afked him, What was Nero's overthrow? He anfwered, Nero could touch and tune the Harp well, but in Government fometimes he used to wind the Pins too high, fometimes to let them down too low. And certain it is, that Nothing destroyeth Authority so much as the unequal and untimely Interchange of Power pressed too far, and relaxed too

much.

This is true, that the Wisdom of all these latter Times in Princes' Affairs, is rather fine Deliveries, and Shiftings of Dangers and Mischiefs, when they are near, than folid and grounded Courses to keep them aloof. But this is but to try Masteries with Fortune; and let Men beware how they neglect and fuffer Matter of Trouble to be prepared; for no Man can forbid the Spark, nor tell whence 'it may come. The Difficulties in Princes' Business, are many and great; but the greatest Difficulty is often in their own Mind. For it is common with Princes (faith Tacitus) to will Contradictories. Sunt plerumque Regum voluntates vehementes, et inter fe contrariæ.3 For it is the Solecifm of Power to think to command the End, and yet not to endure the Mean.

Kings have to deal with their Neighbours, their Wives, their Children, their Prelates or Clergy, their Nobles, their Second Nobles or Gentlemen, their Merchants, their Commons, and their Men of War; and from all these arise Dangers, if Care and Circumfpection be not used.

2 Philoftr. Vit. Apoll. Tyan. v. 38.

3 This is from Salluft, B. J. 113, and not from Tacitus. It is again quoted in the Adv. of Learning, II. xxii. 5, and there rightly given to Salluft.

First for their Neighbours; there can no general Rule be given (the Occafions are so variable,) fave one, which ever holdeth; which is, that Princes do keep due Sentinel, that none of their Neighbours do overgrow fo (by increase of Territory, by embracing of Trade, by Approaches, or the like), as they become more able to annoy them than they were. And this is, generally, the Work of Standing Counfels to forefee and to hinder it. During that Triumvirate of Kings, King Henry the Eighth of England, Francis the First King of France, and Charles the Fifth Emperor, there was such a Watch kept that none of the Three could win a Palm of Ground, but the other two would straightways balance it, either by Confederation, or, if need were, by a War: and would not in any wife take up Peace at Interest. And the like was done by that League (which Guicciardini faith was the Security of Italy), made between Ferdinando King of Naples, Lorenzius Medicis, and Ludovicus Sforza, Potentates, the one of Florence, the other of Milan. Neither is the Opinion of some of the Schoolmen to be received, That a War cannot justly be made, but upon a precedent Injury or Provocation. For there is no Question but a juft Fear of an imminent Danger, though there be no blow given, is a lawful Cause of a War.

For their Wives; there are cruel Examples of them. Livia is infamed for the poisoning of her Hufband: Roxalana, Solyman's Wife, was the

* See Guicciardini, lib. i. c. 1. The League was that of 1485.
5 Grotius, de Jure Belli et Pacis, ii. 1. §§ 2, 3, lays down the fame

doctrine.

Destruction of that renowned Prince, Sultan Muftapha, and otherwife troubled his House and Succeffion: Edward the Second of England, his Queen had the principal hand in the Depofing and Murder of her Husband. This kind of Danger is then to be feared chiefly when the Wives have Plots for the raising of their own Children, or else that they be Advoutreffes.

For their Children; the Tragedies likewise of Dangers from them, have been many and generally the Entering of Fathers into Sufpicion of their Children hath been ever Unfortunate. The Destruction of Mustapha (that we named before) was fo fatal to Solyman's Line, as the Succeffion of the Turks from Solyman until this day is fufpected to be untrue, and of strange Blood; for that Selymus the Second, was thought to be fuppofititious. The Deftruction of Crifpus, a young Prince of rare Towardness, by Conftantinus the Great, his Father, was in like manner fatal to his House; for both Conftantinus and Conftance, his Sons, died violent deaths; and Conftantius, his other Son, did little better, who died indeed of Sickness, but after that Julianus had taken Arms against him. The Destruction of Demetrius Son to Philip the Second of Macedon, turned upon the Father, who died of Repentance. And many like Examples there are; but few, or none where the Fathers had good by fuch Distrust; except it were where the Sons were up in open Arms against them; as was Selymus the First against Bajazet: and the three Sons of Henry the Second King of England.

i. e. Conftantine the Great's Father.

For their Prelates, when they are proud and great, there is also Danger from them; as it was in the times of Anfelmus and Thomas Becket, Archbishops of Canterbury, who with their Crofiers did almost try it with the King's Sword; and yet they had to deal with ftout and haughty Kings; William Rufus, Henry the First, and Henry the Second. The Danger is not from that State, but where it hath a Dependence of foreign Authority; or where the Churchmen come in and are elected, not by the Collation of the King, or particular Patrons, but by the People.

For their Nobles, to keep them at a distance it is not amiss; but to deprefs them may make a King more Abfolute, but lefs Safe, and lefs able to perform any thing that he defires. I have noted it in my History of King Henry the Seventh of England, who depreffed his Nobility; whereupon it came to pass that his Times were full of Difficulties and Troubles; for the Nobility, though they continued loyal unto him, yet did they not cooperate with him in his Business. So that in effect, he was fain to do all things himself.

For their Second Nobles, there is not much Danger from them, being a Body difperfed: they may fometimes difcourfe high, but that doth little Hurt: befides, they are a Counterpoise to the Higher Nobility, that they grow not too Potent: and, laftly, being the most immediate in Authority with the Common People, they do beft temper Popular Commotions.

For their Merchants, they are Vena Porta; and if they flourish not, a Kingdom may have good

Limbs, but will have empty Veins, and nourish little. Taxes, and Imposts upon them do seldom good to the King's Revenue; for that that he wins in the Hundred he leefeth in the Shire; the particular Rates being increased, but the total Bulk of Trading rather decreased.

For their Commons, there is little Danger from them, except it be where they have Great and Potent Heads; or where you meddle with the Point of Religion, or their Customs, or Means of Life.

For their Men of War, it is a dangerous State, where they live and remain in a Body, and are used to Donatives; whereof we fee Examples in the Janizaries and Prætorian Bands of Rome: but Trainings of Men, and Arming them in several places and under several Commanders, and without Donatives, are Things of Defence, and no Danger.

Princes are like to Heavenly Bodies, which cause good or evil Times; and which have much Veneration, but no Reft. All precepts concerning Kings are in effect comprehended in.thofe two Remembrances Memento quod es Homo; and Memento quod es Deus, or Vice Dei: The one bridleth their Power, and the other their Will.