amendment which becomes a part of the Constitution is also a compact between the States, and the question arises, How is it that three fourths of the States, voting in favor of an amendment, are to make a compact with the other fourth, voting at the same time against it, and thus refusing to enter into the compact? How is it that the States voting to adopt, represent the States refusing to adopt, so that, by the vote of adoption, they make a compact between themselves and the others, against the will of the others expressed at the same time. Those voting to adopt act in their own behalf, thereby being one party to the bargain, and thus far it is well; but, on the compact theory, they must at the same time represent those who vote against the adoption, and thus make them another party to the bargain; when the others at the same time represent themselves, and refuse to make the bargain. Or if we state the compact theory with somewhat more of precision, each State is a party to the compact, agreeing with all the others, and one agrees with all the others notwithstanding she and several of the others refuse to agree. Thus, South Carolina, for instance, votes against a proposed amendment, and thereby refuses to enter into the new compact, but does still become a party to that compact, and agrees with the other States to adopt it, being represented by the others, several of them also voting against it, and at the same time not only making the contract for themselves, but aiding in making it for South Carolina also.

Will the advocate of the compact theory say that the provision relative to amendments, in the Constitution as first adopted, constitutes the States agents of one another, so that three fourths of the whole number may thus make an agreement for all, against the will of their principals, acting at the same time and dissenting? If this is so, we must add a new chapter to the law of Agency.

But without extending the argument, two or three illustrations may serve to exemplify the utter absurdity of a construction of the Constitution which should sanction the alleged right of secession.

The judicial department is rightfully divided into circuits and districts, embracing several States in a circuit, and mainly limited by State lines; not because the States have any control of the courts, but because State lines furnish convenient limits for such circuits and districts, except when there is a necessity for districting a State. Suits are instituted from time to time in these courts, questions are tried, verdicts are rendered, judgments entered, and cases are carried from these courts, and also from the State courts in certain cases, to the Supreme Court of the United States, sitting at Washington for the correction of errors. Now suppose a State is allowed to secede at its pleasure, what is the effect? If it may do so rightfully, then the judicial department of the United States holds all its powers, and even its existence, practically, within the limits of any State, at the pleasure of that State; for all its action is arrested at the point of time when the State pleases to secede. The witness on the stand is stopped in the midst of his testimony, on the passage of the act of secession; the juror, who has been sworn to try the case, goes his way without rendering a verdict; appeals are summarily and effectually dismissed, and writs of error quashed, by a nullification of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; the property seized by the marshal upon execution drops from his grasp; he and the district judge are removed from office; the State makes a general jail delivery of United States prisoners within her limits; and the pirate and murderer, under sentence of death, rejoice in a secession pardon. There is no escape from these conclusions.

The power to make treaties is, by the Constitution, vested in the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, who may lawfully, in virtue of that power, enter into stipulations with foreign nations, which can be executed, according to their terms, only within the limits of a particular State. Suppose a treaty with Great Britain, containing a stipulation by which, in consideration of a concession by her of a right

to American citizens to navigate the Thames, her subjects should have a similar right to navigate the Hudson, for a term of years; with various other stipulations relative to matters of high political and commercial interest having a connection with this stipulation, or entered into in consequence of that agreement. It is an entire compact consisting of several parts. That treaty exists at the pleasure of the State of New York, which, although she cannot by any direct act close the navigable waters within her limits, may by an act of secession deprive British subjects of their rights under the treaty, and thus effectually break it, and by the infraction give Great Britain just cause for war,- not against her, for she did not make the compact, and merely exercises her lawful right, but against the United States. If such may be the result, all treaties ought to contain a provision for a peaceable termination of their provisions on the secession of any State.

Not to multiply instances of the superlative folly of such an interpretation of the Constitution, let us make one more supposition. The debt which must be contracted in suppressing the present insurrection is likely to be large; Mississippi would be willing to repudiate her share, and Mr. Jefferson Davis would doubtless justify her in so doing, although she and he have had a large agency in causing it to be contracted. Suppose, instead of such a catastrophe, that all the States except New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island, New Jersey, and Delaware should secede, and thus relieve their people from the obligation of the debt. The States named, remaining loyal and true, and in such case constituting the United States, would have rather a large load to carry, considering their resources and means of payment; but the burden must, by legitimate consequence, fall upon their shoulders, as they could not tax the people of the seceding States, nor very conveniently concentrate their forces so as to compel a contribution. We should ask pardon of the other loyal States for stating this supposition, were it made otherwise than as an effective illustration.

These considerations may be sufficient to show that the Constitution itself, considering it as a fundamental law, can contain no principle of action, nor recognize any principle, or action, by which its full operation, over all parts of the States embraced within the government, may be limited or subverted by State authority. Regarding the Constitution as a law, probably no one can be found, at the present day, to contend for the right of secession.

Let us now consider the argument upon the supposition that the Constitution has the character of a compact between the States.

Our first remark is, that, assuming it to be a compact between the States, with a right of secession attached, the same absurd consequences will follow which have already been suggested. A compact constituting a national judiciary, any circuit or district of which may be cut off in the manner and with the effect which is shown to attend the secession of a State, or one authorizing the formation of a treaty, binding upon all the parties, but which any one of the States can break at pleasure, leaving the responsibility for the breach upon the others, would be a most absurd compact. It is not therefore to be presumed that such a compact exists, but its existence must be proved by indubitable evidence; and we turn to the history preceding and attending the formation of the Constitution, to ascertain whether the States have any sovereign right to break the contract by which they associated themselves together for the purpose of a general government.

The political relations of the people of this country have had a twofold character from the commencement of the Revolution, and even from the early settlement of the Colonies, and there has been no time when any State has been at liberty to act with perfect freedom as a sovereign State. The Colonies were in most instances separate, and independent of each other, managing their local affairs, but all under the general jurisdiction and government of the mother country. They

confederated together for the purposes of the common defence, at first as a council, without articles of agreement, to take into consideration their actual condition, and the differences subsisting between them and Great Britain. The Declaration of Independence shows the union which then existed between them as 66 one people," but still exhibits to some extent this twofold character. It was made, not by separate Colonies, or States, or governments, but by all united, and for all united. This is shown in the introduction, and in the recital of grievances; and the specific declaration with which it closes is that of an entire people. It commences, "When it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another people." The grievances alleged are the common grievances of all. The allegations against the king of Great Britain are, among other things, that "he has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitutions and unacknowledged by our laws." The recital of remonstrances is of the same character. "We have petitioned for redress in the most humble terms; our repeated petitions have been answered only by repeated injury." This form of phraseology, which is found throughout, was not accidental. The declaration was "the unanimous declaration of the thirteen United States," or rather "of the good people of these Colonies"; but it was declared, not that the "United Colonies" are a free and independent nation, but that they are free and independent States, thus recognizing their separate existence, which has never been questioned. They were States, however, which were united, as if one, for the purposes for which Congress was assembled, but with imperfect authority to effect the purposes for which they were thus united.

This lack of authority led to the Articles of Confederation. They were reported in Congress, July 12, 1776, agreed to by the delegates, and proposed for ratification, November 15, 1777; ratified by the delegates of several States, authorized