delusive guise of promoting the interest of the country, the great mass of our population, the consumers, will be made to pay annually to the manufacturers double the amount that they pay for the support of the federal government. This would be unjust, oppressive, and utterly inconsistent with the spirit and genius of a free government. It not only involves the principles of an odious monopoly, but, most distinctly, that of favored classes. If the truth were presented without disguise, every sentiment of justice would rise in rebellion against it. Suppose, then, that the proposition were to raise, by direct taxes, an annual bounty of some twenty-five or thirty millions of dollars, for the encouragement of manufactures? This would be doing directly, and perhaps in the least injurious mode, as smuggling would be thereby avoided, what the advocates of the manufacturing interest wish to accomplish indirectly. Yet, we ask, would any man have the hardihood to propose the raising of such a bounty, by taxation? No, most assuredly. We reflect, with pride and pleasure, upon the character which our state has sustained in the Union. Her representatives in Congress have invariably risen above sectional views, and regarded, alone, the general interests of the nation. One of those representatives, in particular, the present Secretary of War, and, we believe, another, Mr. Lowndes, were decided advocates of the tariff formed soon after the war, which gave to the manufacturers a liberal protection. We did not disapprove of this liberal course, because, in the extent to which it was then carried, it had a national object; increasing the defensive power of the country in time of war. But, when we are called upon to pay a most onerous tax, with no view to national defence, for this is not pretended by its candid advocates, but merely to take some millions annually from the pockets of the agriculturists and merchants, to give, as a bounty, to the manufacturers, we disdain the idea of being the dupes of such a policy, In fact, the only legitimate object of protecting manufactures, by duties on importation, is, not to increase the national wealth, but to provide for its defence, at the expense of its wealth.

We believe it is generally conceded, that the proposed measure will render necessary a resort to direct taxation. This is a strong objection to it. If we had the consolation to reflect that the impost laid on us, for the benefit of the manufacturer, would go into the national treasury, we should have no great ground of complaint, peculiar to the agricultural interest. But, when we are told that the mode of raising tax by impost is "a rotten system," and that the sooner we get rid of it the better, we must be excused for saying there is more of paradoxical quaintness, than of statesman-like wisdom, in the assertion. It is, no doubt, true, that, as a nation grows old, the dis tribution of its capital will change of itself; and the quantity of imported articles will be so diminished that an adequate revenue cannot be raised by impost duties. But does it follow that, because such an event must take place, in the natural course of things, we ought, therefore, to hasten its approach by an unnatural stimulus? As well might it be argued that we ought to hasten the approach of old age, by the

action of exhausting stimulants, because old age will certainly come, if death do not intervene.

The advocates of the manufacturing system appeal to the wealth and power of Great Britain, as a conclusive argument in favor of their favorite policy. Now, we protest against this mode of reasoning, as unphilosophical and delusive. It would equally prove many other positions, to which no American would assent. Let us throw the argument into logical form, and we shall more distinctly perceive the consequences to which it will lead. Great Britain sustains her manufactures by protecting duties and bounties; she is wealthy and powerful; therefore, all nations that wish to be wealthy and powerful, ought to force up manufactures by protecting duties and bounties. This is a fair and candid statement of the argument, as used. For, no attempt has been made to trace any peculiar connection between the wealth and power of Great Britain, and her manufacturing system, other than appears from the naked facts, that she does protect manufactures by duties and monopolies, and is wealthy and powerful. Now, to give the same argument a different application, Great Britain has a hereditary monarch, a corrupt parliament, rotten boroughs, and a body of hereditary nobility; she is wealthy and powerful; therefore, all nations that wish to be wealthy and powerful, ought to have a hereditary monarch, a corrupt parliament, rotten boroughs, and a body of hereditary nobility. Nay, further: the inhabitants of Great Britain are fond of roast beef, and commit suicide; Great Britain is wealthy and powerful; therefore, the people of all nations that wish to be wealthy and powerful, ought to be fond of roast beef, and to commit suicide. Such are the absurdities to which we are led by a course of reasoning, which places, in the relation of cause and effect, circumstances which are accidentally associated. The fact is, the situation of Great Britain is the very reverse of that of the United States, in all the particulars which constitute an aptitude for domestic manufactures. Great Britain is a small island, filled up with inhabitants. She must either keep up her manufacturing system, by legal regulations, or her citizens will seek their fortunes in more favored climes. This, we venture to assert, is the foundation of British policy in relation to manufactures. It is a policy founded in national pride. The proudest and dearest associations of Englishmen are connected with the island. It is the theatre of their victories over despotism, the tomb of their kings, their heroes, and their fathers. Under the influence of sentiments, which we do not disapprove, the statesmen of that country resolved that "old England" should be the seat of a mighty power, and that a system should be devised which would furnish employment for the increasing and crowded mass of population. It is by this system that they have moored to their shores the greatest naval power in the world. The effect of such a system in the United States would be the very reverse of all this. Her navy would be destroyed; for no man is so wild as to suppose we could manufacture articles for exportation, to any considerable extent. There would be no nursery for seamen,

In examining the motives of England for promoting domestic manufactures, we have fallen, we think, upon one powerful motive which operates in the eastern states in favor of the same policy. It is natural for old states, which have once been the seat of power, to repine at the departure of their strength. As much so, as for an old maid to weep over the withered flowers of her youth, and the departed days of her ascendency. The old states, therefore, behold with chagrin and mortification, the tide of their population flowing to the south and west, to fertilize the wilderness! Though this feeling may be natural, it is neither national nor just, in the policy which it dictates. Is it national to endeavor to prevent the diffusion of our population, which will do away sectional distinctions? Is it just that the whole nation should pay a bounty to the old states to enable them to retain their citizens at home? Is it just that the citizens of the new states should contribute their full share of this bounty, to check the progress of emigration and the rise in the value of their lands, which would be the necessary result? The justice of such a policy is so sublimated as to rise above the atmosphere of our humble comprehension. But it is said that we ought to protect home manufactures in opposition to foreign; and some have been so uncandid or dull, as to inculcate the idea that all the industry which shall be thrown into the channel of manufactures will be so much clear gain to the labor and wealth of the nation. Now this is ridiculous jargon, if there is any truth in the views already presented. If we have ten millions of inhabitants, rearing the products of agriculture at an annual profit of fifteen per cent. to exchange for the manufactured articles of Great Britain, fabricated at a profit of five per cent. we should be happy to know if Great Britain does not support as much of our industry as we do of hers, and that too of a much more profitable kind? And while our citizens continue to prosper, in a degree quite beyond a parallel in history, is it not strange that we should complain of the commercial connection upon which that prosperity principally depends? The question, therefore, is not, whether we will prefer home to foreign industry, but whether we will prefer, by unjust restrictions, a home industry that is less profitable, to one that is more so! We hope, therefore, that no further efforts will be made to make the sacred associa tions of "home" auxiliary to a policy calculated to diminish the happiness of that home.

That large manufacturing establishments, by throwing dependent multitudes under the control of large capitalists, would impair the purity of elections, cannot be questioned. Neither can it be denied that manufacturing labor is unfavorable to that strength and elasticity of body, upon which the defence of the country depends. It is no answer to these objections to say, that Providence would not be so unjust as to make those pursuits which nations must follow, sooner or later, incompatible with freedom; for, it will be generally found that when Providence rears up the pursuit, He also provides the remedy for its attendant evils. It is only when the miserable quackery of man anticipates Providence, and forces up premature existences, that

the evil is felt in its full force, unmitigated and uncompensated by any accompanying circumstance.

We will close this remonstrance with one more view of this im. portant subject, showing the extreme caution and deliberation with which Congress ought to act. A false step taken in this system of protections can never be retraced. This will appear from an obvious application of an established maxim of political economy. However high you may raise the duties upon foreign articles, the effect of competition will be to reduce the profits of the manufacturer to the level of the profits of other kinds of industry. When a large manufacturing interest, therefore, shall have grown up under the faith of high protection, and can but barely sustain itself with the aid of the protection, it would be absolute ruin of that great interest to withdraw a protecting duty of some fifty per cent. and suddenly reduce, in a corresponding degree, the value of the whole mass of invested manufacturing capital. The government that would hazard such a measure ought to have a military force to suppress insurrection. We sincerely hope, therefore, that your honorable body will yield to the united calls of justice and sound policy, and abstain from a course of measures not consistent with either.

PETITION OF SETH WEED.

NOVEMBER 27, 1820.

Committed to a committee of the whole House to-morrow.

To the honorable Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled:

The petition of Seth Weed, of Stamford, in the state of Connecticut,

HUMBLY SHEWETH:

That, during the revolutionary war, and in the service of his country, he received a wound by a musket ball in his left leg, in consequence of which, he has been ever since in some degree lame and unable to prosecute business; that he has been placed on the pension list, at the rate of eighty-one dollars and sixty cents a year; that he is now far advanced in life; that his leg, in consequence of said wound, is much ulcerated, and he much debilitated; and now wholly unable to perform manual labor, and incapable of doing any service by which he can support himself; and that the sum now allowed him is altogether insufficient for that purpose. Your petitioner therefore prays your honors to take his case into consideration, and make him such further allowance, by adding to his pension, as you, in your wisdom, judge proper, and your petitioner, as in duty bound, will ever pray. SETH WEED.

Stamford, June 25, 1818.

To Samuel Webb and John Augur, both of Stamford, in the county of Fairfield, in the district of Connecticut, two reputable physicians and

surgeons:

I, Pierpont Edwards, district judge of the district of Connecticut, do authorize and commission you, the said Webb and Augur, to examine Seth Weed, of said Stamford, a person, who is now on the pension list of the United States, late a lieutenant in the revolutionary army of the said United States, and who is desirous of obtaining an increase of his pension, as to the nature of the disability of the said Weed, and in what degree it prevents him from obtaining a subsistence by manual labor; and you are to report your opinion in writing,