized me to pass the title to this property away, without an equivalent, nor will I do it. At the present hour, it is true, there is high national prosperity; but we know not the hour in which dark calamity may rest upon us. I want no national tax gatherer to hover round the doors of my constituentsbrought there by free gifts and legislative prodigality. The act of the South Carolina delegation, but yesterday, was commendable. You were about to cede the right of soil and of sovereignty to a little spot. The delegation of that State amended your bill, so as to accept it only on the payment of its value. It was a proud example, and I felt happy that I had never, on behalf of my native State, asked a gift from the nation. No, sir, Pennsylvania supports the Union-she asks no gifts. The public lands, it seems [said Mr. S.], are to be wasted in donations, unless means are devised to check this. And he would propose shortly that the proceeds of the sales of all public lands, after paying the expenses of the extinction of the Indian title, of survey, land officers, &c., should be annually paid over to the several States in the proportion of their Congressional representation, to be used as a fund for Internal Improvement, or in such other manner as each State should direct. This might at least do justice to the several States. He disclaimed all unkind feelings, or any thing like a purpose of proscription towards the State of Louisiana. But he considered her among the wealthiest States of this Union; her interest had received the most ample protection; and she had largely shared in the benefits of the legislation of this House. As the proposition was simple and distinct, it was one on which the House could as well judge at once, as after it had gone to a Committee, and he was, therefore, opposed to the reference. Mr. HUNT briefly opposed the resolution. The canal itself might be very proper as a national object, but he disapproved of committing its construction to the Legislature of a State, under a large and valuable grant of land. Such grants were liable to be perverted to objects merely local, or even private and temporary in their character. Such an application of the public lands he considered improper; but would cheerfully vote for a distribution of their proceeds among the several States. Mr. BRENT, of Louisiana, was persuaded that the House had not a proper view of the resolution. It did not direct the Committee to report a bill, nor did it commit the House in any form. Such being the case, he appealed to the generosity and justice of gentlemen, and asked if it was either just or generous to refuse even a consideration of the expediency of the measure proposed. The House was not yet in possession of all the facts of the case; but if it had resolved to withhold from Louisiana the same justice which had been awarded to Ohio, to Indiana, to Illinois, and other States, he at least hoped that the reasons would be stated. He did not agree with his colleague as to the specific object to which the grant was to be applied, but he hoped the resolution would at least be suffered to go to a Committee. [H. OF R. Mr. ISACKS was in favor of the reference. By voting for the inquiry, the House would give no decision as to the expediency of the measure proposed; but it was surely worthy of being investigated by a Committee, to ascertain whether it was national in its character, and of interest to a great part of the nation. For his own part, he was of opinion that, if Congress made any appropriation for works of internal improvement, it was as well, and better, to do it in land, than in money. The State could manage land within its own limits to great advantage. It could sell the land for a better price than the General Government could ever obtain. [The hour assigned to reports and resolutions having now expired, the farther debate on Mr. GURLEY'S resolution was suspended.] CUMBERLAND ROAD. The House then, on motion of Mr. MERCER, went into Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, and resumed the consideration of the bill for the preservation and repair of the Cumberland road. Mr. STRONG said, he should not enter upon the old argument respecting the constitutional power of Congress to construct a road, whether with or without the consent of the particular State through which it might pass. That portion of the general argument which goes to prove the power to create a road cannot, I think, be fairly brought into this discussion, which involves only the right of preserving it; and especially as the right to preserve an old road does not include the power of making a new one. This matter, as it appears to me, presents an entirely different subject for consideration. The bill proposes to erect toll gates upon the Cumberland road; and, in my judgment, the whole comes to be a mere question of property, and of the right in Congress to protect, by its laws, that property, whatever may be its kind. Sir, I am always sorry to hear, on this floor or elsewhere, those arguments, too often used, which go to alarm the people for the safety of State rights, and which rarely fail to induce a belief that there is danger, where there is none. I am not against that watchful jealousy and cautious foresight so needed for the preservation of these rights; but I regret and deprecate that train of argument which, whether so intended or not, never fails to act more upon the passions than upon the judgment of men. Much has been said of the absorbing power of the Federal Government, and of its encroachments upon the States. Sir, the hazard is not on the part of the States, but of the Union-the Union is the weaker party, and constantly in danger: experience abundantly proves it. The Federal Union can never destroy the States; but, whenever it is destroyed, the chances are that it will be by the action of the States. This results from the peculiar organization of the Governments. There are twentyfour independent sovereignties. All have their local attachments. Each has its separate interests. These are always strong. Hence it is natural for the citizens to be more attached to the State than to the Federal Government. But, sir, both Governments are the creatures of the people. Nor is the one alien to the other, as some would have us believe. This Government depends as much upon the people for its existence, as the Government of any particular State does upon the citizens of that State. Most of us are sworn to sustain both, within their respective spheres. All owe allegiance to both, and are bound to sustain them. In many respects these Governments are dependent upon each other. There is, moreover, every inducement for the people to preserve the State Governments-to guard their privileges; and if, instead of inflaming and alarming, you will reason with them, rely upon it they will maintain the just rights of the States, and the integrity of the Union. If the judgment be cool, they will soon understand the errors of legislation, and deliberately correct them. The legislation of Congress is but the expressiou of the will of the people-and herculean as the power of this Government has been represented to be, a mere expression of that will may, at any time, render it harmless. Repeal the Judiciary Act, and what can the Supreme Court do? Nothing. That tribunal, so terrible to the imagination of some men, would be powerless. So of every other department and officer of the Government, whenever the people, through Congress, shall please to will it. Besides, as most of the officers of the Federal Government, at short periods, go back to the people, to account to them for the execution of their trust, there is no continuing interest in this Government to encroach upon or swallow up that of the States. The amendment offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. BUCHANAN] is not free from objections. Could I be in favor of ceding this road to the respective States through which it passes, I should be against annexing any conditions to the cession. It seems to me that the amendment involves a serious difficulty. If the United States have not only that sort of property in the road of which it is susceptible (and which the amendment admits, though the gentleman denies it in his argument), but also the right to put up gates on it, then, indeed, Congress may prescribe conditions. But, if the United States have no right to put up gates, then you not only undertake to grant what the United States do not possess, but you impose a condition, which limits the exercise of the sovereign power of a State. The right to erect these gates is clearly in the one sovereign or the other. It is either in the United States or in Pennsylvania. For example: if not in the United States (and the gentleman contends that it is not), then it is in the State of Pennsylvania. The condition, therefore, which is annexed to the grant, will obviously detract from and impair the sovereignty of the State. The gentleman [Mr. B.] also insisted that the bill would impose great hardships upon the offender (for it will touch no honest citizen), by dragging him one or two hundred miles to a Federal court, for the trial of his offence; and would, moreover, give to the Federal court exclusive jurisdiction over all crimes committed upon the road. Why, sir, the inferior courts of the United States can have no jurisdiction over any matter or offence, but what Congress gives, by law. If you impose a fine for injuring the gate, or for refusing to pay toll, you can touch none but the offender, nor prosecute for any other cause. Pennsylvania has concurrent jurisdiction and concurrent legislation over this road; and the trial for crimes perpetrated upon it would be in her courts, and not in the courts of the United States. The objection, on the ground of distance from the Federal courts, is an objection equally applicable to the prosecution of any matter, civil or criminal, in the courts of the United States. It goes to the whole system of the Federal Judiciary. The Cumberland road is a mail road, and the post office laws, among other things, impose fines for obstructing the transportation of the mail. It appears to me that the only object of these fines is to prevent injury to the thing itself; that is, to protect the mail, as matter of property-and not to punish the offender for resisting the execution of the law. This latter offence would be a crime of a high grade, and perhaps could be punished only in the Federal courts. And what is worthy of notice in this law, is, that, by the 37th section of it, all causes of action arising under" it are to be "sued" for, and "all offenders against it prosecuted, before the justices of the peace, magistrates, or other judicial courts of the several States." If the State courts have jurisdiction in these matters, then the tolls upon this road may be collected in the same way, whenever that mode shall be thought advisable. But, if the United States can impose a fine of a hundred dollars upon an offender, for putting a log, for instance, across the road, by which the mail is obstructed for five minutes, can they not [JAN. 21, 1829. also impose a fine for obstructing the passing of a cannon, or the wilful destruction of a gun-carriage, or of a turnpike gate, or for passing the gate and refusing to pay the toll? And where is the hardship or injustice, whether the same thing is done by the one Government or the other? The honorable gentleman [Mr. B.] moreover urges, that this power (which is the power of a sovereign to protect his own property) will become dangerous to the States; because, the exercise of the power being discretionary, if you can put up toll gates on the Cumberland road, you can on every other mail road in the United States. Sir, I think not. The distinction between the two cases is this: the United States own the Cumberland road as a sovereign, and have a right to dispose of it as such. They have an interest, a property, in it; whereas, in the common mail roads they have neither. But is the danger of abusing the power in this case greater than it is in others? The exercise of the great war power is entirely discretionary, and necessarily so; for, although the Federal constitution is made up of enumerated powers, yet each power is, in itself, unlimited. Hence it is, that Congress can authorize the raising of an army of a million of men, or the building of a thousand ships of war, or the levying of a direct tax of five hundred millions of dollars, and yet not reach the limit of constitutional power. So, in these as in other cases, the proper execution of the trust must, of necessity, be left to the sound discretion of the agent. I have said that the property in the Cumberland road belonged to the United States-by property, I mean that sort, whatever it may be, which would have been in the State of Pennsylvania had she constructed the road. By the terms of the agreement (as the Committee will remember) between the people of Ohio and the United States, the United States became bound to make a road leading from tide water to the State of Ohio. The performance of this, however, depended upon the assent of Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland. The Legislature of each of these States gave the assent required, and the Cumberland road was made. The United States, under these circumstances, having constructed this road, I think it belongs to them; that it is their property; unless it be true, as some contend, that they cannot take the title to land, lying within any of the States, nor any interest growing out of it, other than particular parcels, ceded for the purposes specified in the constitution, and over which they have exclusive legislation. In point of fact, the United States now hold real estate within the limits of the old States, and over which they have not exclusive legislation. The right to take and hold these parcels of land must either be incident to sovereignty, or be found in the Federal constitution. It can exist no where else. If a State can give an acre of land, as she clearly can, to an alien subject or State, why not to the United States? But if there be no power in the constitution authorizing the United States to acquire real property, how did they succeed to the vast domain which belonged to the old Confederation? or how take the lands ceded by Georgia in 1802, and over which the States of Mississippi and Alabama have since been organized and admitted into the Union? or how hold such as fall into their hands for taxes or debts? The clause in the constitution which says that " Congress shall have power to dispose of, and make all needful rules and regulations respecting, the territory or other property belonging to the United States," if it does not give in terms, it certainly takes it for granted that the United States have, the right to hold real estate as well as other property. As a co-sovereign, therefore, it seems to me that the United States have the same kind and degree of property in this road that either of the States could have had. The United States having the property, be it what it may, in the Cumberland road, have they the right of erecting toll gates on it for its preservation? I have always sup posed that the Federal and State Governments had equally the power of making laws for the protection of their own separate property; that each individual State has, none will deny. And if any doubt exists in regard to the power of the United States in this respect, it seems to me the clause of the constitution which I have before cited will remove it. That clause gives to Congress the power of making all needful "rules and regulations," not only respecting the "territory," but "other property, belonging to the United States" This obviously cannot relate to the property mentioned in the preceding clause of the constitution, which gives Congress power" to exercise exclusive legislation, in all cases whatsoever, over" what is now the District of Columbia, and "over all places purchased, by the consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock yards, and other needful buildings," because, as this clause confers all power over these places, no other or greater power is needed or can be given. To what, then, does the phrase "other property" refer, and with respect to which Congress has power to make "all needful rules and regulations?" If, therefore, Congress can make laws for the protection and preservation of the property which the United States have in a ship of war, while lying within the limits of a State, or in the public mail, and the like, why not also for the property they have in the Cumberland road? [H. OF R. no exclusive legislation. Indeed, over many of the places purchased for forts, arsenals, and the like purposes, the States in which they are have retained their concurrent jurisdiction. Whence, then, the right to hold them, if legislation over them must be exclusive, and can, in no case, be concurrent? So, if a State should convey its whole domain to the United States, would it affect the constitutional powers of the two Governments? Suppose the United States construct a public road through the public lands in Ohio, for example, as they have a right to do, and erect gates on it, and, at the same time, erect gates on the Cumberland road-are not the powers of Congress over the two roads precisely the same? If different, wherein do they differ? Congress cannot exercise exclusive legislation over one foot of this road in Ohio, any more than over that part of it in Pennsylvania, although the one in Ohio is, in truth, a part of the public domain; and the reason is, that neither of them is for any of the purposes over which this high power is permitted to be given. But both Ohio and Pennsylvania have concurrent jurisdiction and legislation over the respective roads, in common with the United States. And, in my judgment, Congress has the right to make laws to protect the title, and to preserve the property in both roads from destruction. Putting up gates are the usual and ordinary means of preserving this sort of property. It imposes no hardship upon any one. It affects none but the passenger, and he pays only for the benefit he receives at the time. I will now proceed to examine the sort of jurisdiction which the United States have over this road. As this Go- The gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. BUCHANAN] put vernment is peculiar in its structure, so it cannot be rightly the case of a private right of way, and asked whether the judged of by that of any other. Its powers, carried out, owner of the soil could erect gates, and exact toll? I anthose which belonged to the respective States, are, like swer, no; and simply for the reason that he is a subject, those remaining to the States, sovereign and concurrent, and not a sovereign. He also wished to know whether or exclusive, with regard to the particular subject upon Virginia, had she made that part of the road which is in which they act, The judiciary power of the Federal Go- Pennsylvania, could have put up gates and exacted tolls? vernment extends over all the Union. The civil and crimi- Clearly not; because it is out of her jurisdiction, and benal process of the courts of the United States can be ex-yond the reach of her legislation. But, as the powers of ercised in and throughout every part of each and of all the the Federal Government extend over all the States, and States. So the like process of each State may be execu- though the power contended for, in this case, is a concurted any where within its limits, except in places, the ex- rent power only, like that of taxation, yet it is believed to clusive legislation over which may have been ceded to the be sufficient to authorize Congress to protect the property United States. These two jurisdictions must, therefore, in the road, and to put up gates on it for its preservation. be strictly concurrent: for, otherwise, the laws of but one Sir, suppose one of our ships of war to be in the waters, of the sovereign parties could be executed. It seems to and clearly within the limits of Pennsylvania, for example: me, moreover, that, owing to the peculiarity of our federal it is manifest that Congress would not possess exclusive system, the legislative powers of Congress, and of the re- legislation over it. That State might serve her civil and spective State Legislatures, are also concurrent. If they criminal process in it, and might tax it. And yet, is it are not, how can Congress and a State Legislature, at the true that Congress has no power to make laws to protect same time, tax the same subject or thing, or bind the same the property of the United States in that ship, while thus citizen to support both Governments? The fact is, what- situated? Have we power (as we clearly have) to punish ever the theory may be, that person and property are, at the citizen who destroys a ship of war, in a foreign port, all times, subject to the legislative action of the National and does this power cease the moment the ship enters the and State Legislatures. But, nevertheless, Congress can waters of one of these States? The State may wish its neither acquire nor exercise exclusive legislation, except destruction. And is there no power in the other States to over a few places, purchased for specified purposes, such protect their common property, when thus situated? But as forts, arsenals, &c.; and the sole objects of that clause in must Congress fold its hands, stand by in silence, and see the constitution, relating to these places for forts, &c., and the ship destroyed? to which I have before referred, clearly was to enable a State to give, and Congress to exercise, exclusive legislation in the enumerated cases, and not to restrain the power of a State in the disposition of her soil for any other purpose. I am aware that, by the cession of Georgia, the United States took the title to the territory ceded, and acquired exclusive legislation over it. But this exclusive legislation was the result, not of any grant, but of contracting the limits of Georgia, which she had a right to do; because, had her limits remained unaltered, although she might have granted the territory, yet she could not have granted exclusive legislation over it to the United States, as the object of the grant would not have been for any of the special purposes named in the constitution. The United States now have the title to many small parcels of land within the States, and over which they have VOL. V.-32 The Cumberland road is a national road. The nation was bound not only to make, but to sustain it, if it could be done without a continued drain from the Federal treasury. Such, I think, is the spirit of the contract, and of the legislation in relation to it. This road owes its origin to peculiar circumstances. It rests upon a peculiar foundation. The like will rarely, and may never, occur again. I am for sustaining it in the way proposed by the bill. Try it; put up the gates. If the plan proves to be a bad one, repeal the law. This can be done at any time, and leave the matter where it now is. But suppose the amendment prevails, and the States of Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland, put up gates on the road, what will be the prac tical difference, or what the hardship to the passenger upon the road, whether the gate be erected by the State or by Congress? or whether the toll be gathered by an Are agent of the United States, or an agent of a State ? the rates of toll any higher in the one case than in the other? Are the penalties any severer? Sir, I cannot perceive that this measure will trench at all upon the powers of the several States, or put the rights of the citizen at hazard. And I am satisfied that, if the citizens will keep themselves cool, and will judge deliberately, no collision of powers can happen in this case, sooner than in any other. The law will really be felt only by the delinquents; and many of them, when brought up for trial, would hardly know, unless told before hand, whether they were in a Federal or a State court. In a word, sir, I cannot but express a hope that the amendment will be rejected, and the plan proposed by the bill adopted-tried, and tried fairly. Mr. S. WOOD, after giving a brief history of the cession of Virginia, of 1784, and of the ordinance of 1787, stated that the United States, in the act of 1802, for the admission of Ohio into the Union, stipulated that five per cent of the proceeds of the public lands in the said State, sold by Congress, should be applied to the laying out and making of public roads leading from the navigable waters emptying into the Atlantic, to the Ohio, to be laid out under the authority of Congress, with the consent of the several States through which the road should pass, in consideration of an exemption of the lands, sold by the United States, from taxation by the State for a given period. That, by an act of the subsequent year, passed at the request of Ohio, three of the five per cent was agreed to be paid to Ohio, for the purpose of making roads within the said State, and two per cent. only was reserved to be expended in the manner stipulated by the former act. The United States, in conformity with the terms of the compact, obtained the consent of the States of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, to their making a road from Cumberland to the river Ohio. In 1806 the United States made an appropriation to commence the making of the said road, and have gone on making appropriations until the road was completed. The whole amount of the two per cent. fund, on the 31st December, 1826, arising from the sales of the public lands in Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri, amounted only to two hundred and ninety-two thousand four hundred and seventy-seven dollars and three cents, and the moneys expended by the Government on the Cumberland road, from 1806, to December, 1827, amounted to one million eight hundred and thirty-eight thousand and seventy-four dollars and twenty cents; more than six times as much as was required by a literal performance of the stipulation with the State of Ohio. Thus, [said Mr. W.] the United States have anticipated the two per cent. fund many years in advance, and have honorably fulfilled the agreement with the Western States. They have laid out and made the road agreeably to the stipulation, and therefore are under no farther obligations in relation to that road. It is, however, very desirable that so important a road, and upon which so much money has been expended, should be placed in a situation to support itself, and be kept in constant repair. The best mode to ensure the preservation of the road is the establishment of toll gates, with the exaction of a very moderate toll, and an appropriation of the revenue, after deducting the expenses of collection, to the continual improvement of the road. By this plan the road will, at a very small expense to those who shall enjoy the benefit of it, be kept in constant repair, and will be made as perfect as the nature of the ground and the materials will admit. No objection has been made to this mode of keeping the road in repair; but two propositions have been made relative to the means by which it shall be carried into effect. The bill proposes that the General Government shall repair the road, erect the gates, fix and collect the toll, and expend the surplus revenue in the improvement of the road. The amendment proposes to transfer whatever claims the United States [JAN. 21, 1829. have to the road, to the States through which it passes, in full faith that they will take the proper steps for the preservation of the road. I am decidedly in favor of the last of these propositions. It is immaterial to those who use the road, by which government the toll is collected, and the road is kept in repair; but it is all important to the preservation of our political institutions that this power should be exercised by that government to which, in the partition of their sovereign power, the people have allotted it. The power to regulate highways is certainly not among the enumerated powers of the General Government; nor does it seem to be a necessary incident to any one of those powers. The powers of the General Government were intended for those purposes for which the States were not competent; and it is hardly possible to select an object of authority more of a local nature, and more completely subject to municipal regulation, than highways. It is also doubtful whether it is competent for the General Government to establish such inferior tribunals, and to appoint such ministerial officers, as would be necessary to enforce the collection of the toll. The evasion of the toll, and injuries to the roads, can only be prevented by courts and officers in the neighborhood of the road. This would be an extension of the judiciary system of the United States to purposes which do not seem to have been within the contemplation of the constitution. This exercise of authority by the General Government would intrench upon the judicial authority of the States; would efface the lines of distinction between the jurisdiction of the General and State Governments; and would lead to an abridgment of the constitutional powers of the States. If the operation of the act should depend on the judicial authority of the United States as now organized, the expense of prosecution would effectually prevent its execution by the assurance of indemnity to offenders. It is not a subject matter for concurrent jurisdiction, as has been intimated; the imposition of toll exhausts the subject and must necessarily be exclusive. It has been said that the General Government may enforce the collection of toll, and recover the penalties for the violation of the law, by the courts and ministerial officers of the States. Admitting, for the sake of argument, that the State officers might, if they chose, exercise this authority, it is evident that they would not be culpable for the omission, und it would be unsafe and improvident to rely for the execution of your laws upon the voluntary exercise of authority by judicial officers. It has been farther alleged, that Pennsylvania has expressly authorized the collection of toll on this road by the General Government. This is an admission that the General Government has no authority in this case. If the General Government possessed the power, the grant was unnecessary; and if not, it is not competent for Pennsylvania to supply the defect. No one will contend that it is in the power of a single State to enlarge or diminish the powers of the General Government, or that this can be done in any other way than by an amendment, in the mode provided by the constitution. It has also been contended that the Cumberland road belongs to the General Government, and that jurisdiction over it results from the property. It must be admitted that all claims of the General Govvernment to this road are derived from the acts of the three States through which it passes. It is not to be presumed that they granted more than was necessary for the purposes of the grant. The object in view was nothing more than the laying out and making a common highway through their respective territories, and the application was predicated on the supposition that their assent was necessary to authorize it. The assent of the three States does not involve a cession of property or jurisdiction: neither one nor the other was necessary to the accomplishment of the object contemplated. The laws of the several States furnish the power of obtaining roads for the accommodation of individuals as well as the public, and prescribe the means by which this may be effected. When common highways are laid out through improved land, the owner is usually paid for this appropriation of his property by the public or by individuals, but neither acquire any other right in the road than the right of passage, which immediately becomes the common right of every citizen. The freehold, or right of soil, remains in the owner of the adjoining lands. The whole extent of the right acquired by the United States from the assent of the three States was solely the privilege of availing themselves of the provisions of their laws in relation to the subject of common highways; and they acquired nothing more by the exercise of their privilege than individuals, in similar cases, acquire-the common right of passage. The General Government, therefore, could not derive any right of jurisdiction over the Cumberland road from any interest they have in it; nor would this have resulted from an ownership in the soil. The United States may purchase and hold land in a State, but they hold it, in all cases, as individuals do; subject to the jurisdiction of the State, except in case of a cession of jurisdiction, in the special cases provided by the constitution. There is no pretence, therefore, for the General Government to claim jurisdiction over the Cumberland road. The jurisdiction over that road has always belonged, and still belongs, to the States of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia. Without going farther into the constitutional question, I contend that, if it could be conceded that the General Government possessed the power in question, it would be good policy to relinquish it to the States; that they are more competent to its efficient exercise; that they possess better means to effect the object; can accomplish it with much less trouble and expense, and with much greater benefit to the public. Although, according to my views of the subject, no act is necessary to authorize the States to exercise this power, yet previous legislation seems to render it proper to show the sense and wishes of the General Government. There is no need of conditions. The States will be bound, by honor and by interest, to make effectual provision for the perpetual preservation of the road; and the most perfect confidence may be entertained that they will do it more effectually than it is in the power of the General Government to do it. This course will remove all constitutional scruples: will put troublesome questions at rest; and enable us to act with some degree of harmony. Why not, then, adopt the amendment? Is no concession due to those who doubt the constitutional right as well as the competency of the General Government to execute this power, when the object in view can be better obtained in this way than in any other? Rather than the amendment should fail, I would stipulate to vote for any sum that shall be deemed reasonable and necessary to put the road in good repair, and to make the necessary erections, that the States may organize the plan for the preservation of the road and put it into operation without expense. I hope, therefore, that the amendment without the proviso may be adopted. Mr. P. P. BARBOUR said, concurring in the opinion which has been expressed as to the importance of this subject, I feel disposed to submit to the Committee some views in relation to it. I promise, however, to present them in a brief and condensed form, as well because of the lateness of the hour, as because some years' experience in this House admonishes me that, in addressing such a body, it is only necessary to state the propositions proposed to be maintained, to accompany them with some few illustrations, and to leave it to the House to carry the arguments in their own minds to their consequences. This subject of internal improvement, in its different phases, has engaged the attention of Congress for a series of years. On some former occasions, and on one of them particularly, perhaps eleven years ago, I took a part in the discussion, and, to the utmost of my ability, I then endeavored, [H. OF R. in an elaborate argument, to prove that it was utterly without the sphere of the constitutional power of Congress It is not my purpose now to retrace my steps in that discussion. I may be allowed, however, merely to suggest some of the prominent positions which I then occupied. I would not do even this, if it were not to express my dissent to some of the views of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, with whom I concur in the general result at which he has arrived. I denied the power of Congress to appropriate money for the construction of roads, upon these plain principles: that if, as the gentleman from Pennsylvania has admitted, we had no right to construct, we could not have the power to appropriate money for their construction; that the power of appropriation was a means for the attainment of certain ends, which were specified; that, whenever we had not power to execute the end, we could not use the means which conduced to it; for that would be to say that what we had not a power to do, we yet had a power to cause to be done. Thus, if we had not power to raise and support armies, or to provide and maintain navies, we could not rightfully appropriate money for either of those purposes. As to the reasoning which attempted to derive the power to construct roads from that to regulate commerce, from the military power, and even from that to establish post offices and post roads, I resisted it upon the ground that it led to an inadmissible latitude of construction, and an indefinite train of implication, which would run out to such remote consequences, as to obliterate every line of partition between the Federal and State Governments. Thus, for example, take the power of establishing post roads, which bears upon its face the strongest plausibility; this, I contended, meant only to designate the mail routes, as is shown not only by the plain meaning of the terms, but by the practice of the Government from its commencement; for all the laws, professing by their titles to establish post roads, did nothing more than declare what roads should be mail routes; and this argument ought to have much weight with those gentlemen who repose so much upon the strength of legislative precedent Now, sir, let us for a moment examine the long train of implications which have been derived from this single clause. The power to establish, it is said, implies the right to create ; the right to create, implies that to preserve; the right to preserve, implies that to turnpike; that to turnpike implies that to erect gates; that to erect gates, implies that to collect toll; that to collect toll, implies that to punish for non-payment. I will appeal to the Committee to say, if this process of reasoning can be sustained, whether the advocates of the sedition law were not equally sustained in their argument, when they reasoned thus: We have power to suppress insurrections; the publication of seditious papers, and uttering seditious words, lead to insurrections; the sup pression of these will tend to prevent insurrections; prevention is one of the modes of suppression; we, therefore, logically prove our right thus to suppress insurrections, and consequently our right to pass the sedition law. This kind of argument, in either case, may, I think, be fairly represented by comparing it to a cone inverted; as the one must fall, by the laws of matter, so must the other, by a just construction of the constitution; the line of direction falls without the base. But I promised not to go into the argument of these questions, and I will therefore forbear to notice them farther. Before, however, I come to the views which I propose to present, permit me, for a moment, to trace the history of our progress on this subject. At the last session of the Fourteenth Congress, a bill passed both Houses, setting apart a particular fund for the construction of roads and canals: this bill was rejected by the then President, [Mr. MADISON] on the last day of his official life, and upon the express ground that it was unconstitutional. At the first session, I think, of the Fifteenth Congress, a resolution was |
