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bave been guilty of assassination, shall be condemned to five years in irons; and in case of repetition, to ten years likewise in irons.

The second thus conceived:

ART. 44. The accomplices of a crime or offence shall be punished with the like penalty as the principals in said crime or offence, saving in the cases for which the law shall have otherwise provided.

The third provision:

ART. 2. That every attempt at crime which shall have been manifested by outward acts, and followed by beginning to put them into execution, if that has not been suspended, or not failed of its effect only through fortuitous circumstances, or such as were independent of the will of the principal, is regarded as crime and shall be punished by imprisonments, the continuance of which shall be in proportion to the gravity of the case.

The fourth stipulating:

ART. 20, first line, in fine provides, that every individual, of the one sex or the other, who shall be condemned to the punishment of seclusion, shall be employed in prison in labors, the product of which may be in part applied to his benefit, as shall be directed by the government.

Reading whereof having been made in a high voice by the dean:

For all which causes and reasons, the court, after deliberation thereon, condemns the firstnamed Antonio Pelletier, aged forty-three years, captain of vesse! navigating the high seas, merchant, born at Fontainebleau, (France,) residing and domiciled in New York, to the punishment of death for having committed the crime of piracy and of fraudulent taking of property on the high seas and at the Grand Caymans by force of arms, with violence and threats of assassination; condemns him besides to restitution of the merchandise stolen, or the value thereof, estimated at three thousand five hundred and sixty-two piasters twentynine cents specie.

2. Condemns also the accused, John Henry Brown, aged twenty-nine years, seaman by occupation, born at Quimper, (France,) domiciled at Boston; naturalized American.

3. Thomas Collar, aged thirty-five years, seaman, second mate of the bark William, born at Epping, England; naturalized American.

4. Urbain Castaing, aged twenty-seven years, teacher of languages, born at Plaisaunce, (France,) domiciled at Mobile, (United States,) to five years' imprisonment; ordered they be employed in prison at hard labor, and in works whose product can be in part applied to their use, as will be regulated by the government, all three being proved to be accomplices in the crime of attempted piracy, and of slave trading on the coast of Hayti; condemus them, moreover, to costs to the state, allowed the greffier in the sum of twenty-four (gourdes) dollars, and this note including the cost of this judgment and even on the body. And in conformity with the directions of article 10 of the above-written penal code, the court declares confiscate to the benefit of the state the ship William and all her accessories; declaring also confiscation the arms, munitions, projectiles, and utensils, which were found on board or may be found there still, as things which have served and were intended to serve for the commission of crime.

Determining on the two applications for restitution and damage and interest put in by Messrs. Antonio Caño and Juan Cotis.

Considering that the accused, Pelletier, proven and declared guilty of fraudulent abstraction by force of arms, &c., of merchandise, to the damage of Mr. Antonio Caño, and of which, inthe end, he consummated the sale at Port-au-Prince, is not only held to restore the said merchandise, but is liable to reparation of the damages which he has done to Mr. Caño by the abstraction of his goods, and charges of the voyage and the enterprise he had undertaken for the reclaiming of his rights and interests so largely compromised by Pelletier.

Considering that in respect of Mr. Juan Cotis, by the fact of having broken his confidence in him, of having deceived him, and having abandoned him with his wife and child and servant, at a point other than at which he should have landed him, Pelletier did him wrongs and caused him expenses, he is bound to make them good; that on the terms of articles 116, folio 1169, of the civil code, "any aid soever of a man which damages another is binding on him, by whose fault it was done, to repair it."

For these reasons the court, after deliberation, condemns the said Antonio Pelletier to pay one thousand piasters, under the title of indemnity, in favor of Mr. Antonio Caño, and to three thousand piasters damages and interest in favor of Mr. Juan Cotis for the wrong and injury done to the latter, the whole of dean greffier, together in conformity with the provisions of article 36 of the penal code, and this for the reasons above set forth.

Given by us, Cherimon Cheri, judge discharging the functions of dean of the criminal court, Brutus Alexander Gillot, judge; Durant Mégé, puisne judge, aided by Citizen J. M. Duvet, greffier, in presence of Citizen J. J. Lilavis, substitute for government commissioner at the public academy, the thirtieth of August, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one, and 50th independence.

All marshals are ordered by this requisition to carry this present judgment into execution at the offices of the public department, to aid the civil courts and give strong support to all commanders and other officers of the public force, and lend a strong hand when it shall be required lawfully.

In faith whereof the minute of said judgment has been signed by the judge, the puisne judge and greffier.

C. CHEVI.

B. ALEX. GILLOT.

D. M. MEGE.

J. M. DURANT, Greffier.

For the purposes intended.
Compared:

J. M. DURANT, Greffier.

Mr. Pelletier to Mr. Seward.

PROVIDENCE HOSPITAL,

Washington, July 30, 1864

SIR: Herewith I enclose, to be filed in the department, as evidence in my

case

Aa.-Official copy of the record of my trial, conviction, and sentence in the criminal court of Port-au-Prince.

Bb.-Official copy of the record of proceedings in the court of cassation on the hearing of my appeal.

I wish to call attention to the total absence in the record of my trial, which contains the evidence in full, of any appearance of proof, by the oath of any witness, of any criminal act.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,

A. PELLETIER.

Secretary of State.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

In the matter of the memorial of Antonio Pelletier.

1. I am directed to present

A review of the judicial proceedings in my case, showing the grounds upon which I claim that those proceedings were irregular or illegal under the laws of Hayti, for want of jurisdiction or other cause.

A brief recapitulation of the judicial proceedings represents preliminary examination; inquiry by commission as to Haytien jurisdiction in my case, which resulted in an order for my discharge; trial, on which I was discharged; appeal and proceedings in court of cassation; second trial and pretended conviction and sentence; appeal and proceedings thereon, in court of cassation; sentence at Cape Haytien, in pursuance of order of court of cassation; appeal from said last-mentioned sentence, and proceedings on said appeal.

The irregularities and illegalities in these several proceedings are manifold. But chief of all, and what, it would appear, ought to preclude the necessity or use of any further inquiry or discussion, is the overshadowing fact that the foundation charge upon which all their proceedings, and the whole fabric of their injustice, rest, was fictitious and false, the accusation being made and prosecuted while the Haytien government had in its own hands the fullest proof of my innocence. The proofs of this are ample and indisputable, and are fully before the Department of State.

I was charged with piracy committed upon Juan Cortez, in violently and forcibly taking his property from him on the high seas, or at Grand Caymans, and consummating the offence by selling the property in Hayti.

The proofs in the case show that the Haytien government has in its posses

sion the fullest evidence that I was innocent of the offence, and that no such

offence had been committed by any one. The proofs also show in the fullest manner the entire transaction with Cortez, by which I received a transfer of his property on my ship, and that the Haytiens had full information of all the par

ticulars thereof.

It seems absurd, as it is fruitless, to discuss the regularity and legality of judicial proceedings on a trial for an offence known to be fictitious. It is belittling the Department of State to a commission to supervise the proceedings of a moot court. The bald fact stands prominent that a criminal charge was fabricated, a pretended trial enacted, and a sentence pronounced and executed, whereby I was despoiled of my property and subjected to a horrible imprison

ment.

No word of denial can be interposed to this proposition. Why, then, should I not have immediate reparation? Why should not my property be restored to me, and satisfaction rendered for the sufferings and injuries I have been personally subjected to? Why should I be compelled to await the result of inquiries into the regularity or legality of judicial proceedings which are already known to have been baseless? Why should the Department of State permit itself to be trifled with, in discussing legal technicalities about a state of facts known never to have existed?

But to comply with the direction quoted in the beginning of this paper, I proceed to state the exceptions taken by my counsel on the trial, which are believed to be valid :

1. Violation of the 24th article of the code of criminal instruction, and of the sacred right of defence, in which this article enacts that a copy of the verbal proceedings should state the offence, and that the written declarations of the witnesses should be delivered gratuitously to the accused, or to his counsel. Now, in spite of the reiterated demands of the appellants verbally, as also by request to the chief judge of the criminal court, and by motion at the bar, the said copies were arbitrarily refused, the chief judge confining himself to an offer of said papers during the session of the court.

2. Violation of article 200, same code, and of the sacred right of defence, in which Thomas Collar and John H. Brown, having been provided with counsel, who could not assist them, Mr. Laveaux, in the interest of the law, remarked to the court that the accused were partners in the crime, and on his motion Messrs. Clavier and Guigeron took up the case; but on the next session of the court the accused declared that they had chosen for their counsel Messrs. Linstant, Radine, and Laveaux, in place and stead of the counsel which had been assigned them by the court. This choice of new counsel was equivalent to the revocation of Messrs. Clavier and Guigeron, as this new choice had been made in their presence. Messrs. Laveaux and Radine remained the only counsel for the accused. Subsequently, these last-named counsel were forced to abandon the case, and the accused, not having been provided with new counsel, the result was that they were condemned without defence.

3. Violation of article 199 and 202, of the same code, and violation of the sacred right of defence, in which the chief judge, or his substitute, in examining the aforesaid Thomas Collar, who is ignorant of the French language, and in bringing to his notice and making the admonition prescribed by the law, article 201 and 203, was not assisted by an interpreter; consequently the aforesaid Thomas Collar must be considered as not having received the admonition prescribed in article 203.

4. Violation of the rule of competency, and violation of the power vested in the private counsel of judges, who are only a court to examine if the indications were sufficient to send them before the criminal court, and not to declare if the facts imputed to the accused were true, which they assumed to do.

5. The government attorney having required, and the chief judge of the crim

inal court having caused to be read several depositions of witnesses not present in court, these depositions should have been translated by the interpreter. Furthermore, the chief judge having declared the pleading closed, the summing up was made likewise, without furnishing a translation to the accused, Thomas Collar.

6. Martial law having been declared by the President of Hayti, on the 10th July of that year, the national guard were by this fact mobilized; said martial law existing even until now in full force, it is prohibited by article 216 that a jury should be composed of military men. This jury was consequently null and void, as the citizens composing it were soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and officers of the mobilized national guard, and the mobilization of the national guard caused the citizens who composed the jury to cease to be citizens, and they in fact were military men.

7. Violation of article 265 of the code of criminal instruction, in which the necessary interpreter to assist the accused Thomas Collar, who does not understand the French language, did not take the necessary oath required to make his acts valid according to said article, the fact of being a public interpreter not dispensing with the necessity of taking a new oath in present case.

8. Violation of article 304 of the code of criminal instruction, in which it is prohibited to mention the answers of the accused, and the contents of the depositions of witnesses not present, notwithstanding which the proceedings of the criminal court show that not only the answers of the accused, but likewise the depositions of absent witnesses, were admitted.

9. False interpretation and false application of articles 5 and 6 of the code of criminal instruction, which are irrelevant to the matter. Pelletier and his associates were not accused of counterfeiting national money having circulation, nor of national bonds, nor of crime against the security of the state.

10. Excess of power, false interpretation, and false application of article 3 of the law of 8th April, 1815, and of article 210, 20, 44, 324, 326, of the penal code, and violation of the rule of competence, as in effect it appears by the observations of Daunies, by which the law of 1st November, 1814, was abrogated; that the Senate of 1815 had only in view to define local piracy of the country; that is, piracy committed by Haytiens, so that any foreigner accused of piracy is, after the instruction of his process, remitted into the hands of the representatives of the country to which he belongs, to be there judged. There is no exception to this rule, only in case that piracy was accompanied by murder. It was so decided by the court of appeals, by its decree of 23d May, 1821. Piracy is a compound crime, composed of different facts and elements. The pretended theft with force of arms, menaces, and violence committed in open sea on board the William, constitute in the present case the fact of piracy; consequently one would not be able to detach this pretended theft with force of arms, with its circumstances, and apply to it article 326 of the penal code, and to make piracy a simple offence, punishable by article 3, of title 2, of the law of 1815. 11. Further violation of the rule of competency, abuse of power, and violation of article 5 of the law of 1815, and article 4 of the law of 19th November, 1829, in which piracy and slave traffic are governed by special laws, which prohibit postively the trial of foreigners accused of slave traffic and piracy, unaccompa nied by murder; therefore in this present case it was not necessary to know or question if Pelletier and associates were to be sent before another court, he not being amenable to any Haytien court, having not committed murder. Neither was it lawful to inquire what punishment was applicable to his case. The incompetence of the Haytien court is therefore radical and absolute, and as such it should have been presented, and it was the duty of the tribunal to officially declare incompetency.

12. Abuse of power in the fact that the theft, with violence and threats, attributed to Pelletier, a foreigner, by Cortez, another foreigner, if true, would

have been committed in the public domain of the open sea. Therefore this fact escapes the Haytien jurisdiction, and in taking cognizance of this case she has usurped a foreign jurisdiction, and committed an abuse of power susceptible of placing in danger the security of the state. It results from the instruction of the process that the pretended attempts of piracy and slave traffic, of which Pelletier and his associates are accused, were committed at Fort Liberty; that is to say, after the departure of the William from Port-au-Prince, therefore more than five months after the pretended theft with force of arms. Thus it follows that there was not the least connection between the case that Cortez accomplished and achieved in Grand Caymans, a dependency of Great Britain, and the pretended attempts at piracy and slave traffic at Fort Liberty.

13. Excess of power, and violation of the sacred right of defence, when the judge of instruction, in causing himself to be assisted in the examination of Thomas Collar by an interpreter, did not cause the said interpreter to take the usual oath. The omission of taking the oath is equivalent to the total absence of the interpreter, and Thomas Collar appears to have been tried and condemned without having had a hearing.

Objections to the judgment officially presented by Andre Germain, government attorney, attached to the court of appeals:

1. Violation of article 257 of the code of criminal instruction, in which the verbal process of the council of judges does not show that the jury had been notified of the character of the informer.

2. Violation of articles 269 and 270 of the code of criminal instruction, in which piracy being a complex crime, the chief judge should have put the questions which constitute the crime of piracy.

3. Violation of article 2 of the penal code, in which the attempt of the crime of piracy is composed of two elements, the two questions relative to these two elements should have been put to the jury.

4. And last, abuse of power of the chief judge of the criminal court, resulting from article 251 of the code of criminal instruction, where a witness, summoned and present, was permitted to testify without taking the oath.

The following Haytien statutes are referred to by Mr. Lewis, United States commercial agent, in his protest of 17th August, 1861, filed in the Department of State, and are believed to be conclusive as to the incompetency of the Haytien courts to try Pelletier and his associates for the crimes with which they were charged. (Laws of Hayti, law of 24 August, 1808, vit. 1, article 5. Law of Hayti, law of 8th April, 1815, vit. 2, article 5.)

These statutes provide that foreigners accused of piracy and slave traffic, in the manner in which Pelletier and associates were accused, shall be remitted to their own government for trial.

In the same protest of Mr. Lewis is set forth a violation of Haytien laws, (article 211 of the criminal code,) which required the papers abstracted from me, and which were necessary to my defence, or copies thereof, to be delivered to me. An illegal proceeding of the court of cassation, and which is claimed to invalidate their decree, is the alteration of the verdict of the jury by striking out the words "by force of arms and threats of assassination."

The statutes of Hayti require that in case of an appeal from a criminal sentence, when the appellant is deprived of his liberty, every business shall be put aside, and such appeal shall be decided within thirty days, yet in my case nearly two months elapsed before the decision of the first appeal, and ten months before the decision of the second.

It is claimed by my counsel, Baudeauf, in his exceptions to the sentence passed upon me at Cape Haytien, that the court of cassation exceeded its power (which extends only to reviewing and affirming or reversing a judgment of an inferior court) in ordering what judgment should be given against me, and this by a different court from the one which tried me, and without submitting the H. Ex. Doc. 260-7

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