OF THE DEBATES OF CONGRESS, FROM 1789 TO 1856. FROM GALES AND SEATON'S ANNALS OF CONGRESS; FROM THEIR REPORTED DEBATES, BY JOHN C. RIVES. BY THE AUTHOR OF THE THIRTY YEARS' VIEW. VOL. IX. NEW YORK: D. APPLETON & COMPANY, 346 & 348 BROADWAY. 1858. ENTERED according to Act of Congress, in the year 1856, by D. APPLETON AND COMPANY, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court for the Southern District of New York. NINETEENTH CONGRESS.-FIRST SESSION PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. CONTINUED FROM VOL. VIII. MONDAY, March 13, 1826. Amendment of the Constitution. The House, on motion of Mr. McDurFIE, resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, Mr. McLANE, of Delaware, in the chair, on the resolutions for the amendment of the constitution. Mr. BRYAN addressed the committee as lows: Mr. Chairman: I regret that, to the other disadvantages under which I labor in addressing the committee in this stage of the debate, that of bodily indisposition should be added; but as I have the privilege of the floor to-day, I am determined to exercise it. column to promote party views or individual aggrandizement, I should deem myself an imitator-yes, sir, a humble imitator of the wretch who applied the torch of destruction to the Ephesian temple to gain an execrable immortality. It would be a vain regret, sir, to express my sorrow, that I cannot spread before the comfol-mittee the rich classical repast with which they have been so sumptuously regaled by the honorable gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. EVERETT.) It has not been my lot, like him, to breathe the inspiring zephyrs of the land of Homer; I have not had my imagination fired, and my heart exhilarated and ennobled by treading the plains of Marathon and Platea; I have not mused amid the ruins of Athens, and gathered lessons of political wisdom from the silent, but impressive memorials of her departed greatness; nor has fair science, "rich with the spoils of time," unfolded to me those secret treasures which she could not conceal from that honorable gentleman. I am not desirous to impose upon this committee a general essay upon the constitution; but I confess, sir, I am solicitous to explain the reasons of my vote, and willing to assume all the just responsibilities of my station. In doing this, as briefly as I can, I may be permitted to regret my political inexperience, and want of constitutional learning; but, sir, I de- I come not here, sir, from the Lyceum or the rive some consolation from the belief, that, if I Portico; I come, sir, from the court-yards and am inexperienced, I am also unprejudiced. I cotton-fields of North Carolina; and I come, have not been reared at the feet of any politi- sir, to proclaim the wishes and assert the rights cal Gamaliel; my opinions of men and meas- of the people I have the honor to represent. ures, erroneous though they may be, are my My life, sir, has been spent among the people own; they have not been assumed by compact, of my native State; the most valued part of and therefore, sir, I feel myself at liberty to my political information has been derived from correct and amend them as experience may dic-association and converse with my fellow-cititate. Upon the subject of this constitutional reformation, I have earnestly endeavored to discover the true meaning and spirit of the constitution, and am sincerely desirous to carry these into full and complete effect. God forbid that I should ever be so weak or so wicked as to displace one stone of this hallowed temple In endeavoring to reply to the argument of where liberty delights to dwell, for any other the honorable gentleman from Massachusetts, purpose than to secure her permanent abode. I hope he will do me the justice to believe that I most solemnly assure the committee, that, if I could be impelled by other motives-more especially, sir, if I should attempt to unfix a zens. I know their wants, and I feel them too; I know, sir, that they wish to participate in the election of the Chief Magistrate of this Union, and that they are dissatisfied with the present mode of expressing their voice-if expression it may be called. I do so in a spirit of kindness and respect. I should do violence to my own feelings were I to act otherwise; for, although I differ from H. OF R.] Amendment of the Constitution. [MARCH, 1826. him materially on some points, yet, when I can | from the fathers of the revolution, and the agree with him, I do so with lively satisfaction. framers of this constitution, and the States who He has told us, sir, that it would be unconstitu- adopted it. The powers of this executive chief tional to make these amendments. Unconsti- excited very lively apprehensions in the bosoms tutional! sir. This assertion is certainly con- of some of the purest and wisest of our foretradictory to experience-to the constitution fathers. Some thought they had an "awful itself; and the argument seems to move in a squinting" at monarchy-they imagined that circle. We know, sir, that amendments have they could discern "the diadem sparkling on been made; that one of these, the amendment his brow, and the imperial purple flowing in of 1804, by confining the choice of the States, his train.' And how, sir, did the advocates of when the election devolves upon the House of the constitution endeavor to lull these appreRepresentatives, to three, instead of the five hensions? Not, sir, as that honorable gentlehighest on the list of those voted for by the man has done, by endeavoring to persuade the electors, has made a material change; it im- people that his powers were not great; but paired too, sir, a federative power, and in- that they were necessary to give proper consistcreased a popular one. Suppose, sir, that it ency and strength to the system-that he was should be necessary to vest in the General Gov- properly checked by the other departmentsernment powers which an emergency might that he was elected for short periods, and liable render essential for the preservation of the Un-to impeachment-but, above all, that he was ion. Cases might occur which I do not even dependent upon the people. Let us examine, wish to imagine. Must these powers be usurped sir, a few of his constitutional attributes. He at the hazard of revolution and bloodshed? is the representative of his country, among the Must we sit here like the Roman Senate-qui- nations of the earth. He originates treaties, etly fold our arms, and await our destruction and, with the advice of the Senate, confirms with dignity? or must we not rather apply for them; and they are the supreme law of the these powers in the mode prescribed by the land. It is his prerogative to receive ambassaconstitution? Our ancestors well knew that dors, and with the advice of the Senate, to send they could not pierce the veil of futurity, and them. He is Commander-in-Chief of the Army provide for events beyond the ken of mortal and Navy of the United States. His qualified wisdom. They provided a remedy, sir, for evils veto gives him an important agency in legislawhich might be disclosed by experience and tion itself. He can elevate to offices of the practice; and they provided a security against greatest dignity and emolument. His patronage amendments proposed from "light and tran- embraces the distribution of millions. He opesient causes" by the mode in which alone they rates upon the hopes and fears of thousands. can be effected. The honorable gentleman from Although he has not the constitutional power Massachusetts has sought to draw an argument of making war, yet by means of his other powin support of his position from the proviso of ers he can at any time place his country in a belthe fifth article of the constitution, "that no ligerent state. Suppose he should refuse to reamendment which may be made prior to the ceive the British or French ambassador, or send year 1808, shall in any manner affect the first him home with contumely and insult. Suppose, and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the under the act for the suppression of the slave first article; and that no State, without its con- trade, he should order our cruisers to capture sent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in vessels in the Mediterranean, or upon some unthe Senate." Now, sir, to my mind, this clause, founded suspicions. Indeed, sir, many cases so far from helping his argument, militates might be supposed, when, by an undue exercise most strongly against it; it indicates, to my of a constitutional power, he might draw upon understanding, that this special exception was us the anger of a foreign nation. But, says necessary to exempt from amendment, for a the honorable gentleman from Massachusetts, limited time, the first and fourth clauses men- the King of Great Britain can elevate to the tioned in it, and to confine any amendment of peerage the humblest individual, and ennoble the federative feature in the Senate, which should him and his posterity. Indeed, sir, he seemed deprive a State of its equal right, to the special to describe the dazzling honors of a coronet case of the States consenting to it. I should, with so much rapture, that those who did not therefore, sir, most strongly infer, according to know him might have suspected that, during a very old and sound rule of construction, that his residence abroad, he had conceived an affecthe power of amendment in other cases, was to tion for what Chatham could not refuse. be inferred. Self-preservation is the primary law of societies, as well as of individuals, and, if necessary, we must act upon it. Before I dismiss this brief examination, sir, lest I should be mistaken, I will take the liberty to say, that, although I believe the powers of the President to be great, yet I believe them to be necessary for the safety of the Republic. What the jealous statesmen of the rev The honorable gentleman from Massachusetts seems to think that the powers of the President have been greatly magnified by my honorable friend from South Carolina, (Mr. Mc-olution, with Washington at their head, have DUFFIE) he deems them very limited, and not the proper object of much jealousy. I can assure him, sir, that he thinks very differently given, I will not presume to impair. The stress or intent of my argument, sir, is to show, that the greater power, the greater necessity that MARCH, 1826.] Amendment of the Constitution. [H. OF R. the due dependency on the people should be | State may be entitled in Congress," &c. It preserved. then proceeds to direct that they shall meet in their respective States, and ballot for President and Vice President, and point out the mode of conducting the election by the Electoral Colleges. It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that the constitution here, by the word "State," means the Commonwealth-the political society-the people, or at least that portion of them who exercise the elective franchise; and therefore, that, whenever the State Legislatures have exercised the power of appointing the electors, instead of simply directing the mode in which the State should appoint them, they have violated the rights of the people. It would have been very easy, if the power was intended to be given to the Legislatures, to have used expressions plain I will admit, sir, that, before any amendment is adopted, its adaptation to the genius and spirit of the Government ought to be satisfactorily ascertained; for it is obvious that maxims and political reasons, which would justly be entitled to great weight when applied to a consolidated Government, one and indivisible, such as Britain, or any of the ancient Republics, would be inapplicable to a Government compounded as ours is, of national and federative features. They too often serve to create false analogies, and lead us astray from the true points of inquiry. The checks and balances of the British Constitution are contrived and intended to protect and preserve the King, Lords, and Commons, who are all integral parts of the same State-different classes of the same political so-ly indicative of such an intent—and the inferciety. The checks and balances of our constitution are intended to protect the Union, the States, and the people. The States, according to the theory of our constitution, are independent members of a Confederacy, and are, themselves, in many respects, sovereign. We must, therefore, always keep in our mind's eye, this leading and animating principle, when we sit in judgment upon this great work of our fathers. In all human affairs, "self-love, the spring of action, moves the soul." This principle is ever active and vigilant, and may be relied upon as a faithful sentinel for its own preservation. ence that they would have done so, is rendered to my mind irresistible, by recurring to the first clause of the third section, which prescribes the mode of electing Senators. The expression there is, "The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof," &c. But the honorable gentleman from Virginia, the second from that State who spoke in this debate, (Mr. STEVENSON,) contends, and his argument is supported by the honorable gentleman who immediately preceded me, (Mr. EVERETT,) that it is not only constitutional for the Legislatures to exercise this power of appointing the The framers of the constitution well knew electors, but that it was even expected they that the States were the best guardians of State would do so. Sir, I do most conscientiously rights the people of popular rights; it was differ from these gentlemen, and I will endeaonly necessary, therefore, to give them, respec- vor, by the indulgence of the committee, to show tively, in this form of government, adequate that, if the contemporary exposition of this part power, and their self-love and interest might be of the constitution, by its advocates, is to be relied upon, for their exercise and preserva- relied upon, that it was not so understood and tion: if this could be done, and the political explained. If Hamilton and Madison, commachine which was to be moved by these pow-bined, and agreeing upon this point, are entiers so adjusted, that they should have a harmonious and salutary action, the grand object of all government was attained-they had then a self-creating political movement, whose object was the happiness of the governed. It would be collateral, Mr. Chairman, to the present inquiry, and would also be presumptuous in me to attempt to point out to the committee the many indications of these mixed principles. The subject before us regards solely the constitution of the President and Vice President. Was it to be supposed that they should lose sight of these controlling principles in the mode of appointing this great officer-the Executive Chief of the confederated Republic-whose constitutional action was to have so important, so pervading an influence in the character of the Government-the policy and the destiny of the nation? No, sir, it was not to be expected, nor has it so occurred. The constitution declares that "each State shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the tled to credit, it was intended that the people |
