earth; but, in the questions which may arise, relative to the power of the Federal Government, it is impossible not to perceive, that they are the tribunals of one party, organized, appointed, paid, receiving rank, distinction, and the means of reputation. Feeling their influence to extend with the extent of their jurisdiction, and their dignity to increase with the magnitude of their powers, they must be more than men to resist the temptations that press upon them-the breathings of that inaudible voice, which, through the organs of pride, vain glory and ambition, urges them silently, but unceasingly, to amplify their powers, and enlarge the foundation of that structure, on which their greatness rests. Let us add also, in charity, a probable persuasion in their own minds, that by widening the limits of their authority, they might multiply the means of doing good, and thus add to the benefits their labours may confer on their country. Be this as it may, they certainly stand on an eminence, where every impulse that can act on the frailty of man, and every feeling that is indirect and selfish, urges them to assume a still more commanding attitude. Nothing but naked, unrewarded integrity, assuming, perhaps, the garb of unbecoming humility, can preserve them in an unchanging position. Our records are said already to shew, that some who have been selected to the high office, for their supposed devotion to popular opinions, and, particularly, for their avowed preference for the docrines of strict and literal construction, have no sooner found themselves within the influence of this relaxing atmosphere, than they have become latitudinarians in practice and in principle, and have assisted in loosening every restraint which the Constitution was supposed to impose on the action of the government.

Without, however, supposing any liability to change, or even to modify an opinion from the mere influence of office, it must be obvious to all who study the operation of our government, that it is in the power of its authorities, by appointment, to shape the opinion of the Supreme Court in such a manner, that, after a given time, it shall respond to any decision of a permanent majority, and uphold their doctrines. Independently of the variation which office may be suspected to produce, who can doubt, that as vacancies occur, men will be selected to fill this high station, for opinion's sake, as well as for their talents; and that none will be called to construe the Constitution, whose doctrinal views shall not have been previously known and considered. An occasional exception may occur in appointment, or a departure from this principle may, under peculiar circumstances, take place, but it must be regarded as a maxim of acknowledged truth, that

in a course of years, the offices of the highest supreme tribunal in our land, will be held only by those whose political opinions, and whose constructive doctrines of constitutional right and constitutional power will accord with the views of those who hold the reins of government. Such as are disposed to resist the assumption of power, or, in a word, the minority, must not, for a moment, think of confiding their rights to the decision of such a tribunal. They must, at once, plead to the jurisdiction.

Let us illustrate this opinion by facts, and if we introduce names, we do it without the slightest disrespect. However we may regret that certain opinions have been held by celebrated individuals, we are far from considering it an offence, much less as a crime. Many of our readers have no doubt heard of the talents and character and opinions of the late Judge Roane of Virginia. He was distinguished by many at home, as the head of the party who opposed the assumption of constructive power by the government, and wished to limit its jurisdiction to the objects explicitly entrusted to its care. The talents and sentiments of Mr. Pinckney, of Maryland, were more known, because they were displayed on a different, and a wider theatre. Who can doubt, that if, during the two last administrations, a vacancy had unfortunately occurred on the bench of the Supreme Court, and these distinguished jurists had been placed as competitors, the choice would have fallen on him, whose opinions in respect to this very point, (the extended jurisdiction of the court) were known to be friendly, and this without reference to talents; for either of these gentlemen was competent ably to discharge all the duties of such a station. Mr. Pinckney is stated to have devoted much time and research, in the latter years of his life, to the support of these doctrines. All his arguments abundantly verify this. And why, we would ask, was this labour bestowed upon an instrument, whose powers, as vested in the government by the parties to the compact, were sufficiently clear, and so well marked by distinct and definite boundaries? Why were laboured efforts to extend, by subtle and forced interpretations, and by remote analogies, the power of the Constitution? Can it spring from any other source, than an ardent desire to include within the jurisdiction of the court, all authority, and to render it, in all respects, sovereign and supreme.

Let us take another case in which the remedy through these tribunals would be hopeless. The tariff laws for the promotion of manufactures, have been pronounced by some of the ablest lawyers and statesmen of the North, as contrary to the principles of the Constitution. They have been considered, al

most unanimously in the South, as an outrage upon these principles. Now, with what hope of success, could an appeal, on this subject, be carried before Mr. Justice Baldwin, who in his congressional career was the steady undeviating advocate of this System, or before Mr. Justice Johnson of this State, who has recently made a public declaration, that the protection of domestic manufactures is not only constitutional, but that no State is more deeply interested in maintaining the principles of the tariff than South-Carolina. Can it be supposed that the one would depart from the avowed opinions of his past life, or that the other, after such a public declaration of his hostility to the settled convictions of his countrymen of South-Carolina, could meet this question with the unbiassed mind that becomes the sacred functions of a judge? As in one, so it might be in all who had been engaged in political life, and might have former opinions and public declarations to encounter. If there is any sliding, history and philosophy, both unfortunately teach us, that the proclivity is more likely to be in favour of, than adverse to an increase of power. Lord Strafford viewed the complaints and rights of the people with a widely different feeling from Sir Thomas Wentworth, and we suspect, that, in our own history, Mr. Jefferson is the only President who retired from office with the same opinions as to the limits of State and Federal authority with which he entered.

And what has been the practical progress of this loose construction of the Constitution? Agriculture was, in the Convention, excluded as a subject fit for the legislation of Congress, and yet we observe in Congress amongst the Standing Committees, a "Committee on Agriculture." The power to grant incorporations, was expressly denied in the Convention, as proper to be given to the government. The court has determined, that Congress has power to create corporate bodies. Mr. Madison, in Congress, strenuously opposed, in 1792, the incorporation of the former National Bank. As President of the United States, he confirmed the charter of the present National Bank. Even General Washington pressed upon Congress the establishment of a National University, though, as President of the Convention, he must have known that, on such a power being proposed to be added to the enumerated powers, it had been three several times negatived in that body. What a melancholy lesson does this teach us of the natural tendency of power to widen the first path which it opens for itself, and

* See Judge Johnson's answer to an invitation to attend a public dinner and meeting at Columbia, S. C. published in the Columbia Telescope, of September 17th, 1830.

of the facility with which, even the prudent, the wise and the just, can persuade themselves, that the beneficial end of any particular measure, can sanctify its irregular adoption.

If we are to judge of the future by the past, we can see no hope that Congress will cease to exercise powers, not warranted by the Constitution, or that where these powers are disputed, the Supreme Court can ever be relied on, as an impartial arbiter, to decide questions of boundary between the State and Federal jurisdictions. From the foundation of the government, until the present time, we have had from this Court, professions in abundance, that they were no more desirous to limit State sovereignty, than they were to extend the Federal perogative beyond the enumerated powers. We believe, that no professions were ever uttered in greater sincerity; but we must be constrained to say, for the reasons already given, that the judges of this Court, must, from the very nature of things, be silently carried onwards on the gentle stream of extended interpretation, until they shall find themselves on an ocean of illimitable judicial jurisdiction. It may be confidently said that they are already embarked on such a sea. They are evidently under the influence of some invisible under current, which has thrown them out of that course they were most solicitous to steer, and the mistake in their reckoning, can never be rectified until the mists they have so long encountered in the voyage shall be dissipated, and they shall be able to take an observation by the first unclouded mid-day sun of their own minds. This sunshine, so essential to the true latitude of their powers we fear will never again beam upon them, until it shall vouchsafe the majesty and power of the State sovereignties, which created all things under the government, to give them this light, by some manifestation of its sovereign will and pleasure. Our judges would then discover the hidden causes, which, in spite of all their careful calculations of course and distance, from the time of their departure, have brought the judiciary department of the United States to be regarded as the high, controlling authority over the sovereignty of the States, stead of carrying it to its destination, as a co-ordinate, independent department in our anomalous system, no more sovereign over the State judiciary authorities, than those authorities are sovereign over it. That the lights of an unclouded judgment in the Supreme Court, have not been visible, under any circumstances, where the powers of the Federal Government have been drawn into question, is a truth amply attested by the records of our judicial history. Our limits will not per

mit us to go into detail of all the instances, but we shall advert to some of them.

The first case in which the Court, in its reasonings, clearly developed its intention to give an extended construction to the powers of the Courts of the United States, was that of Chisolm v. the State of Georgia, (2 Dall. 419.) By this decision, a sovereign State was rendered liable to be brought to the bar of that Court, as a defendant, at the suit of an individual citizen of another State. There were many points made in this case; but the only one material to our present discussion, was, the question of a State's liability to be sued. The ground of the decision against Georgia, was that clause in the Constitution, which declares, inter alia, that the judicial power shall extend to controversies "between a State and citizens of another State." The Attorney General, Mr. Randolph, who, in the Convention, had been foremost amongst the decided advocates of a supreme national government, who was opposed to the equality of suffrage in the Senate, who proposed that Congress should have a negative over the acts of the State authorities, and who was displeased with the present Constitution, because it was a federal and not a national government, seems to have argued this case under the most pleasant feelings, for he considered "the constitutional right as supported by his own conviction, and that to surrender it, would be official perfidy." On the part of Georgia, Ingersoll and Dallas declined arguing the case, having received positive instructions not to do so; but they presented "a written protestation, on behalf of the State, against the exercise of jurisdiction in the cause." In our humble judgment, this was a case, in which, to say the least of it, considerable doubts might well be entertained, and, therefore, good room for the Court to say, that these doubts should be thrown into the scale of State sovereignty. On the one side, it was said with truth enough, that the words " controversies between a State and the citizens of another State," seemed to indicate, that the Court was to possess jurisdiction, whether the State were plaintiff or defendant, and it is equally certain, that, in the succeeding clause, this exposition does seem to be enforced, when it is provided, that in "cases in which a State shall be a party," the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. But, on the other hand, it was certainly fair reasoning, and it was so allowed by the Chief Justice, that as the same section of the Constitution which extends the judicial power to controversies "between a State and the citizens of another State," also extends to controversies "to which the United States shall be a party," it would follow,

that